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Errors during radiotherapy treatment can cause severe, and potentially fatal, patient 
harm. The final check immediately prior to treatment delivery, whereby two 
radiographers ensure that the dose about to be delivered corresponds with the 
prescription, is the last defence against error. The aim of this research was to increase 
understanding of this final treatment check and factors affecting error detection, in 
order to improve the safety of radiotherapy treatment delivery.  
The research adopted a mixed methods approach, combining qualitative and 
experimental studies to investigate the interaction of factors affecting accuracy during 
the final treatment checks.  The qualitative interviews and task analysis pointed to 
difficulties maintaining attention and variation in how these checks are conducted. The 
interface used to conduct the final treatment check was also recognised to have 
usability issues.   
The laboratory-based experimental studies results indicated that a structured form of 
double checking, called challenge-response, is most effective at error detection, when 
compared to single or unstructured double checking. Furthermore, it was found that 
alternating the roles of challenger and responder, and the order parameters are 
checked in, significantly increases accuracy during repeated treatment checks.  
 
The original contribution of this research was a detailed investigation of a previously 
understudied aspect of radiotherapy treatment. The results informed the design of an 
original, evidence and theoretical based two-person checking protocol for use during 
the final treatment check.  Qualitative evaluation indicates that it would be well 
received as a standardised method of treatment checking. Furthermore, an alternative 
interface design has been proposed, specifically for use during the final treatment 
check. This was comparatively tested against the most frequently used software 
package within the UK and found to have a significant positive impact upon user’s 
VI 
  
accuracy. An additional output is a series of practice based recommendations to 
improve accuracy during repeated treatment checking. 
 
This research has concluded that implementation of the practice recommendations, 
checking protocol and interface design should help maintain radiographers’ attention 
during repeated final treatment checks, thereby preventing errors passing undetected. 
Future research into the radiotherapy interface design and implementation of the 
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In healthcare, this refers to an unintended or unexpected 




Focussed awareness on available perceptual information. 
Beam 
 
The delivery of the radiotherapy treatment dose. 
Beam modification Accessories placed in the way of the radiotherapy beam to 





A verbalised, structured form of double checking conducted 
by two people. One person acts as the challenger and reads 
values aloud, the other acts as the responder and verbally 
confirms if the value is correct or not. Often used in aviation. 
 
DICOM mode DICOM stands for Digital Imaging and Communications in 
Medicine and is a standard for storing and transmitting 
medical imaging data.  This standard includes specific file 
formats and communications protocols between machines 
which can create or exchange DICOM format files of patient 
image and data. Alongside this, a record and verify system 
will usually be used to manage patient’s treatment 
prescriptions on the linear accelerator machines as an 
additional safeguard. Yet, if there is a technology failure, the 
record and verify systems may be down which is referred to, 
by radiographers, as treating in DICOM mode. In these 
circumstances treatment verification against the source 




Double checking When two people are responsible for conducting a check. 
Often used in healthcare. 
 
Energy One of the parameters prescribed on the patient’s 
radiotherapy prescription. The value represents the amount 




A generic term encompassing all acts which lead  to a 
planned sequence of events not being executed as intended, 
leading to an undesirable outcome or significant potential 
for such an outcome. 
 
Final treatment check 
 
The last confirmation that the radiotherapy dose about to be 
delivered to a patient is correct. It happens immediately 




Part of a patient’s radiotherapy dose. Each patient has a 
radiotherapy prescription dose which consists of many 




The planned process and systematic introduction of new 
intervention, innovations or practice changes of proven 





The phenomena to describe when regularly repeated actions 
are conducted automatically without full attention paid to 




The machine used to deliver the dose of radiation. Often 





A potential error which was spotted and corrected before it 
caused harm to a patient. 
 
Monitor units One of the parameters which make up a patient’s 
radiotherapy prescription. Monitor units are measured by 
ionisation chambers within the treatment head of the linear 
accelerator machine and give a measurement of the 




The details of the radiation dose that it is intended the 





This refers to the processes which occur prior to the patient 
receiving external beam radiation treatment. During this 
process a simulator machine takes X-rays of the body to 
determine the exact location and size of the tumour. 
Calculations are then conducted to determine the optimum 
dose and position to ensure maximum radiation reaches the 
tumour whilst minimising damage to healthy tissue. Ink 
marks may need to be made on the skin to help with 
positioning. This forms the patient’s treatment prescription. 
Calculations and images must be checked for accuracy.  
 
Record & Verify system 
 
A software package installed on the linear accelerator 
machine. A patient’s prescription is entered into the 
programme before treatment starts. Then prior to treatment 
the software then verifies that the correct treatment is 
about to be delivered, based on this initial entry. 
 
Safety critical industries Industries, such as nuclear power and aviation, which 
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 operate in a high risk domain in terms of safety. 
 
Single checking  
 




The process of developing and implementing a set of 
processes or methods to be used in the same way across all 




A method or process which is identical and used the same 
way in all departments. 
 
Switch on The term given to the process of actually giving the radiation 




The healthcare professional responsible for the delivery of 
radiation, and patient care whilst undergoing radiotherapy 
treatment. Referred to as radiographer throughout this 
thesis. 
 





A specific type of radiation beam modification to optimise 









1 Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
Patient safety is a major concern within healthcare. The World Health Organisation (WHO) 
has stated that unsafe care and avoidable errors result in “significant mortality and 
morbidity throughout the world” (World Health Organisation 2008: 3).  In the UK iatrogenic 
harm can result in unnecessary patient harm, death, distress and increased cost to the NHS. 
The discipline has evolved over time and, with the publication of the Francis report in 2013, 
which exposed serious quality and safety concerns in the NHS, there is ever increasing public 
scrutiny on healthcare to improve (Francis 2013).  
 
Radiotherapy is an area of healthcare which has a maturing patient safety culture following 
a series of high profile errors and publication of the Radiotherapy Risk Profile (WHO 2008).  
Approximately 125,000 patients undergo radiotherapy treatment in the UK annually 
(Department of Health 2012). It is estimated that errors, or near misses, occur in 1.9% of 
these treatment courses (Department of Health 2012). These errors may lead to either an 
overdose or an underdose, and may cause severe, and potentially fatal, harm. One 
mechanism put in place to increase safety in radiotherapy are treatment confirmation 
checks. 
 
The radiotherapy treatment process consists of a number of stages. There are many checks 
of a patient’s treatment built into this process, in order to minimise the likelihood of an 
error, or catch an error before it causes harm (Donaldson 2007). The final opportunity to 
detect an error is when two radiographers conduct the final check of a patient’s treatment 
immediately prior to treatment delivery. During this final safety check the treatment dose, 
consisting of several parameters, are displayed on a screen. Radiographers must ensure, and 
confirm, that these values correspond exactly with those that were prescribed for the 
patient, by comparing the values on screen to the patient’s paper prescription. This check is 





Double checking is employed in many other areas of healthcare, such as drug 
administration, to prevent or trap errors before they occur, thereby preventing patient 
harm (Shillito, Arfanis and Smith 2010). There is currently a debate in the literature as to 
whether single or double checking is more effective at preventing errors in healthcare.  
Double checking has been criticised for being ineffective and time consuming (Armitage 
2009). Yet, there is little empirical evidence to support either method of checking with the 
majority of literature consisting of either opinion or retrospective analysis (Alsulami, Conroy 
and Choonara 2012). There has also been no research conducted on double checking in 
radiotherapy specifically. Consequently, there is currently limited evidence to support the 
best method of checking to be used during the final treatment check in radiotherapy. 
 
Of the limited research into radiotherapy treatment checking safety, there is evidence to 
suggest that the final treatment check in radiotherapy is vulnerable to allowing errors to 
pass undetected resulting in potentially severe patient harm (Toft and Mascie-Taylor 2005).  
It has been hypothesised that this may be due to a failure in attention (Toft and Mascie-
Taylor 2005). There are likely to be a number of contributory factors affecting the 
effectiveness of this final safety protocol. Therefore, this thesis will explore the final 
treatment checking process in depth, to analyse the factors underlying effectiveness. With 
this understanding, recommendations surrounding the final treatment checking process can 
be suggested to help ensure that the treatment check traps errors prior to treatment 
delivery, preventing patient harm.  
1.1 Thesis aim and objectives 
The aim of this research is to fully understand the process of the final treatment check 
immediately prior to radiotherapy treatment delivery in order to determine how the 
reliability might be improved to help ensure errors are detected and improve the safety of 
treatment delivery. The specific objectives are to: 
1. Examine and review the checking process immediately prior to beam delivery 
and identify factors affecting the reliability of this process to detect errors 
2. Experimentally test the impact on performance of different approaches to 




3. Specify and design an evidence-based revised checking process for use 
immediately prior to beam delivery 
4. Evaluate the revised process to determine user acceptance 
 
1.2 Thesis content 
The research is informed by a literature review. Literature relating to radiotherapy patient 
safety is presented in chapter 2. Through discussion of error rates in radiotherapy, this 
chapter provides the rationale for the focus on the final treatment check immediately prior 
to beam delivery.   
 
Current understanding of errors in radiotherapy is reviewed in chapter 3. Theoretical 
models of error are applied to radiotherapy, alongside a discussion of the current literature 
on radiotherapy errors. This chapter argues that there is scope for increased understanding 
of checking errors and the final treatment check process.  
 
Chapter 4 reviews the literature relating to double checking in healthcare, and the potential 
theories to explain double checking failure which have been presented to date.  Chapter 4 
concludes with a summary of all the literature review findings indicating that further 
empirical investigation is needed to understand the final treatment check in radiotherapy 
and why it may fail to detect errors.  
 
Chapter 5 presents the methodology of the research contained in this thesis. It presents the 
research philosophy, structure of the thesis, and discusses issues of reliability, validity and 
ethics. 
 
In response to the literature review, chapter 6 presents a task analysis of the final treatment 
checking process to explore the potential factors underlying checking accuracy. This is 
supported by the study presented in chapter 7, which consisted of semi-structured 
interviews with radiographers and student radiographers to understand their perceptions of 
how the final treatment check is conducted and potential reasons why it may not be 





The results of the interviews and task analysis were central in guiding the subsequent 
chapters. The main findings from the interviews suggested that there was variation in how 
the final treatment check was conducted both between and within departments and that a 
standardised protocol for the final treatment check was required and desired amongst 
radiographers. They also pointed to issues with the interface that may increase error. In 
chapter 8 two experimental, laboratory-based studies are described that explored different 
methods of checking to determine the most effective method of maintaining attention 
during repeated final treatment checks. The experimental studies employed a paradigm that 
involved a simulated radiotherapy checking task, designed to mimic the repetitiveness of 
the final treatment check in radiotherapy, albeit in shorter timeframes, see section 8.2. The 
first experimental study, in section 8.3, compared different methods of checking: single (one 
person) checking, unstructured two person checking and a structured form of double 
checking, called challenge-response checking. This was to explore the variation in current 
practice and provide evidence for the most effective method of checking to detect errors. 
The results of the experimental studies suggested that challenge-response checking is most 
effective at error detection, when compared to single or unstructured double checking. 
However, it was found that attention still lapsed during repeated challenge-response 
checking which has the potential for allowing errors to pass undetected. Therefore, the 
second study, in section 8.4, explored methods to maintain attention during repeated 
challenge-response checking. The results suggested that small changes to how the 
challenge-response check is conducted can help to maintain attention. These were regularly 
alternating the roles of challenger and responder, and varying the order parameters are 
checked in. It is thought that this improves attention through introducing variation and 
minimising routine. 
 
In response to the findings in chapter 8, chapter 9 details the design and evaluation of a new 
two person final verbal safety protocol for use immediately prior to beam delivery. The 
verbal checking protocol incorporates the results from the experimental studies described 
above. Qualitative evaluation of this protocol was conducted through semi-structured group 




weaknesses, barriers to use and improvements to be made to the protocol, alongside 
consideration of implementation. 
  
Following feedback from radiographers, chapter 10 considers the impact of the static 
interface used at the point of the final treatment check on error detection. The static 
interface displays the treatment parameters which are about to be delivered to the patient. 
It is these values which are compared against the patient’s original prescription to ensure 
there are no discrepancies, and prevent erroneous treatment delivery. A study was 
undertaken to design and evaluate a proposed static interface to be used specifically for the 
final treatment check. This proposed interface was comparatively tested against the static 
interface from the most frequently used software package within the UK, MOSAIQ, and 
evaluated through semi-structured group interviews with qualified and student 
radiographers. The findings are translated into recommendations concerning future re-
developments of radiotherapy software systems.  
 
Chapter 11 is the concluding chapter. It discusses and draws together the research findings 
surrounding radiotherapy treatment checking safety. Future research directions are 
discussed along with observations surrounding the research process and results arising from 
it. 
1.3 Original contributions of the research 
This research has revealed a paucity of patient safety research specifically in relation to 
radiotherapy treatment checking. The thesis has addressed a very specific area of 
radiotherapy error prevention, the final treatment checking protocols used to ‘trap’ errors 
immediately prior to treatment administration. The approach adopted combines qualitative 
investigation and experimental studies to address the complex interaction of factors 
affecting checking accuracy. The thesis has made the following original contributions: 
1. A detailed understanding of the final treatment checking process in radiotherapy 
and identification and analysis of factors contributing to effectiveness 
2. The design of a unique experimental paradigm designed and employed to mimic 




3. An empirical evidence base to support the validity of challenge-response 
checking in radiotherapy 
4. The development and evaluation of a new evidence and theoretical based verbal 
safety protocol for use immediately prior to treatment delivery in radiotherapy 
5. Recommendations surrounding the design of the radiotherapy interface to 
improve treatment checking accuracy 
6. Practice recommendations to improve detection of errors in patient’s treatment 






2 Chapter 2 – Patient Safety in Radiotherapy 
 
This chapter will introduce the field of patient safety and the concept of adverse events. The 
chapter will then provide an overview of the radiotherapy treatment process and error rates 
within radiotherapy. Through discussion of error rates and patient safety considerations, the 
rationale for the focus of this thesis will be formed.  
2.1 Patient Safety 
Patient safety is the study of, 
 “the avoidance, prevention and amelioration of adverse outcomes or injuries 
stemming from the process of healthcare” (Vincent 2006: 14).  
 
As medicine has become more complex and advanced over the decades, it can also be said 
to have potentially become more risk-prone due to more opportunities for errors potentially 
resulting in iatrogenic harm (Vincent 2010). Patient safety is a multidisciplinary field, 
combining the theory and expertise from psychology, ergonomics, medicine and 
management, to research and prevent potential errors and subsequent patient harm.  
 
Patient safety has always existed within healthcare, previously described within concepts of 
quality of healthcare, prior to the arrival of the term patient safety (Vincent 2010).   Yet 
there is a distinction to be made between quality and safety. Quality refers to the gap 
between what should be done and what is done. Safety refers to the extent to which a 
patient is harmed during contact with healthcare providers or organisations (Vincent 2010). 
Therefore, it is recognised that the two terms are not interchangeable. Patient safety 
became a standalone priority across the world following the publication of key documents 
which highlighted that more needed to be done to prevent patients being harmed by the 
systems designed to improve their health. These key publications are discussed below in 
sections 2.1.1-2.1.6. 
2.1.1 ‘To Err is Human’ 
The publication To Err is Human: Building a Safer Healthcare System was published in the 
United States of America (USA) in 2000 by the Institute of Medicine (Kohn, Corrigan and 




patient safety to the top of healthcare agendas, as well as increasing public awareness 
about it (Vincent 2010). The publication included shocking statistics about the rate of 
iatrogenic harm. For instance it was stated that between 44,000 and 98,000 people die 
annually in USA hospitals as a result of medical errors.  The key message from this 
publication, aside from the extent of iatrogenic harm, was that healthcare was at least 10 
years behind other high-risk industries in terms of attention to, and a proactive approach to 
safety (Kohn, Corrigan and Donaldson 2000). 
2.1.2 ‘An Organisation with a Memory’ 
An Organisation with a Memory was published in 2000 in the UK by the Department of 
Health, and was the British equivalent of To Err is Human. The publication reported that the 
NHS urgently needed to improve care so that patients were not being harmed by the system 
designed to treat them. It was also reported that the NHS did not appear to be learning 
from previous mistakes and errors (Department of Health 2001a).  
2.1.3 ‘Building a Safer NHS’ 
Building a Safer NHS for Patients: Improving Medication Safety was published in the UK by 
the Department of Health in 2001 and detailed the plans for how to implement the 
necessary changes recognised in An Organisation with a Memory. It was noted in the 
publication that prior to 2000 there had been no systematic and focussed study on patient 
safety in the NHS. Poor safety rates in the NHS and the fact that healthcare lagged 
significantly behind other high risk industries such as nuclear power and aviation was 
recognised. It was also reported that efforts to improve safety in the NHS would be a long-
term task requiring effort, commitment and strong leadership from healthcare 
professionals, due to the complex nature of healthcare (Department of Health 2001b) 
2.1.4 Formation of the National Patient Safety Agency 
In 2001 in the UK the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) was formed, partly in response 
to An Organisation with a Memory. This agency was designed to be a central focus point for 
targeting efforts at learning from mistakes and improving patient safety in the NHS. One of 
the outcomes of the formation of the NPSA was the creation of the National Reporting and 
Learning System (NRLS). The NRLS received feedback from, and provided guidance to 




the NPSA, as a result of the NRLS was able to send alerts to all relevant departments in the 
UK when a preventable safety incident was recognised, with the aim of preventing the same 
error occurring twice (National Patient Safety Agency 2014). In 2012 the NPSA was 
disbanded, with the key functions and expertise transferred over to the NHS Commissioning 
Board Special Health Authority, to ensure patient safety considerations remained central to 
the organisation. Public Health England have since taken over responsibility for error 
monitoring. 
2.1.5 Francis reports  
A seminal public inquiry in the field of patient safety produced the two Francis reports into 
the failings at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust between January 2005 and March 
2009. The first inquiry revealed unacceptable levels of care and rates of incidents across the 
trust, which led to high levels of patient and relative suffering (Francis 2010). Alongside poor 
and unsafe care, the culture within the Trust was said to not be conducive to providing good 
care to patients, or a supportive working environment for staff. The report uncovered many 
reasons for the failings in care and a culture which accepted low standards of care. In 
addition, a series of serious systematic faults were uncovered which resulted in the failure 
to detect warning signs signalling poor quality care and compromised safety within the 
trust. Some of the factors believed to compromise patient safety were: 
 Poor staff attitudes to patients, both lacking compassion and uncaring towards 
vulnerable patients 
 Bullying and fear of adverse repercussions from whistle blowing amongst staff 
 Lack of staff trust in management  
 Low staff morale due to financial constraints and staff cuts 
 A passive attitude towards change amongst senior staff 
 Poor maintenance of professional standards across all staff grades 
 Patients and families feedback was repeatedly not acted upon 
 
The second Francis inquiry’s remit was to reveal which organisations were responsible for 
the failings at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust and make NHS wide 
recommendations to improve care (Francis 2013). This second Francis inquiry made 290 




and to prevent a repeat of the failings at the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust 
(Francis 2010). Above all the most prominent message the Francis report gave was that a 
fundamental culture change was required so that it is always the patients’ welfare which 
drives a healthcare organisation, not targets. Hence, a major theme of the 
recommendations was increased seeking of patient feedback,  
“While benchmarks and data-based assessments are important tools, these should 
not be allowed to detract attention from the needs and experiences of patients. 
Benchmarks, ratings and status may not always bring to light serious systemic 
failings.” (Francis 2010:24) 
 
In response to the Francis report the government published Hard Truths: The Journey to 
Putting Patients First in 2013 which laid out what the government was going to do to 
implement the recommendations made by the Francis report (Department of Health 2013). 
These actions include: 
 Every patient to know the name of the doctor in charge of their care 
 Public access to each hospitals’ safety levels 
 Informing patients if they have suffered an adverse event 
 Consulting with patients more about their care 
 More feedback from patients sought by the Care Quality Commission 
 A more transparent complaints process 
 Nursing staff levels to be increased in hospitals 
 Increased frequency of unannounced visits by the Care Quality Commission 
 More support for NHS staff as whistle-blowers 
Many of the actions published in Hard Truths: The Journey to Putting Patients First 
(Department of Health 2013) centred on improving and measuring quality and safety, 
alongside actions to help prevent adverse events in healthcare. 
2.1.6 Berwick report 
In response to the Francis report, the government approached Don Berwick to conduct a 
review into what needs to be done to “make zero harm a reality” in the NHS (Berwick 2013: 
7). The resulting report, A Promise to Learn-A Commitment to Act, acknowledged the 
challenges faced by the NHS and set out many recommendations surrounding: 




targets and staff blame and a clear line of responsibility. The most important message from 
this report was that, 
“The most important single change in the NHS in response to this report would be for 
it to become, more than ever before, a system devoted to continual learning and 
improvement of patient care, top to bottom and end to end.” (Berwick 2013: 5)  
 
Therefore, it is clear that patient safety developments and learning remain a priority in the 
NHS. As such a thorough understanding of all areas of healthcare is required in order to 
learn how to ensure a high standard of care throughout the NHS.  
2.2 Adverse events 
An adverse event is, 
 “an unintended injury caused by medical management rather than the disease 
process and which is sufficiently serious to lead to prolongation of hospitalisation or 
to permanent impairment or disability to the patient” (Vincent 2010: 53).  
 
Adverse events can arise from either the actions of an individual healthcare worker, or arise 
from the healthcare system. Adverse events can result a wide range of mistakes; 
misdiagnosis, omission of diagnosis or treatment, mistreatment or failure to intervene 
appropriately to prevent the disease process. The figures below taken from An Organisation 
with a Memory (Department of Health 2001a) illustrate the scale of adverse events in the 
NHS: 
 Adverse events occur in around 10% of patient admissions or at a rate of an 
estimated 850,000 adverse events a year 
 400 people die or are seriously injured in adverse events involving medical devices 
every year 
 Adverse events cost approximately £2 billion a year in additional hospital stays 
 The NHS pays out around £400 million per annum on clinical negligence claims 
 Hospital acquired infections, around 15% of which may be avoidable, are estimated 
to cost nearly £1 billion every year 
 
From analysis of these adverse events, it was recognised that in some areas of medicine 
patterns of errors were occurring which could be prevented with specific targeted action, in 




Safer NHS was produced by the Department of Health in 2001 and set out national targets 
for reducing the rate of adverse events in four specific areas of healthcare (Department of 
Health 2001b): 
 “Reduce to zero the number of patients dying or being paralysed by mal-
administered spinal injections by the end of 2001 
 Reduce by 25% the number of instances of harm in the field of obstetrics and 
gynaecology which result in litigation by 2005 
 Reduce by 40% the number of serious errors in the use of prescribed drugs by 2005 
 Reduce to zero the number of suicides by mental health patients as a result of 
hanging from non-collapsible bed or shower curtain rails on wards by 2002” 
2.2.1 Never Events 
These four key targeted areas of risk reduction can be seen to be a formative list of Never 
Events. Never Events are serious safety incidents which, given they are a known area of risk, 
should never happen (Vincent 2010). However, Never Events do still happen occasionally 
and are therefore used by organisations as a safety target. The first list of Never Events in 
the United Kingdom was drawn up by the National Quality Forum in 2004 and the list now 
consists of 25 Never Events, including: 
 Surgery performed on the wrong body part or wrong patient 
 Infant discharged to the wrong person  
 Patient death or serious injury due to a medication error 
 Retained instrument post-operation 
 Inpatient suicide using non-collapsible rails 
 
Incidents must meet the following criteria to be classed as a Never Event: 
 The incident has potential for severe patient harm 
 The incident has occurred in the past and is therefore a known source of risk 
 There is existing guidance on how the event can be prevented 
 The event is preventable if the guidance is implemented 
 
From the information above it can be seen that radiotherapy does not feature in targeted 




has been little focus specifically on radiotherapy, despite the potential for severe patient 
harm if errors occur in this domain. 
2.3 Patient Safety in Radiotherapy 
“Radiotherapy is widely known to be one of the safest areas of modern medicine, yet, 
for some, this essential treatment can bring harm, personal tragedy and even death” 
(World Health Organisation 2008:2).   
 
Radiotherapy is a clinically effective and cost efficient cancer treatment, accounting for just 
5% of the national spend on cancer (Department of Health 2012). It is estimated that 
approximately 125,000 patients undergo radiotherapy treatment in the UK every year. Yet, 
as cancer is predominantly a disease of later life, that number is set to continue to rise due 
to an aging population (Department of Health 2012). Radiotherapy is the second most 
effective treatment for cancer, behind surgery. 40% of cancer survivors received 
radiotherapy as part of their treatment, and 16% of all cancer survivors cure can be 
attributed to radiotherapy alone (Department of Health 2012). However, as with all areas of 
healthcare there is a risk of error, that can devastating to the patients, their families and the 
healthcare professionals involved. A focus on this area is important as the delivery of 
therapeutic radiation has a high propensity for harm if errors occur. 
2.3.1 Radiotherapy treatment process 
The aim of radiotherapy is to target and maximise radiation to tumours in order to destroy 
cancer cells, whilst minimising damage to surrounding healthy cells. Hence the accuracy of 
the dose and placement of the radiation beam is vital to successful treatment. There are a 
number of stages in a patient’s treatment which can be broadly divided into planning and 
delivery (Donaldson 2007). A patient’s treatment is decided upon and planned by a 
multidisciplinary team of oncologists, medical physicists and radiographers in the planning 
stage. During the delivery stage the patient visits the radiotherapy department to receive 
their treatment. A patient’s radiotherapy treatment is usually made up of a series of 
fractions (doses of radiation) given over consecutive days. The diagram in figure 2.1 






Figure 2.1: Overview of the radiotherapy treatment process, adapted from Donaldson (2007) 
The radiation is administered by a machine called a linear accelerator. The linear accelerator 
interface displays the treatment parameters, including strength of radiation, area to be 




screen both in the treatment room and an adjacent observation room. In the UK alone, 
there are over 200 linear accelerator machines which deliver approximately 4.5 million 
individual exposures each year (Department of Health 2007).  
 
An error in radiotherapy can lead to either under dosing or overdosing, both of which can 
have considerable detrimental and potentially fatal effects on the patient (Donaldson 2007). 
An under dose can lead to inadequate tumour control, whereas an overdose can lead to 
burns, organ damage and death (Department of Health 2007). There have been a series of 
high profile incidents in recent years in the UK which are detailed below.  
 
In 1991, at the North Staffordshire Royal Infirmary in England it was discovered that, 
following the introduction of new technology, radiographers erroneously believed that the 
machine did not make necessary adjustments to treatment doses. Hence, radiographers 
made additional unnecessary manual adjustments to every patient’s dose. Consequently, all 
patients receiving treatment on this new machine received an under dose until the error 
was discovered 10 years later. This error is estimated to have affected one thousand 
patients (Department of Health 2007).  
 
A serious error effecting one patient occurred in 2005 at the Cookridge Hospital in Leeds. A 
breast cancer patient received 2.5 times her prescribed dose due to an incorrectly 
programmed dose parameter. This went undetected, despite checks, for 14 consecutive 
treatment days. The patient survived the error but her doctors believe her life expectancy 
has been shortened as a result of the error (Toft 2005). 
 
Errors can also lead to a fatal overdose of radiation. Lisa Norris, aged 15, was a victim of a 
fatal dose calculation error in 2006 at the Beatson Oncology Unit in Glasgow.  Whilst 
undergoing treatment for a brain tumour, Lisa Norris received 158% of her prescribed 
radiation because radiographers erroneously believed the machine made the required 
adjustments to her dose. Consequently, dose adjustments were not made and 19 overdoses 





These high profile adverse events illustrate the negative impact of errors in radiotherapy. 
Following incidents in other countries and these in the UK, the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) published the Radiotherapy Risk Profile. This was a seminal document within 
radiotherapy and highlights vulnerabilities in the patient pathway, with a view to reducing 
or eliminating errors through analysis of previous adverse events and incidents. Other areas 
of healthcare conduct risk profiling as an activity to improve safety, but radiotherapy is 
currently the only healthcare domain to have a risk profile document published by the 
WHO. The document provides information on error rates and sources of errors. It also 
suggests interventions to increase patient safety including: ensuring adequate staffing 
levels, more use of checklists and increasing reporting of and learning from errors. Yet, 
detail on these interventions is limited thus far (World Health Organisation 2008). 
 
In response to the imminent publication of the Radiotherapy Risk profile, the Department of 
Health (DH) in the UK published a document entitled Towards Safer Radiotherapy 
(Donaldson 2007)1. Recommendations were made in this document to increase patient 
safety in radiotherapy and prevent errors including: 
 Development and promotion of a good safety culture in which staff are encouraged 
to question potentially unsafe working, and report errors and near misses 
 Clear communication between all staff regardless of hierarchy 
 Staffing levels appropriate to the number of patients being treated 
 Working environments designed to prevent distractions 
 
These recommendations, especially surrounding culture and reporting have been 
repeatedly echoed in many patient safety documents, illustrating a growing recognition of 
the importance of these factors in ameliorating patient risk across healthcare. One way to 
explore the importance of these factors and evaluate if the increased focus on culture and 
human factors is improving healthcare safety is to study patterns and rates of error. 
                                                     
1
 Towards Safer Radiotherapy is a document produced by a working party from Royal College of Radiologists, 
Society and College of Radiographers, the Institute of Physics and Engineering in Medicine, NPSA, Health 
Protection Agency and British Institute of Radiology which was designed to find practical and organisational 




2.3.2 Error rates in Radiotherapy 
The WHO Radiotherapy Risk Profile reviewed literature in an attempt to calculate worldwide 
error rates (WHO 2008).  In the document it is stated that many more errors may have 
occurred but passed undetected, or had not been reported. The WHO conducted a review 
of major radiotherapy incidents that led to radiation injury or death, in middle to high 
income countries in USA, Europe and Asia. This review suggested that between 1976- 2007, 
3125 patients were reported to have been affected by an error leading to an adverse event 
in these countries. Some 1.4% (38) of these patients died as a result of the error. 
 
The policy document, Towards Safer Radiotherapy (Donaldson 2007), provides error rates 
for the UK alone. It is estimated in the document that in the UK in the period May 2000 to 
August 2006, 181 incidents were reported, adversely affecting 338 patients. It has been 
estimated from this that incidents occur in 40 out of 100,000 treatment courses, giving an 
error rate of 0.04% (Donaldson 2007). Furthermore, out of these 40 errors it is estimated 
that 24 patients would suffer clinically adverse consequences (Donaldson 2007). Yet, these 
error rates are subject to the ‘tip of the iceberg’ effect, as recognised in healthcare as a 
whole, and may be higher. 
2.3.3 Reporting of errors 
 “to err is human. To cover up is unforgiveable. To fail to learn is inexcusable” 
(Donaldson 2004) 
 
The above quotation is from the Chief Medical Officer of the Department of Health in 2004. 
As the above quote states, an additional way to help prevent errors is learning from 
previous errors. In order to learn from errors they must be reported alongside the 
circumstances surrounding the error, to increase understanding of where the weak 
defences in healthcare lie. Prior to 2000 there had been little systematic learning from 
previous errors in the NHS, partly due to the unsystematic method of recording errors 
(Vincent 2010). With the formation of the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS), 
organisations in the UK were encouraged to report errors and near misses by uploading 
incident reports to the NRLS website, which were then categorised into error type and 




database has had over 4 million incident reports entered (National Patient Safety Agency 
2014), illustrating more of a commitment to reporting and learning across the NHS. 
 
However, it is widely recognised that reports of incidents suffer the ‘tip of the iceberg 
effect’, whereby in addition to the reported errors there are many more errors occurring 
and not being reported for reasons such as: fear of punishment, patient is unharmed or lack 
of awareness over what constitutes an error (Vincent 2010). Leape et al. (1991) states fear 
of punishment decreases reporting of errors. Consequently, Leape et al. (1991) found, from 
a large scale review of adverse events in the USA, that reporting rates increased if staff are 
offered immunity from punishment. Furthermore, analysis of incident reports detailing 
medication errors in a paediatric hospital in Glasgow submitted over a five year period 
between 1994 to 1999, showed the reporting rates increased when the form was changed 
to be less punitive and instead encouraged reflection from the healthcare worker involved 
in the error (Ross, Wallace and Paton 2000). From both studies, it may be concluded that if 
the culture surrounding reporting is altered to be less punitive, but more fair and open, 
reporting rates increase. 
 
Prior to 2000 there was no legal requirement to report radiotherapy errors in the UK, unless 
they were attributed to equipment failure (Donaldson 2007), although it was customary for 
departments to record and investigate incidents locally. This lack of central standardised 
reporting system has made it difficult to compare error rates prior to 2000. In May 2000 
Ionising Radiation (Medical Exposure) Regulations (IR(ME)R) came into force in the UK. 
Under these regulations departments are required to immediately investigate any incidents 
resulting in a patient being “exposed to ionising radiation to an extent much greater than 
intended” (The Ionising Radiation (Medical Exposure) Regulations 2000 (SI 2000/1059: 4)). 
Unless this investigation can show “beyond reasonable doubt” that overexposure did not 
occur, departments must notify the appropriate authority and arrange for a detailed 
investigation into the circumstances surrounding the incident (The Ionising Radiation 
(Medical Exposure) Regulations 2000 (SI 2000/1059: 4)). The regulations state that the term 
“much greater than intended” should be interpreted as more than 10% of the whole dose or 
20% more than intended in any given fraction. However, there is no requirement to report 





A study conducted by the NPSA suggests that the radiotherapy profession is increasingly 
committed to error reporting. The NPSA conducted a questionnaire study in order to 
understand reporting of errors and near misses to the NRLS.  The NPSA sent email 
questionnaires to 56 radiotherapy department managers in the UK. There was a good 
response rate of 84% which the NPSA note reflects the occupations’ dedication to improving 
safety (NPSA 2009). It was found that 42 of the 47 responders submitted incident reports in 
their departments to the NRLS, yet only 33 of these reported all incidents they were aware 
of. The remaining nine departments, only submitted reports of errors which they deemed to 
pose significant risk, or if there was severe harm as a result of the incident. This lack of 
reporting represents a potential missed opportunity for other departments to learn from 
near misses or less severe errors. All survey responders reported that they facilitate 
communication about recent errors and attempt to share lessons from errors with all staff 
in their trust, usually during staff meetings. Yet, the results showed there was very little 
dissemination about errors between other trusts. In sum, the survey showed that whilst the 
majority of radiotherapy departments report incidents to the NPSA and are committed to 
improving local reporting and learning from errors, there is minimal sharing of lessons 
learned between departments. This potentially allows similar errors to be repeated at 
different sites. This is known as isomorphism, whereby an incident in one organisational 
setting may be repeated in a similar setting, due to similar patterns of behaviour, unless 
lessons are shared from the original incident and acted upon in all similar settings (Toft and 
Reynolds 2005).  
 
A more recent analysis of incidents reported to the NRLS has shown that the number of 
radiotherapy incidents being reported has significantly increased in the years between 2010 
and 2013, from just 294 annually reported incidents to over 1500 incidents in 2013 (Robson, 
Clark and White 2014). The majority of these errors were either minor or near misses, with 
only a few major incidents reported. Furthermore, an analysis of radiotherapy errors by the 
Health Protection Agency (2012) has shown that the number of major incidents has reduced 
and the number of minor errors increased between 2009 and 2012.  This increased level of 




more work is needed to continue the reduction in errors by sharing knowledge on errors 
and understanding the factors contributing to error. 
 
There is evidence that the reporting and monitoring of errors has continued to increase 
significantly in recent years. Following the disbanding of the HPA, Public Health England 
have published biannual reports on radiotherapy errors since 2010, with a view to analysing 
error trends and disseminating error knowledge to radiotherapy departments in a timely 
manner via quarterly newsletters (Public Health England 2014). This is in response to the 
recommendations made in Towards Safer Radiotherapy. Departments are encouraged to 
report all errors, including minor incidents and near misses, rather than just errors which 
are reportable according to the Ionising Radiation Regulations criteria. The most recent 
analysis published in November 2014 was of errors during the period December 2011 to 
November 2013. During this period 7655 radiotherapy error reports were submitted (Public 
Health England 2014). For the first time data was also collected on the number of treatment 
courses delivered in the same time period. This data estimated that in this two year period 
413,730 treatment courses were delivered, giving a rate of reported incidents of 1.9%. The 
majority of these reported incidents, 68.4%, were near misses with no patient impact. Some 
28.6% were minor incidents which did not have clinically significant impact, as errors could 
be rectified by altering the remainder of the patient’s treatment prescription. Of the 
remaining 3% of incident reports, only 1.7% of errors were reportable under the Ionising 
Radiation Regulations. Whilst this data suggests clinically significant adverse effects are rare, 
if they do occur, they can have severe and potentially fatal effects due to the nature of the 
treatment. Therefore, the document warns that the radiotherapy profession cannot become 
complacent about errors. 
 
 When comparing the figures above with the preceding two year period, it was observed 
that the number of reported incidents had increased by 130% (Public Health England 2014). 
This was noted to not be due to an increased risk in radiotherapy, but increased reporting, 
as there were fewer high level errors and an increase in minor incidents and near misses. 
This is believed to reflect the radiotherapy community’s increasing commitment to 
reporting and learning from error. Indeed, the latest radiotherapy safety newsletter, 




now regularly submitting error reports (Public Health England 2015). However, there is still 
variance in the swiftness of submitting reports, with a mean of 51 days between incident 
and error report submission. This increasing reporting is believed to reflect a maturing 
safety culture with radiotherapy. 
2.3.4 Types of error 
As radiotherapy is a complex process, in order to fully understand what is causing errors and 
adverse events, there is a need to know which part of the treatment process errors are 
originating from. The Radiotherapy Risk Profile (WHO 2008), alongside calculating error 
rates, also attempted to map where worldwide errors were occurring during the patient 
pathway. Of the 3125 errors between 1976-2007 in middle to high income countries in USA, 
Europe and Asia, 55% were attributed to errors in the planning stage. The remaining 45% of 
errors occurred during the delivery stage. These arose due to: the introduction of new 
technology or equipment (25%), during treatment delivery (10%), during information 
transfer (9%), or in multiple stages (1%). 
 
Furthermore, the WHO Radiotherapy Risk Profile (2008) identified near misses and the stage 
from which they originated by reviewing published and unpublished literature from 
Australia, Canada, USA, UK and other European countries. From 1992 to 2007, 4616 near 
misses were identified. These errors were detected prior to treatment and did not harm the 
patient. The errors were due to planning (9%), incorrect transfer of info (38%) or arose 
during treatment delivery (18%). The remainder could not be attributed to one stage or 
were the result of errors at various stages. 
 
From this analysis of errors it can be seen that many errors occur during the planning stage. 
The most recent available data available on UK errors, published by Public Health England as 
detailed in section 2.3.2, also suggests many errors occur during the planning stage. Of the 
128 serious and clinically significant errors, 21.1% and 12.5% could be attributed to errors 
during pre-treatment imaging and planning respectively. However, 43% occurred during the 
delivery of treatment. When considering the reported near misses, it was found that the 





At the planning stage radiographers are not involved and an understanding of these type of 
errors would require an understanding of diagnosis, decisions to treat and the complex 
physics calculations used to determine treatment plans. This is beyond the scope of this 
thesis which is focussed on investigating and preventing errors at the point of treatment 
delivery. Errors which originate from mistakes in the planning stage cannot be detected 
once they have passed into the delivery stage, as when comparing the treatment that is 
about to be delivered against the source treatment plan, it would appear correct. 
 
Aside from those errors originating in the planning stages, it can be seen that the transfer of 
information and data entry is a vulnerable step in the patient process. Errors during 
treatment delivery may also be the result of erroneous data transfer or entry. There are 
many opportunities for human error to occur, as treatment data is transferred many times, 
from initial planning to entry into the treatment delivery machine, as can be seen in the flow 
diagram of the radiotherapy treatment process presented in figure 2.1. As Leunens et al. 
(1992) noted when discussing quality assurance in radiotherapy, “garbage in equals garbage 
out”. Therefore, the transfer of data is a critical safety step and the thorough checking of 
parameters immediately prior to beam delivery is essential to detect any errors before they 
cause harm. However, inadequate checking of treatment parameters has also been 
highlighted in the Radiotherapy Risk Profile as a risk with a high potential impact on the 
patient (WHO 2008).  
2.3.5 The final treatment check 
As shown in figure 2.1, there are a number of stages to the radiotherapy treatment process. 
Due to this complex nature of radiotherapy treatment, and the need for transfer of 
information, treatment checks are built in to every stage of the process in order to detect 
errors and prevent their impact. These are referred to as end of process checks. The most 
recent analysis of radiotherapy errors, detailed in section 2.3.2, revealed that in 17.9% of 
the incidents reported, errors were not detected during these end of process checks (Public 
Health England 2014). This was consistent with the figures from the prior biannual report 
which gave a figure of 19.4%. The most frequent failure (25%) of these end of pre-process 




This suggests that these end of process treatment checks, especially those occurring at the 
point of treatment delivery, are a poor defence against error.   
 
The most important end of process treatment check is the final check conducted at the 
point of treatment delivery, immediately prior to beam switch on. This is the last check 
before radiation is given to the patient. Hence, it is the last opportunities to detect an error 
which may have occurred earlier in the delivery stage and prevent erroneous treatment 
delivery (Donaldson 2007). The safety role of the final treatment check was highlighted by 
an analysis of the first 1074 incident reports sent to the Radiation Oncology Safety 
Information System (ROSIS2 ) between 2003 and 2008. This analysis revealed that the 
majority of errors (754) were detected at the time of the patient’s treatment, reinforcing 
the safety barrier which radiographers supply when checking and confirming treatment 
parameters (Cunningham et al. 2010). Some 43% of these errors were detected by the 
radiographer whilst at the treatment machine. Therefore, treatment checks immediately 
prior to beam administration are a vital defence against errors. However, it is also the safety 
check which has been identified as not being a strong defence against error in the latest 
error analysis by Public Health England, as detailed above.  
2.3.6 Technological developments and the final treatment check 
Radiotherapy technology has become increasingly sophisticated since the early 1990s. The 
field has moved from relying on manually inputting treatment parameters for every 
treatment, to more automated computer-controlled delivery (Fraass 2008). This increase in 
reliance on technology may lead radiographers to believe that the final treatment checks 
are now somewhat redundant. Many departments use record and verify systems (RV). 
These systems negate the need for radiographers to manually enter treatment parameters 
for every dose, with the aim of preventing data entry errors (Donaldson 2007). As illustrated 
in the treatment process presented in figure 2.1, prescribed treatment parameters are 
entered into the RV systems prior to the patient arriving in the department for their first 
radiotherapy treatment. The RV system wirelessly sends the patient’s treatment data to the 
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linear accelerator machines, which deliver the radiation, and verifies that the dose about to 
be delivered matches that which was originally entered into the system.  
 
Comparative studies of pre and post implementation have shown that the introduction of 
RV systems have reduced errors in treatment delivery significantly (Fraass et al. 1998), and 
significantly increased efficacy in the radiotherapy department, reducing treatment time 
(Klein et al. 1998). However, these technological advances do not make the final manual 
treatment check redundant. It has been noted by Fraass (2008) that whilst technology has 
improved the treatment process it cannot replace human input. This is because technology 
may fail, data may have been incorrectly entered in the first instance, and RV systems do 
not prevent radiographers from opening up the incorrect patient file. Furthermore, not all 
departments have wireless networks to transfer data to the linear accelerator machines and 
may still rely on manual data entry immediately prior to treatment delivery (Baiotto et al. 
2009). Therefore, Fraass (2008:4) warns that departments must ensure that “human review 
quality assurance is not lost to automation”.  
 
RV systems, whilst improving safety and efficiency by ensuring the same treatment 
parameters are set up for every treatment, may also introduce a different risk into the 
process. A warning is given in Towards Safer Radiotherapy that the implementation of 
guidelines for checking and confirmation of parameters prior to beam delivery is 
challenging, as radiographers believe the automatic system to be correct and hence the 
checks unnecessary (Donaldson 2007). However, a study which retrospectively analysed all 
treatments delivered for 1925 consecutive patients in the USA, found that 15% of treatment 
errors could be attributed to RV systems (Macklis, Meier and Weinhous 1998). Of the 
treatments involved in the analysis, there were 59 errors identified. The authors noted that 
many more errors had been prevented due to RV systems detecting an error prior to 
treatment delivery. Yet, nine of the errors were found to be directly related to the use of RV 
systems. In these incidents, it was found that patient’s treatment parameters had been 
incorrectly entered into the RV system in the first instance, usually with a transposition of 
similar digits, which went undetected during the final treatment check. Hence, RV systems 
do not make treatment delivery infallible, as the systems are susceptible to human error. 





Another study at a hospital in Utah, also suggested that RV systems do not make treatment 
delivery error proof and may play a contributory role in error. A retrospective analysis of 38 
error reports from a one year period in one department was conducted. It was found that 
23% of errors in this year were related to over-reliance on the RV software (Patton, Gaffney 
and Moeller 2003). It was suggested by the authors that these errors could have been 
prevented if radiographers had maintained vigilance during the final treatment check.  
 
The risk of incorrectly entered parameters entered into RV systems has also been reported 
in Italy. Baiotto et al. (2009) reported the results of a study comparing source date with data 
entered in a RV system in one department. The source data was compared with the values 
which had been entered into the RV system. The checks were conducted weekly by the 
researcher for all treatments given to 7768 patients from 2000 to 2006. Discrepancies were 
found in 452 patient treatments. That means that for 5.8% of patients, treatment 
parameters had been entered incorrectly into the RV system and would have resulted in 
erroneous treatment delivery, if it was not for the manual check of treatment values. 
Therefore, whilst RV systems play a crucial role in ensuring accurate and correct treatment 
is delivered, radiographers should not rely on the RV system to be correct, but retain 
vigilance during the manual final treatment check. 
 
Similar results have been found in the UK as well. Cunningham et al. (2010) reaffirmed the 
need for radiographers to remain vigilant as errors in treatment parameters were observed 
despite the presence of the RV system. Cunningham et al. (2010) conducted a review of the 
first 1074 incidents reported to ROSIS between 2003 and 2005. Some 50% of these incidents 
resulted in erroneous treatment delivery. Of these errors, only 258 were detected prior to 
the treatment delivery stage. Hence, the study by Cunningham et al. (2010) reinforces the 
notion that the final treatment check is the most important line of defence against error, as 
the majority of errors, 43%, were “found at time of patient treatment” (Cunningham et al. 
2010:603).  
 
All studies conducted to date which have analysed discrepancies between source data and 




error suggests it is a universal problem. It is therefore suggested that RV systems do not 
remove the risk of error altogether but alter the type of potential errors; from random 
transcription errors when entering treatment parameters, to systematic errors resulting 
from overreliance on the technology. Furthermore, excessive confidence in RV systems 
could lead to patients receiving repeated erroneous treatment on consecutive days, if the 
error in input to RV systems continues to go undetected throughout treatment. Therefore, 
in order to minimise this radiographers must be supported to maintain attention and 
remain vigilant during the final treatment check immediately prior to treatment delivery, as 
it is argued that, this is a vital error defence, regardless of whether or not a RV system is 
used.  
2.3.7 Beam modification errors 
Beam modification accessories have been identified as a particularly vulnerable aspect of 
treatment. Beam modifications, such as a wedge or a bolus, are used to manipulate and 
target the amount of radiation reaching the body, and are planned as part of the patient’s 
prescription (Donaldson 2007). The incident in Leeds, presented in section 2.3.1 was due to 
the incorrectly entered parameter of a patient’s prescription, the status of a wedge, into the 
RV system. In this case it was prescribed to be in place, shown as IN on the prescription, but 
it was programmed as OUT. This went undetected for 14 fractions. 
 
Wedge, and other beam modification mistakes, account for a large proportion of errors and 
hence demand a thorough check (Calandrino et al. 1997). Yeung et al. (2005) found that 
there were 252 incidents during patient set-up over a ten year period in just one cancer 
centre in Canada. However, the paper does not report the total number of treatments 
delivered in this period. The majority of these errors were beam shielding errors (48%) and 
three errors were related to wedge positioning.  
 
In the past decade, in addition to the incident reported by Toft (2005), there has been 
another high profile error associated with beam accessories. In Brooklyn (USA) in 2007, a 
radiographer had mistakenly programmed the linear accelerator to wedge out instead of 
wedge in. Consequently the wedge was not there to modify the beam and the patient 




These incidents and analysis of incidents suggest that not only is the final treatment check 
vital to ensure safety, but that the confirmation of the wedge status is especially vulnerable 
to error.  
2.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter has provided a brief overview and introduction to the field of patient safety, 
which is a relatively new but rapidly growing field, which aims to understand the causes of 
errors in healthcare, and methods to prevent them.  This review has shown that errors in 
radiotherapy, whilst occurring in relatively small numbers compared to other areas of 
healthcare, have high impact with potentially devastating patient consequences. None of 
the Never Events currently published by NHS England and detailed in section 2.2.1 recognise 
patient safety incidents within the radiotherapy domain. Yet, an error resulting from a miss-
programmed wedge or dose meet the criteria for a Never Event, as it is preventable, the 
error is known about and the error can result in major harm or death.  Despite the potential 
severity of patient harm resulting from error, the quality and scope of patient safety 
research within radiotherapy, especially in regards to treatment checking, is limited. Yet, 
there does appear to be a maturing safety culture within radiotherapy.  
 
The review has demonstrated that errors can occur at many stages of the radiotherapy 
treatment process, but that data transfer is a particularly vulnerable stage of the treatment 
process.  It is not clear the number of errors occurring in radiotherapy, but what is clear, is 
that the final treatment check of parameters immediately prior to beam switch on, is the 
final opportunity to detect an error and prevent patient harm. Whilst technology, such as 
record and verify systems, have been introduced to address some of the risk, these do not 
entirely eliminate the risk. Therefore, this thesis will explore the role of the final treatment 
check.  
 
The next chapter will explore this final treatment check in more detail, and through 
application of theoretical error models, begin to build an understanding of why this check 






3 Chapter 3: Applying error theory to the final treatment check  
 
In this chapter theories of error propagation will be applied to the final treatment check 
immediately prior to treatment delivery, in order to help understand the factors influencing 
the effectiveness of the final treatment check to detect errors. As discussed in section 2.3.5, 
the final treatment check immediately prior to treatment delivery is the last opportunity to 
ensure that the radiation the patient is about to receive corresponds exactly with the 
patient’s prescription. This check is carried out immediately prior to treatment delivery 
whilst the patient is positioned on the treatment couch, by two radiographers working 
together (Donaldson 2007).  If errors go undetected at this stage, it may result in a patient 
receiving a potentially fatal overdose of radiation.  As the final defence against error in this 
domain is a human defence, efforts must be made to consider how the human interacts 
with the wider system. Reason’s theory of human error will be presented, before applying it 
to the final treatment check in radiotherapy. 
3.1 Human error theory 
3.1.1 Human factors and defence against error 
As the final defence against error in this domain is a human defence, efforts must be made 
to consider and optimise how the human interacts with the wider system, therefore a 
human factors approach to error is valuable. When systems and processes are evaluated 
with a consideration of human factors, potential human errors can be pro-actively designed 
out of the process or system (Vincent 2010). Human factors applies psychological and 
ergonomics theory, principles and methods to the design of technology, devices or systems. 
This approach is increasingly being adopted to improve healthcare safety. 
 
The clinical human factors group was set up 2007 in the UK by Martin Bromiley in response 
to losing his wife to an avoidable error during routine surgery. The aim of the independent 
campaign group is to embed the study and application of human factors within healthcare, 
and increase the understanding of the role that human factors play in the safety, quality and 
efficiency of healthcare. Their manifesto published in December 2012 notes three areas in 
which the increased application of human factors, aside from the design of improved 




education and training for health professionals and healthcare managers, building high 
reliability organisations and mandatory independent investigation of errors (Clinical Human 
Factors Group 2012). 
 
Awareness of human factors within radiotherapy appears to be growing, evidenced by 
published investigations of errors and the publication of Towards Safer Radiotherapy and 
other papers exploring reasons underlying radiotherapy errors, for instance, Portaluri et al. 
(2010), Akroyd, Caison and Adams (2002) and French (2004). These are discussed in more 
detail in section 3.2.1. However, radiotherapy appears to lag behind other healthcare 
domains and it has been recognised that the application of a more thorough human factors 
approach to radiotherapy delivery could improve safety (Chan et al. 2010). Therefore, in 
order to understand how the final treatment check may be improved it is important to 
consider the role of the person within the wider system. 
3.1.2 Systems and person-centred approach to errors 
There are two main approaches to error in the literature and in practice. Reason (2000) 
makes the distinction between a systems approach to understanding error and a person-
centred approach. The person-centred approach implies that errors are the ‘fault’ of an 
individual, without considering the impact of the systems in place or other contributory 
factors to error, such as the environment. Therefore, a person centred approach to error 
implies that it is healthcare staff at the ‘sharp end’ of healthcare who are responsible for 
any unsafe acts or errors. A consequence of this approach is that organisations which blame 
an individual, rather than assessing the situations surrounding an error, forfeit the 
opportunity to learn from the error and potentially prevent future similar errors. 
Furthermore, this approach to error leads to potentially unfair blaming of staff with no 
organisational responsibility taken for an error.  
 
A systems approach recognises that humans are prone to error and that errors are triggered 
by faults in the system. Errors may be trigged by, for instance: the organisational culture, 
process of working, work design or workplace design. The systems approach allows a 
proactive response to safety, in which the system is analysed, errors anticipated and the 




3.1.3 ‘Swiss cheese model’ 
Reason’s (2000) accident causation model uses the analogy of Swiss cheese to illustrate this 
system approach to error.  This is probably the most widely cited model in patient safety, 
and therefore is used here to analyse radiotherapy errors. This model, presented in figure 
3.1, describes error formation; how active failures, latent failures and human error combine 
to cause an error. 
Figure 3.1: Reason’s (2000) Swiss Cheese model of accident causation 
 
The model illustrates that hazards are ever present, yet there are many defences built into a 
system to prevent errors occurring. Reason likened the layers of defence to Swiss cheese. 
Each slice of cheese represents a defence, which should, in an ideal world, be impenetrable 
by a hazard. 
 
These defences may be embedded in technology, for instance alarms or forcing functions in 
computer systems. Conversely, defences may rely on input from humans, for instance in 
checking or following established procedures. Yet, if defences are weak, illustrated by a hole 
in the cheese, errors may occur. If a hazard escapes detection at one defence, or slice of 
cheese, it can still be picked up, and thereby an error prevented, at the next layer of 
defence. Yet, if the holes in the defences align, an accident trajectory is created.  
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When this model is applied to radiotherapy, it can been seen that each end of process check 
acts as a layer of Swiss cheese, or a defence against error. The final treatment check prior to 
beam switch on acts as the final slice of cheese, the final defence against error. If errors 
have passed undetected during the earlier lines of defence in the system, they must be 
detected at the final treatment check to avoid an error occurring. Therefore, in order to 
improve the safety of treatment checks, either the final check, or previous defences must be 
strengthened. It has already been recognised, based on analysis of error rates, as discussed 
in section 2.3.5, that the final treatment check is a weak error defence. The factors 
underlying this weakness need to be understood in order to strengthen the defence. 
3.1.4 Active and latent factors 
The ‘holes’ in the layers of defence, illustrated in Reason’s ‘Swiss cheese model’, could be 
due to either active or latent conditions, which are fluid yet ever present in the system. The 
distinction between the two is discussed below. 
 
Latent factors are often factors which have lain dormant within a system for a length of time 
until, when combined with an active failure, can contribute to error. Latent conditions 
create situations which can easily provoke an error, for instance, short staffing leading to 
fatigue in staff, or medical wards designed with no quiet environment for staff to check 
patient medication. Latent conditions can also be managerial decisions which weaken 
defences in the system, for instance deciding to forgo daily quality assurance tests on 
equipment or muting safety alarms on wards. These latent conditions are more easily 
identifiable than active conditions as they are always present, observable and predictable. 
Therefore, a proactive approach, rather than reactive, to safety could theoretically be taken 
to identify and remove, or design out, these potentially error inducing latent conditions 
prior to an error occurring. Conversely, a reactive approach to patient safety may involve 
conducting an error analysis, subsequent to an error to identify these latent conditions. 
However, these latent conditions are often embedded into the healthcare organisation and 
may require culture change to alter perceptions to remove (Vincent 2010). Some previous 
research into radiotherapy has identified potential latent factors believed to contribute to 
error, such as: lack of training, staffing levels and working environment (Donaldson 2007). 





In comparison to latent conditions, an active failure can be referred to as the ‘unsafe acts’ of 
individuals, which lead to an action not being carried out as intended (Reason 2000). These 
are less predictable and influenced by individual factors.  
3.1.5 Types of active failures 
The final defence against error in radiotherapy is a human defence; two radiographers 
conducting a check of treatment details to confirm they are correct. As humans are fallible 
they must be supported to be a strong final defence, or earlier defences built stronger to 
compensate. Due to the frequency of a defence against error requiring human input in 
many safety critical industries, human error is often reported as the cause of an accident. 
Yet, an understanding of the term reveals that simple human error is a vague description. 
Reason (2000), one of the popular theorists of human error, suggests that errors can be 
differentiated as faults in either memory, perception or attention. Reason (2000) has also 
presented categorisation of types and levels of human error. It is recognised that there are 
other theories of human error, such as Norman’s slips and lapses (1988) and Rasmussen’s 
skill-based, rule-based and knowledge-based errors (1983). Whilst both of these error 
theories consider the setting in which the error occurred, both are considered too vague to 
fully explain error in complex domains. Norman’s hybrid classification does not fully expand 
upon the cognitive processing underlying error. Whereas, Rasmussen’s SRK model does not 
differentiate the underlying levels of complexity underlying cognitive processing. Reason’s 
theory of error is considered more comprehensive as it combines and builds upon both of 
these theories, in order to explain errors occurring in highly complex environments. As such 
this error model is discussed in reference to radiotherapy errors. 
 
Reason (2000) has defined slips and lapses, the lowest level of error, as failures of action. 
Slips are a skill-based failure and can be described as failing to complete an action as 
intended and is often due to attention failing. Lapses however, result in the same 
phenotype of error, a skill-based failure, but are due to memory lapsing. Both slips and 
lapses most frequently occur during regularly repeated actions which are prone to 
automatic performance, and the cause of the memory or attention lapse can usually be 




Unlike errors occurring from a skill-based failure, Reason defined mistakes as a failure in 
knowledge. Mistakes are a higher level error than a slip or a lapse, where an action has gone 
the way it was intended but the planning for the action was incorrect. Mistakes can be 
either rule-based or knowledge-based. A rule-based mistake occurs when the wrong rule 
has been applied to an action, for instance treating a patient for a heart attack when they 
are suffering an anxiety attack. A knowledge based mistake occurs commonly during a novel 
situation when there is no knowledge of how to plan an action correctly, for instance, a 
patient has symptoms the doctor is not familiar with and is therefore treated for the 
incorrect condition.  
 
Another high level error is a violation, which is an intentional deviation from known rules or 
procedures. An important distinction is that unlike slips, lapses and mistakes, violations are 
intentional rather than unconscious errors. Violations do not necessarily mean the person 
was intending to do harm, they may have been forced to commit a violation by the latent 
conditions in a system. For instance, if a nurse was forced to cut corners when checking a 
patient’s medication records due to time pressure resulting from staff shortages. 
 
The combination of how latent failures, active failures and human error can combine is 
presented in figure 3.2, which is an expanded illustration of the Swiss cheese model adapted 





Figure 3.2: Accident causation model adapted from Reason (1997) 
 
Reason’s error model is applicable to all high risk industries, which have complex systems 
requiring human input. Vincent, Taylor- Adams and Stanhope (1998) expanded upon 
Reason’s model by adapting it to healthcare. Table 3.1 presents a list of error and violation 
producing conditions in healthcare delivery which have been categorised into factor types. 
The authors note this framework provides a conceptual basis for guiding the understanding 
of all possible contributory factors for errors when investigating and analysing incidents. 
These provide a useful framework for investigating errors during the final treatment check 
in radiotherapy. This is because each factor can be analysed in more detail to determine if 
that factor has an impact upon the final treatment check. This allows research to be 
focussed on the most relevant factors.  
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Table 3.1: Contributory factors effecting safe healthcare (Vincent et al. 1998) 
3.2 Applying error theory to radiotherapy 
The models detailed above are useful to apply within the context of radiotherapy delivery in 
order to understand how the final treatment check could be strengthened to help increase 
the likelihood of error detection. As there is limited existing literature on the final treatment 
check, literature was sought surrounding errors in radiotherapy generally. This is because 
the latent and error producing conditions would be applicable to all errors in this healthcare 
domain. 
 
A search of the existing literature on errors in radiotherapy was conducted using the 
databases EBSCO, Science Direct and SCOPUS, and combinations of the search terms 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of this thesis can be viewed 




‘radiotherapy’ ‘safety’, ‘error’ and ‘human factors’, alongside published reports such as 
Radiotherapy Risk Profile and Towards Safer Radiotherapy. In order to identify key human 
factors issues and build an understanding of error in radiotherapy, the results of this search 
were classified into latent failures, error and violation producing conditions, and active 
failures, as in figure 3.2. These are discussed below.  
3.2.1 Latent factors 
Towards Safer Radiotherapy (Donaldson 2007) identified a number of latent factors, present 
in radiotherapy departments and believed to contribute to radiotherapy incidents: 
 Lack of training, competence and experience. This includes a lack of specific local 
training when staff move between departments which is pertinent considering the 
range of equipment and local protocols in use 
 Poor design and documentation of procedures 
 Overreliance on automated systems. This can impair staff expertise if the automated 
systems negate the need to exercise their skills 
 Hierarchical departmental structure and culture. These can prevent junior staff from 
speaking out about failure to comply with protocols 
 Staffing and skills level 
 Changes to process. Changes to processes must be monitored as any change may 
make old processes redundant. If this is the case, continuing with redundant 
processes will divert resources away from safety critical steps with potential risky 
effects 
3.2.1.1 Culture 
Culture is often cited as a major factor contributing to quality and safe delivery of 
healthcare. For instance, it is quoted as a major contributory factor in the failings at Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust (Francis 2010). It is a widely held belief that culture 
change combined with structural and procedural change in the NHS will lead to improved 
and safer healthcare (Vincent 2010). Yet, it is argued that the link between culture and 
healthcare improvement lacks explicit evidence, as culture is hard to define and there are 
many sub-cultures with local barriers preventing widespread culture change. Scott et al. 
(2003) therefore argue that universal culture transformation within the NHS would be a 




to focus on improvement in individual NHS departments or professions, rather than the 
entire NHS, such is the approach taken in this thesis. 
 
A subset of culture is an organisation’s safety culture, or safety climate. Safety climate refers 
to the way staff in an organisation think about patient safety, and how safety is 
implemented through processes in the organisation (Vincent 2010). This can be measured in 
various ways using numerous evaluated tools, such as the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire 
and Safety Climate Survey (The Health Foundation 2011). Within radiotherapy, little work 
has been focussed on safety culture, or safety climate, despite the large influence culture is 
known to have on safety.  Yet, the increased reporting of errors as detailed in section 2.3.3, 
may well represent an increasing safety culture within radiotherapy.  
 
Another measure of safety culture can be adherence to, or compliance with, safety 
protocols. Simons et al. (2010) found, by video-taping two teams of radiographers in one 
department in the Netherlands for 56 treatment deliveries, that compliance with safety 
guidelines in radiotherapy was not consistent. Across 18 safety processes such as observing 
patients during treatment and verbally confirming patient ID, compliance to guidelines 
ranged from 2% to 100% with an average of 59% compliance. They concluded that 
compliance was higher if guidelines were detailed and accompanied by an explanation as to 
why they should be used. This research did not include compliance rates with double 
checking treatment details, yet suggests research must measure adherence alongside staff 
understanding of the safety reasons behind checking protocols to increase adherence. 
However, the methodology of this study can be considered weak as there was a small 
sample size of treatments observed with the sample drawn from a narrow population of 
one department. 
 
The paucity of safety culture research within radiotherapy, especially surrounding treatment 
checking, represents the need for an increased focus on patient safety and treatment 
checking within radiotherapy. This research adds to this by creating the building blocks of a 
robust environment to support safety in one specific area of radiotherapy treatment 




in place to manage identified risks. Only then can radiographers be more actively involved in 
safety and alert to all possible errors. 
3.2.2 Error producing conditions 
The literature revealed a number of factors, present in the environment or radiographer’s 
work design, which are believed to contribute to the risk of error.  
3.2.2.1 Fatigue 
Towards Safer Radiotherapy identified the risk of fatigue and stress in radiographers. This 
was recognised as especially relevant when data checking, hence it was recommended that 
staff take regular breaks during this task and regularly alternate tasks (Donaldson 2007). 
One of the few empirical studies investigating radiotherapy patient safety provides support 
to many of the factors identified in Towards Safer Radiotherapy. Portaluri et al. (2010) 
conducted a human factors analysis of incidents over a five year period in a radiotherapy 
department in Italy. It was found that there were recurrent factors underlying the majority 
of incidents: attention failures, distracted/overconfident behaviour, loss of situational 
awareness and mental fatigue. Consequently, the authors recognised the need to alter 
departmental protocols in order to improve attention and reduce fatigue. The department 
therefore implemented a protocol to ensure radiographers alternated job roles during a 
shift, to prevent long periods of sustained attention on one task. However, this has not 
become a required standard worldwide in the profession, suggesting more work is needed 
to implement findings from research. 
 
There has been more empirical support to the notion that radiographers can easily be 
affected by work fatigue.  Akroyd, Caison and Adams (2002) found, in a study of 
radiographers in the USA that they are often multi-tasking during their duties due to 
supervision and training of new staff and students. Additionally, the authors found that 
radiographers are under pressure to work quickly, which, when combined with the 
emotional demands of working with cancer patients, leads to a high level of burnout 
amongst radiographers (Akroyd, Caison and Adams 2002). Hence, the radiographer’s job can 
be demanding and stressful, however, this study was conducted in the USA, and the results 





A qualitative investigation of stressors and coping mechanisms in qualified radiographers 
(n=8) of varying grades working in one NHS trust in East Anglia in the UK was undertaken 
(French 2004). Analysis of the interviews found that there are several categories of stressor 
reported by radiographers: personal performance, patient contact, working environment 
(including pressure due to machine breakdowns), communication, management, 
professional behaviour and departmental working. The most frequently cited coping 
mechanisms were social support and escape-avoidance. This paper also claims to have 
uncovered a new stressor amongst radiographers, the ‘potential to make errors’ (French 
2004:13). Radiographers were very aware that the treatment had potential for harm and 
that despite there being processes in place, errors could still occur (French 2004). Therefore, 
it is believed that radiographers will benefit from any process which can reassure them that 
their work is being made safer.  However, it is recognised that this study had a small sample 
size and was conducted at one site only, and therefore results may not be generalisable to 
all radiographers nationwide. 
3.2.2.2 Time pressure 
The time pressure to deliver treatments has been recognised in the literature. An audit of 
practice in 32 departments in the UK in 2004 found that 75% of departments allocated only 
ten minutes to treat each patient, with the remaining departments allocating a maximum of 
15 minutes per patient. Departments treated on average 40 patients per day with some 
departments treating over 50 patients on an average of three linear accelerator machines 
(Stratford et al. 2006). In reference to the earlier process diagram in figure 2.1, this means 
radiographers have 10 minutes to collect the patient, align them correctly on the treatment 
couch, verify the treatment parameters and deliver the radiation. Some patients may have 
more than one treatment field which means the alignment and final treatment check must 
happen multiple times. Hence, radiographers may be under pressure to conduct the final 
treatment checks quickly. 
3.2.2.3 Equipment design 
Chan et al. (2012) conducted a work flow analysis of the interface on the linear accelerator 
used by radiographers to deliver radiotherapy. The research suggested the interface design 
is not optimal to support human performance in this task.  A re-designed interface with 




errors from occurring, as well as being more time effective. More detail on this study will be 
presented in chapter 10 which considers the role of the interface design. 
3.2.3 Active failures 
These factors have not been as represented in the existing literature, which is more focused 
on the radiotherapy system and environment, rather than the radiographers working within 
the system. The investigation by Toft into the wedge error in Leeds, detailed in section 
2.3.1., suggested that errors may be due to failures in radiographer’s attention. During the 
investigation into the error it was found that it was only on the 15th day of treatment, when 
the patient was treated on another linear accelerator machine in a much quieter location 
that the error was detected (Toft 2005). Toft and Mascie-Taylor (2005) believed this error to 
be due to a phenomenon called involuntary automaticity (IA). IA occurs when a regularly 
repeated action becomes second-nature and as such is conducted without attention (Toft 
and Mascie-Taylor 2005). If IA occurs during checking, errors can pass undetected. As the 
process of the final treatment checks, comparing the linear accelerator screen to the 
prescription, are identical on every occasion, they may quickly become vulnerable to IA. Toft 
and Mascie-Taylor (2005) also note that IA is more likely to occur during pressurised 
situations and in a noisy environment.  
3.3 Chapter summary 
The final treatment check immediately prior to beam delivery is the final defence, in 
Reason’s error model, against errors which may have occurred earlier in the treatment 
process. This final treatment check conducted by two radiographers, of four parameters 
relating to patient’s dose, is vulnerable to error, as humans are fallible.   
 
In order to reduce risk either the prior layers of defence need to be strengthened, or the 
human needs to be supported to conduct a robust final treatment check. To do this a 
thorough understanding of the active and latent factors present in the very specific system 
of study is needed.  This review has demonstrated limited previous research into the latent 
factors and error producing conditions in radiotherapy treatment checking. Additionally, 
there is little empirical research in this area with the majority of literature consisting of 
qualitative research or retrospective reviews. This indicates a need for research into the 





This review has indicated even less existing research on the potential active failures 
surrounding the final treatment check. Therefore, the following chapter will explore the 
final treatment checking task in more detail, in order to understand how active failures may 
influence the effectiveness of the final check at detecting errors.  Due to the paucity of 
research around treatment checking in radiotherapy, the chapter will review and discuss 
existing literature surrounding double checking within healthcare and factors potentially 
underlying double checking failures. Literature from other industries will also be drawn 




4 Chapter 4 – Checking failures 
 
The previous chapter identified latent conditions potentially contributing to ineffective final 
treatment checks and concluded that further research is required to understand the active 
failures surrounding why the final check may fail to detect errors it is designed to trap. The 
final treatment check is the final defence against error (Reason 2000). Therefore, this 
chapter will focus on the checking task in order to understand how it could be improved to 
aid error detection. 
 
The final treatment check should be conducted by two radiographers as a double check, 
according to radiotherapy guidelines (Donaldson 2007). Therefore, this chapter will review 
the existing literature surrounding double checking. Double checking is frequently used 
throughout healthcare with the aim of catching errors before they cause harm to a patient. 
Double checking is defined as check completed by two people independently, both of whom 
have equal responsibility to ensure that details are correct. Conversely, single checking is 
conducted by just one person. Checking sometimes involves checking of calculations used to 
arrive at a dose. Radiotherapy, at the point of the final treatment check prior to treatment 
delivery, does not require calculations, but simple confirmation that the treatment 
parameters on screen correspond exactly with those on the patient’s paper prescription 
(Donaldson 2007). Due to the paucity of research on checking within radiotherapy, double 
checking research across other areas of healthcare will also be considered, in addition to 
literature from other safety critical industries.  
 
The chapter will also consider the importance and role of other patient safety concepts, 
such as standardisation, implementation and sustainability of safety initiatives. 
4.1 Existing checking recommendations  
There are currently no standardised published guidelines on how to conduct the final 
treatment checks in radiotherapy. This is despite the Royal College of Radiographers stating 
that they are “seeking to improve checking procedures” following the death of Lisa Norris 
(Royal College of Radiologists 2006:1).  Furthermore, the Department of Health issued an 




report into an incident, to inform sites to review their procedures for checking of the wedge 
position. This alert stated that departments must ensure that their checking procedure 
immediately prior to beam delivery elicits an active response, in order to combat 
involuntary automaticity, whilst also ensuring there is “a suitable work environment” and 
that “staff should be allowed to work uninterrupted when checking”. However, there is little 
precise detail provided on how to check, and no evidence of departments’ adherence to this 
alert. 
 
The final treatment check immediately prior to beam delivery was recognised as a risk in the 
Radiotherapy Risk Profile and the solution provided to prevent errors passing undetected 
was the use of independent checking of treatment parameters (WHO 2008). However, once 
again, there is no description of how to do this provided. The document Towards Safer 
Radiotherapy goes into more detail on checking and advises on the need for detailed 
protocols stating:  
“The fine details of checks and verification procedures and how they are performed 
are critical in ensuring they are effective and have the greatest chance of detecting 
an error” (Donaldson 2007:6).  
 
The document states which parameters must be checked prior to switch on: 
“Prior to turning on key parameters of monitor units, beam energy and beam 
modifications should be verified by both staff using source documentation and active 
verification”. (Donaldson: 44).  
 
The document states that active verification must elicit verbal input from both staff and be 
conducted in a quiet distraction free environment. The guide also recognises the need for 
detailed protocols which make staff responsibilities and accountability clear: 
 “Procedures to verify data should be active, eliciting a specific detailed response 
rather than a passive reaction in which case the answer “yes” might suffice….Active 
procedures can help to overcome the problem of involuntary automaticity, where one 
perceives what one is expecting rather than what is actually present” (Donaldson:35) 
 
The document Towards Safer Radiotherapy also states that data checking is a tiring task 
requiring immense concentration that can quickly result in fatigue. Hence, it is 
recommended that staff involved in these tasks take frequent breaks and alternate checking 




minimum standard to avoid errors from Involuntary Automaticity” (Donaldson 2007: 39).  
However, involuntary automaticity (IA) is equally as likely to happen between two people. 
Therefore, despite recognition of the need for precise details in checking protocols no 
guidance is given on how to verify the treatment parameters aside from ensuring there is an 
active response from each checker rather than just agreement. However, technological 
advances, such as the record and verify system, have made the final treatment check 
increasingly passive, because radiographers are no longer required to manually input 
treatment parameters prior to beam switch on, and rely on the RV system to be infallible, as 
discussed in section 2.3.6. As such, a new, evidence-based method of conducting this final 
check is required. 
4.2 Single or double checking debate 
In order to understand how the final check could be improved, the literature on checking 
was considered. Shillito, Arfanis and Smith (2010) conducted a literature review into double 
checking in healthcare with the aim of increasing understanding of the role of double 
checking in healthcare safety. The review confirmed that double checking is used 
extensively in healthcare. Double checks are conducted at multiple points in a patient’s 
journey through the healthcare system, from background checks on equipment and 
procedures through to identity checks and pre-procedure checks. Some of these double 
checks will have standardised practice guidelines for performing the checks, whereas others 
are less officially enforced. Shillito, Arfanis and Smith (2010) suggest double checking is 
under studied due to its apparent and presumed simplicity and suggest a number of 
research directions to improve the practice of double checking. Of particular note was the 
need to find methods to overcome involuntary automaticity when checking and the need 
for empirical research comparing the effectiveness of single and double checking in order to 
provide evidence-based practice recommendations. As there is controversy in the literature 
as to whether single or double checking is more effective in healthcare settings, there is 
currently no concrete evidence base to support the implementation of either checking 
policy in radiotherapy. 
 
Through a post hoc review of intravenous drug administration errors in anaesthesia from 




medicine prior to administration had been conducted, 58% of the errors could have been 
prevented. However, this conclusion was based on post-hoc consideration and judgment by 
experts, rather than an experimental study and hence could be argued to be opinion rather 
than fact based. Nonetheless, the authors concluded that the double checking of drugs prior 
to administration is the most effective measure to prevent erroneous intravenous medicine 
administration in anaesthesia (Jensen et al. 2004).  
 
Another retrospective study demonstrated double checking to be effective at reducing 
medication errors in pharmacy. A retrospective document review of medication errors over 
a five year period between 1994 and 1999 was conducted at the Royal Hospital for Sick 
Children in Glasgow, one of the largest paediatric teaching hospitals in the UK.   It was found 
that 195 errors were reported during this period. The authors calculated this equated to one 
error per 662 patient admissions, or one error per 1976 patient bed days. Pharmacy errors 
accounted for 20% of all errors. Midway through the period in focus the pharmacy checking 
policy was changed; from 1996 it was policy to double check all drugs prior to dispensing. 
The authors found that this reduced error rates in pharmacy dispensing from 9.8 per year to 
six per year. However, from analysing error reports it was found that 67% of the pharmacy 
errors over the five year period occurred despite two people double checking (Ross, Wallace 
and Paton 2000). Therefore, this suggests that double checking can prevent some, but not 
all, medication errors. 
 
It has been suggested that double checking does not prevent all errors and there is doubt 
surrounding the effectiveness of double checking over single checking. For blood 
transfusions it is accepted as best practice that blood products be double checked 
immediately before transfusion, yet, it has been acknowledged that more research is 
needed to confirm the effectiveness of double checking over single checking (Bradbury and 
Cruickshank 2000). One reason for this doubt over the efficacy of double checking is that it 
may lead to a diffusion of responsibility whereby each checker relies on the other checker to 
apply their full attention. As Linden and Kaplan (1994) note,  
 “not only does the passive check have significant potential for distraction, multiple 
responsibility itself does not necessarily enhance human performance. Unless 
carefully configured to prevent it, in a system in which two people are responsible for 





Therefore, a recommendation was made by the British Committee for Standards in 
Haematology in 1999 stating that it is more effective for a single registered nurse or doctor 
to conduct the check prior to transfusion. However, very few hospitals have implemented a 
one-person check policy, perhaps due to a lack of supporting evidence (Watson et al. 2008). 
Consequently, Watson et al. (2008) undertook a systematic review of the literature 
surrounding blood transfusion checking and found that no randomised controlled trial has 
been conducted to support either single or double checking in either blood transfusions, or 
any other healthcare field (Watson et al. 2008).  
 
In addition to divided opinions on effectiveness, arguments have been put forward in 
regards to the economic implications of double checking. It has been suggested that double 
checking requires more time and is more staff intensive than single checking. Kruse et al. 
(1992) conducted a randomised cross-over study across two wards of a geriatric assessment 
and rehabilitation unit at a hospital in Australia. For the study period of 23 weeks one ward 
employed single checking and the other double checking, this was then reversed for the 
second study period, also of 23 weeks. During the study periods an independent researcher 
audited the patient’s medication charts and drug error reports. It was found that the error 
rate was 2.98 errors per 1000 medications administered when single checking. This was 
significantly higher than the 2.12 errors per 1000 medications administered when double 
checking. This suggests double checking prevented a significant number of medication 
errors. However, the researchers also conducted a time and motion study for one week 
during the study period, which involved counting the number of medications administered 
and the time taken to do so.  From this it was found that double checking required an extra 
17.1 hours per 1000 medications administered compared to single checking. The authors 
calculated that this time was equivalent to having another nurse working 40 hours per week 
for 55 weeks. Therefore, despite double checking significantly lowering the number of 
medication errors the authors concluded that a clinical recommendation to double check 
was dubious considering the extra time and money it required. This finding resonates with 
the views of Leape (2000 cited in Armitage 2007) who states that double checking is a 




double checks run the risk of becoming an ineffective ritualistic chant (Leape 2000 cited in 
Armitage 2007).   
 
Jarman, Jacobs and Zielinski (2002) conducted a descriptive research design to examine the 
impact of a change from nurses double checking to single checking prior to medication 
administration at a hospital in Australia. The researchers measured reported errors in all 
adult inpatient departments, the emergency department, operating theatres and birthing 
suites for seven months following the change to single checking. It was concluded that 
double checking did not have any significant safety benefits over single checking because 
there was no difference in the number of errors reported. Furthermore, a visual analogue 
questionnaire with 15 items related to medication checking was administered to a 
convenience sample of 129 registered nurses from the studied wards. Results of the 
questionnaire suggested that nurses preferred single checking because it freed up time 
which could be spent on patient care, increased their autonomy and flexibility and made the 
nurses feel more confident, accountable and responsible for their actions.  
 
Research has also suggested that this preference for single checking is more pronounced if 
staff receive adequate training in how to check effectively. O'Connell et al. (2007) evaluated 
nurses’ perceptions of single checking pre and post education sessions surrounding single 
checking. The education sessions consisted of outlining changes to checking policy, 
assessments of the nurses’ competencies to administer medication and all attendees were 
provided with a resource manual containing the written checking policy and a self-
assessment checklist for single checking. A questionnaire assessing attitudes to single 
checking were completed by 129 nurses pre and post attendance at the educational 
sessions. Analysis of the questionnaires suggested that after attending the education 
sessions nurses had a more favourable view of single checking. Results of this study also 
suggested that the education session increased nurses’ confidence to administer medicines 
correctly, encouraged nurses to pay more attention during checking, and afforded nurses 
more responsibility and accountability. Furthermore, nurses reported believing that single 
checking occupies less time than double checking and that the nurses would welcome this. 






Dickinson et al. (2010) sought to understand paediatric nurses understanding of double 
checking and both facilitators and barriers to conducting double checks. Three focus groups 
were conducted with a total of 19 paediatric nurses recruited from one hospital in New 
Zealand. The focus groups were analysed using thematic analysis. Four themes were found; 
independent checking is best practice, variability in the process of double-checking, 
environmental influences such as competing priorities and interruptions, and attitudinal 
influences such as a false sense of security when double checking. The research also found 
that there was poor understanding about what double checking is and that more clarity was 
needed on how to double check. This research also identified that workload, distractions, 
automaticity and deference to authority were detrimental to effective double checking.  
 
Armitage (2007) attempted to understand why double checking may be ineffective. Firstly, a 
random sample of 191 drug error reports from a large city based teaching hospital were 
content analysed. This confirmed that double checking was a frequent safety process across 
the hospital, especially in nursing. The analysis also revealed that double checking errors 
occurred, yet the author notes that these were only clear cut in 12 cases. It was found that 
the error reports where a double checking failure occurred were very brief and the error 
reports did not seek to investigate why the double checking failed by examining the 
checking process, instead the authors suggest that individuals were blamed for the error. 
The author therefore asserts that more research is needed to understand why errors may 
occur. Armitage (2007) also conducted semi-structured interviews about double checking 
with 40 multidisciplinary healthcare professionals including doctors, nurses, pharmacists 
and pharmacy technicians from the same hospital. The results of these interviews suggested 
that double checking was an inconsistent process. The authors believe that as double 
checking is used across disciplines, it requires a solution which can be suited to all 
disciplines. Qualitative analysis of the interview revealed four reasons as to why double 
checking may fail. Staff believed deference to authority was a risk as staff may feel staff 
more senior to them must be correct and feel unable to question a senior. Reduction of 
responsibility was also perceived to be a risk, both through over reliance on the other 
checker and the social nature of checking leading to informality and diminished 




checks, with checks repeated regularly but with little active input from both checkers, 
especially if the drugs being checked were routine and frequently administered. The final 
weakness of double checking suggested in this research was lack of time. Even staff who 
spoke of themselves as advocates of double checking felt it was hard to find the time to be 
able to double check effectively. Armitage (2007) therefore concludes that double checking 
may contribute to error as staff trust it to be effective, yet there are many reasons why it 
may fail. Therefore, greater understanding of the risks of double checking are needed 
through increased psychological research into the process, in order to ensure that checking 
is conducted optimally.  
 
A recent literature review into double checking in healthcare has concluded that there is 
insufficient evidence on which the use of double checking can be justified. Alsulami, Conroy 
and Choonara (2012) conducted a search for literature search for articles related to double 
checking in healthcare. Some 16 articles were found to meet the inclusion criteria of 
assessing or discussing double checking of drug calculation, dispensing or administration. Of 
the 16 articles, two articles were literature reviews, and nine were qualitative-assessing 
views and perceptions of healthcare staff. These have been reviewed in this chapter. Only 
three articles employed quantitative methods to compare the effectiveness of single and 
double checking. However, one of these was a retrospective analysis (Ross, Wallace and 
Paton 2000) and therefore not a direct comparison. Another revealed very small numbers of 
errors when single or double checking (Kruse et al. 1992). Only one study, described below, 
directly compares methods of checking (Evley et al. 2010). Therefore, Alsulami, Conroy and 
Choonara (2012) concluded that clinical trials are required in order to provide evidence that 
double checking prevents errors. 
 
A small number of studies have compared the difference between single and double 
checking. Evley et al. (2010) has conducted one of the only comparative studies on methods 
of checking. Following a review into adverse incidents which suggested 58% of errors in 
anaesthesia could be prevented with double checking, the authors suggested that there was 
a lack of evidence on the efficacy of double checking. Therefore, Evley et al. (2010) 
conducted a feasibility study which compared two methods of confirming drugs; barcodes 




evaluate the feasibility of introducing double checking or barcode confirmation into 
practice. Seven NHS trusts participated in a study period of three months. Five trusts 
employed a second person check and two employed barcode technology to confirm drugs 
administered during anaesthesia. Independent observers visited each site to observe both 
methodologies. For those sites with barcode technology, barcodes were attached to each 
drug vial. When drawn up the vial could be scanned with a hand held scanner by the 
anaesthetist and an electronic system provided a visual and audible drug confirmation. For 
those sites using two people confirmation the authors created a double checking flowchart 
which made the role of each checker explicit (see figure 4.1). The flowchart ensures both 
people checking have an active involvement in the checking process. The checking process 
follows a challenge-response format which will be described in more detail in the section 
4.5, when discussing checking methods in aviation. 
 
Figure 4.1: Anaesthesia drug double checking process flowchart (Evley et al. 2010) 
After the study period four focus groups were conducted with participants and observers 
from the seven sites. Qualitative analysis revealed benefits, disadvantages and practicalities 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of 




associated with both methods of checking. Both methods of checking were perceived to 
increase safety and potentially prevent drug errors. Double checking was seen as enhancing 
patient safety whilst not requiring any additional equipment. However, the practice of 
double checking did not always fit into working patterns, as a second checker was not 
always available when it was needed. Consequently, the protocol was adapted by users to 
fit their workflow, for instance by checking multiple drugs at once. Also it was noted than in 
an emergency situation double checking was abandoned. Some participants also refused to 
take on the role of the second checker as they felt it delayed administration. Conversely, the 
barcode technology was believed to require less time, and impinged less on working 
practices. As such the author’s concluded that the electronic system was preferred as it 
fitted better into existing workflow. However, there were design faults with the technology, 
such as being able to scan multiple drug barcodes simultaneously. Additionally there were 
teething technical problems such as integration of existing technology and missing drugs 
from the database. Evley et al. (2010) note that both methods of checking when introduced 
increased participants’ perception of the importance of checking, although some staff were 
reluctant about the need for double checking due to errors being rare. Hence, the authors 
conclude that barcode confirmation was more feasible in the anaesthetic environment, but 
only if technological integration was preferred and feasible. They also note that second 
person confirmation was effective but would require cultural change for it to be successfully 
implemented.  
 
Barcode technology has also been advocated in blood transfusions. Due to the high risk 
associated with erroneous blood transfusions, the NPSA issued an alert entitled “Right 
Patient, Right Blood” which directs organisations to establish the feasibility of introducing 
barcodes or other electronic patient identification. The John Radcliffe Hospital in Oxford 
uses barcodes at all stages of a patient’s transfusion journey which is described as an 
unquestionable success (Murphy et al. 2009), as correct patient identification rose to 100% 
after implementation of barcode technology. However, they noted that is likely to have 
been in part due to a clearer, simplified procedure delivered alongside education. Askeland 
et al. (2008) calculated that with the use of  barcodes transfusion errors would only happen 
once in every 100 months on average, making it approximately three times safer than 





Barcode technology has also been considered in pharmacy to improve safety. Poon et al. 
(2006) found that errors and potential adverse events significantly decreased after 
implementation of a barcode assisted system. The use of barcode technology appears to be 
a possible alternative to two people checking. However, within radiotherapy, the purpose of 
the final treatment check is to ensure values which have been manually entered into a 
computer system match those prescribed for the patient. In order to use barcode 
technology these values would have to be entered onto another computer system, 
therefore the use of barcode technology would still require a manual check of values 
entered into a computer system. 
 
As this review of existing literature has demonstrated, there is a divide in the literature as to 
whether single or double checking is more effective at detecting, and thereby preventing, 
errors.  Furthermore, there has been little research into why double checking may fail to 
detect an error. Consequently, more research is needed to conclude which method of 
checking is most effective, in order to apply this knowledge to the final treatment check in 
radiotherapy.  
4.3 Causes of checking failures 
Several root cause analyses have identified that a double check of medicines could have 
prevented a medical error, for instance, Toft's (2007) review of an erroneously administered 
injection of heparin. However, following Toft’s (2007) review Sir Liam Donaldson expressed 
his concerns that a double check may actually increase the risk of errors due to involuntary 
automaticity and reduction of responsibility. Donaldson also notes that double checking is a 
complex area, with little evidence on the benefits. Anderson and Webster (2001) also note 
that checking in any form can never be 100% effective because humans are not 100% 
reliable.  
 
According to Reason’s (1990) classifications of human error, a double check not detecting an 
error is an active failure which can be divided into slips and lapses, due to disruptions in 
memory or attention respectively. As discussed in section 3.2.3, there is limited literature to 




existing reports in the literature surrounding attention failures during checking in healthcare 
more generally. 
4.3.1 Attention failures during checking 
Existing literature suggests that double checking can become a ritualistic task, conducted 
without attention if repeated regularly.  Double checking has been labelled a “double 
checking chant” and Leape (2000 cited in Armitage 2007) notes that it saps time and is 
ineffective. Barshi and Healey (1993) conducted an experimental study and found evidence 
to suggest that checklists are susceptible to automaticity. The study is grounded in aviation 
where checklists are used for safety purposes. Hence, if checklists are susceptible to 
automaticity, they can be potentially dangerous. Barshi and Healey (1993) provide an 
excellent rationale for their study into automaticity in checklists; previous research has 
focussed on the benefits of automaticity and ignored the risks of automaticity. The design 
used to investigate ritualisation and automaticity in checklists was original and simple. The 
authors asked participants to proof-read a number of multiplication sums, which the 
authors argue simulates the five stages in checklists: call, action, visual verification and 
response. Participants were timed as to how long it took to complete the proof-read of all 
the multiplication sums. After practice, the decrease in time spent completing the proof-
reading of multiplication sums suggested automaticity occurred, as automaticity is 
associated with high speed responding. However, after several repetitions of these set of 
sums, participants failed to notice errors in completed multiplication sums. Therefore, the 
authors showed that the same stimuli presented in the same order leads to automation, 
wherein performance becomes quicker but errors can pass undetected. This suggests 
automaticity will occur quickly under identical conditions, such as the final treatment check 
in radiotherapy; 
 “Habit diminishes the conscious attention with which our acts are performed” 
William James (1890 cited in Reason 2000:114) 
 
Barshi and Healy (1993), in the same study into checklist automaticity, suggested that 
automaticity can be prevented in repeated checking by varying the order of operations or 
stimulus and placing alerts in the material. When the order of the sums was varied, less 
errors were missed, which the authors theorised was due to preventing automaticity. 




errors being detected, which was theorised to be due to the interruption of automaticity. 
The finding that varying the order of items and placing alerts into the checklist resulted in 
significantly higher error detection can possibly be applied to healthcare checklists.  
 
Toft and Mascie- Taylor (2005) conducted the only existing research into double checking 
errors in radiotherapy specifically. They suggest that double checking in radiotherapy is 
prone to, what they call, involuntary automaticity. Automaticity is not a new concept. 
Automaticity is generally a positive and useful phenomenon, as it means that regularly 
repeated actions, such as walking, can be performed without conscious consideration. This 
allows attention to be diverted to other, more productive, higher-level processes. The 
process of automation is when the nervous system actively adjusts to accommodate its own 
processing. Frequently occurring processes become ‘hard-wired’ into the system, so that 
that can run on their own, or autonomously, without the need for constant consideration 
and monitoring. Neuroimaging studies have been able to map the neuroplasticity 
mechanisms which underlie this autonomic motor skill learning (Dayan and Cohen 2011). 
This motor learning and automation is clearly beneficial, until a regularly repeated action 
requires conscious attention, such as the final treatment check. The danger of IA is that one 
is not aware when it is occurring. This makes it a dangerous phenomenon in healthcare, 
because errors can easily pass undetected if the check is conducted autonomously, yet 
healthcare staff believe they have conducted a thorough double check.  As IA is an 
unconscious and unintentional phenomenon, IA has been suggested as a legal defence for 
healthcare professionals against accusations of negligence in cases of adverse medication 
events (Toft and Gooderham 2009). The authors note that if a healthcare professional has 
previously reported to their line manger that their working conditions are placing them at 
risk of forcing an error, be it noise, workload or stress, and these conditions are not 
addressed, then the healthcare professional should not be held accountable if an error does 
then occur. 
 
In addition to the literature suggesting that attention factors underlie checking failures, 




4.3.2 Deference to authority  
Armitage's (2007) qualitative study, detailed in section 4.2, reveals deference to authority as 
a cause of errors in healthcare. This research suggested that errors may be perceived by 
junior staff but that they disregard their perception as wrong if their senior disagrees. 
Griffiths (2009) writes that the health service is one of the most hierarchical organisations 
but these hierarchies are dangerous when it comes to double checking and need to be 
removed. 
4.3.3 Diffusion of responsibility 
Armitage’s (2007) study also suggests that when double checking individual responsibility 
becomes diluted which leads to complacency. Hence, double checking can be considered a 
safety risk as staff may not take full responsibility for ensuring they conduct an effective 
check. 
4.3.4 Perceived workload 
Schell (2004) asked participants to complete a visual search task and memory tasks either 
before or after an error detection task, simulated in a pharmacy context. The authors found 
that when participants completed the tasks before the error task they performed better in 
the accuracy checking task. The authors note that tasks thought to cognitively demanding 
had a ‘mobilization’ effect on error detection, whereby the pre-tasks increased arousal 
which led to higher perceptual and cognitive readiness. The authors state that if this finding 
is replicated it could have important implications when applied to checking, as the results 
suggest that a cognitive or visual task can act as a ‘warm up’ to improve error detection.  
4.4 What can be learnt from other industries 
Despite definitive research related to checking efficacy in healthcare, lessons on checking 
can be learned from other high risk industries, such as aviation. Both healthcare and 
aviation are safety critical industries involving highly trained individuals working in teams 
and transfer of knowledge from the aviation industry to healthcare is advocated (Armitage 
2007). 
 
The aviation industry has been the subject of intensive research into human error, and the 
industry has used checklists to help ensure errors are prevented since the 1930s. A checklist 




complex human interaction. Gawande (2011), author of the checklist manifesto, is an 
advocate of the effectiveness of a simple checklist to support humans to perform optimally. 
He notes that aviation checklists were introduced after WWII because flying had become 
much more complex and there was so much for pilots to remember. A significant number of 
aviation crashes can be traced back to a failure to complete a checklist properly (Gawande 
2011). Field studies of flight deck checklists, interviews and analysis of accidents have 
revealed a number of common checklist mistakes, resulting from early aviation checklists 
not benefitting from human factors input (Degani and Weiner 1990). These mistakes 
include; not reading checklist items aloud, calling items from memory, responding quickly to 
checklist items without actually verifying, and chunking items together. Hence, significant 
work has been focussed on improving the effectiveness of checklists. 
 
Checklists can be said to have a dual purpose; both as a memory aid and generator or co-
ordinator of tasks. Degani and Weiner (1990) note all checklists follow the same format: 
1. Reading or hearing a checklist item 
2. Accomplishing that item, either by verification or executing that task 
3. Responding to the outcome of the action 
 
Following a review of aviation checklists, Degani and Weiner (1993) recommended the 
following checklist features: placing safety critical items at the beginning of the checklist, 
employing the user’s tactile sense and keeping items in a logical order. Additionally, the 
sterile cockpit rule is advocated whereby there is silence during critical safety phases. 
Furthermore, aviation checklists employ a challenge- response method, whereby one 
person reads out an item and the other checks it and responds. The work in aviation 
suggests that a well-designed checklist which elicits an active challenge- response call 
successfully improves safety (Degani and Weiner 1990).  
 
However, there is argument that the comparison between aviation and healthcare is too 
simplistic. There may be too many variables in medicine compared to aviation. It could also 
be argued that authority gradients are much more salient in healthcare, compared to 
aviation. Despite the potential differences between the domains, the principles of good 




a need to understand the requirements of the users in the specific domain, which can only 
be achieved through new empirical research. 
4.5 Healthcare checklists 
A systematic review of 20 articles on the impact of healthcare checklists on team factors, 
found that checklists have also been demonstrated to improve team work, communication 
and inter-disciplinary working in healthcare (Russ et al. 2013).  The design of aviation 
checklists was used to inspire the development of the surgical safety checklist (Weiser et al. 
2010).  The surgical safety checklist (SSC) is perhaps the most notable checklist in use in 
healthcare. The SSC was introduced in 2008, with the view to increase consistency of care in 
the operating theatre, to minimise the frequency of surgical adverse events. The checklist is 
comprised of three stages, ‘sign-in’, ‘time-out’ and ‘sign-out’. These are carried out when 
the patient arrives in the operating room, prior to incision and following completion of the 
procedure respectively. The principle of the checklist is for all operating staff to be present 
when the checklist is conducted, and to create an environment in which all staff feel able to 
speak out about any potential errors or expected difficulties. A landmark publication in 
2009, comparing pre- and post- implementation, reported that implementation of the SSC 
reduced mortality rates from 1.5% to 0.8% (Haynes, Weiser, Berry et al. 2009). Use of the 
SSC in all operating theatres is currently recommended through national guidance in the 
United Kingdom, but the decision for use lies at the individual Trust level.  However, a 
recent report published following an investigation into 11 incidents of retained foreign 
objects post-operatively at Sheffield Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust in a 38 month 
period, recommends that this guidance to follow the SSC becomes national policy, and thus 
mandatory in the UK (Toft 2014). 
 
An observational study of 294 operations across five hospital sites, demonstrated that the 
compliance rate of performing the SSC correctly is not optimal (Pickering et al. 2013). The 
study found that the ‘sign out’ stage of the SSC is often not conducted, suggesting that it 
does not fit the workflow of surgical teams.  A qualitative investigation on the barriers and 
facilitators to use of the SSC revealed some interesting findings surround healthcare staff’s 
perceptions of the SSC (Russ et al. 2015).  Results of the semi-structured interviews in this 




and between hospitals. A number of facilitators to SSC adherence were found including; 
integration with existing protocols, strong leadership skills from the person leading the 
checklist, senior clinician buy-in, feedback on the impact of the SSC and support from 
management. Additionally, a number of barriers to use were discovered, including; patient 
perceptions, scepticism of the evidence base, additional time implications, lack of local 
modification and duplication of existing safety procedures.  These barriers must be 
considered in the design of any new treatment checking protocols. 
4.6 Standardisation of checking 
Towards Safer Radiotherapy provides the guideline that two radiographers conduct the final 
treatment check and be recognised as the responsible operators (Donaldson 2007). 
Employers are required to maintain a list of operators entitled to “switch on”, meaning 
press the button which administers the radiation beam, and to provide precise protocols 
specifying their responsibilities and accountabilities. However, as discussed in section 4.1 
there is no standard checking protocol, leaving the final treatment check open to local 
interpretation.  Therefore, if a new checklist protocol was to be implemented, it would 
require a standardised method of working at the point of the final treatment check which is 
currently novel in radiotherapy 
 
Standardisation is common elsewhere in healthcare, with the aim of preventing variation in 
practice, and ensuring everyone is working to the best practice. Standardisation is thought 
to reduce the risk of error, as well as increasing efficiency by reducing complexity: 
“one of the most powerful means of preventing errors of all kinds is to standardise 
processes” (Institute of medicine 2000:190).  
 
This is because when processes are standardised trained healthcare workers can easily 
move to a different department or hospital, and immediately be capable of working to best 
practice. However, healthcare lags significantly behind other safety critical industries in 
terms of standardisation. For instance, in aviation any trained pilot can fly a Boeing 747 for 
any airline, yet it is unlikely that any qualified surgeon can schedule, prep and perform an 
operation in any hospital (Leotsakos et al. 2014). A reason for this lag may be because it is 
believed that achieving standardisation in healthcare is challenging. Standardisation 




complexity, diversity and changing nature of healthcare and the NHS. Another reason may 
be the prevailing person-centred approach to error which removes responsibility for error 
from the system design (Runciman et al. 2008).  
 
Standardisation within healthcare is currently the subject of a body of research by the WHO.  
This body of research focuses on three standardised operating procedures (SOP): correct 
surgery, medication reconciliation and concentrated inject-able medicines. Implementing 
these SOPs into practice in five hospitals around the world, followed by evaluation of 
adherence to the SOPs, will provide insight into the feasibility of standardisation and 
associated behaviour management needs in healthcare (Leotsakos et al. 2014). The results 
are expected over the next few years. 
 
What is currently clear is that radiotherapy currently lags behind other healthcare domains 
in terms of standardisation, and that standardisation of error-prone processes, such as the 
final treatment check, may reduce risk. 
4.7 Implementation science 
In order to achieve standardisation of the final treatment check, new ways of working would 
need to be introduced, yet implementing change is challenging. Implementation science, 
sometimes referred to as improvement science, is the term given to the relatively new 
multidisciplinary field concerned with evaluating the best methods of closing the gap 
between what is consider best practice and what is done in practice (May 2013). 
 
In healthcare, the evidence based practice approach is the underlying approach to quality 
standards. Yet, gaps often exist between what healthcare professionals know they should 
be doing to deliver quality healthcare and what is actually done (Haines 1998). In fact it has 
been estimated that successful implementation rates for quality improvement projects (QI) 
are under 50% (Alexander 2008). The gaps between knowledge and practice, and low 
implementation rates, could be attributed to the challenges associated with implementation 
of QI initiatives. QI innovations include clinical breakthroughs, protocols or interventions 
which are developed but then may not realise the patient benefit they were designed for 




implementation failure: the intervention not being of proven effectiveness in practice, lack 
of evidence of cost or resource benefits, resistance, and culture in the target setting (Ham, 
Kipping and McLeod 2003). It could be said therefore, that change in healthcare is an 
iterative process between science and practice- one needs to inform the other reciprocally 
to produce effective change. 
 
A QI initiative failing to be integrated into practice may be because of the way it was 
introduced. There are many theories surrounding the best way to implement quality 
improvement initiatives successfully, to describe these all is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
These theories draw upon multiple discipline fields, such as: psychology, health behaviour 
change, economics and management.  It is clear there is a need for reviewing and refining 
the many theories of implementation into a single, complete and simplified general theory 
of implementation (May 2013). The main components that each current theory draws upon 
are presented in table 3.2. Each theory of implementation is likely to feature one or more of 




Table 4.1: Approaches aimed at implementation (Grohl et al. 2013) 
There is currently little evidence of which theoretical approach to implementation is more 
successful. A systematic review of 235 studies which had reported to have used theory to 
inform evaluations of implementation concluded that there is often little, or poor quality, 
justification for the use of a chosen theory (Davies, Walker and Grimshaw 2010). Therefore, 
the authors argued that there needs to be greater and more explicit use of theory in 
implementation in order to increase understanding of what works, and what does not work, 
in healthcare implementation. 
 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of this thesis can be viewed at 




Not only is there poor use of theory in implementation approaches, but each local specific 
improvement intervention may require a different balance of the components described 
above to ensure successful implementation. There is little guidance on how to determine 
the best match for each local situation (Proctor, Powell and McMillen 2013). Furthermore, 
with each local situation there are specific determinants of change, or barriers and enablers, 
which can influence the effectiveness of change in a negative or positive way respectively. 
These determinants of change can either be; related to the innovation that is implemented, 
the motivations or beliefs of the individuals expected to adopt it, the setting in which they 
act, or the structure of the healthcare organisation. To avoid unexpected challenges in 
implementation users must be considered and placed at the centre of the QI initiative 
design, process of implementation and continued evaluation of the innovation (Proctor, 
Powell and McMillen 2013). Therefore, any design of a QI initiative must involve a detailed 
analysis of barriers, enablers and the situation into which it is intended to be deployed, in 
order to optimise the design and determine the best method of implementation to ensure 
every chance of success. 
 
The engagement and involvement of health care professionals in the design of improvement 
interventions can be crucial to success. In order for an intervention to be implemented, it 
requires behaviour change from the healthcare staff. Behaviour change can be challenging, 
but is more effective if based on psychological theories of behaviour change (Cane, 
O'Connor and Michie 2012). A review of 235 implementation studies showed that only a 
small minority explicitly used behaviour change principles in the design of the 
implementation (Davies, Walker and Grimshaw 2010). There are a plethora of behaviour 
change theories and, as such, the Theoretical Domains Framework (TDF) was designed to 
simplify and improve accessibility to behaviour change theory for healthcare researchers 
when designing interventions (Michie et al. 2005). This framework was developed with 
input from health service researchers, psychologists and health psychologists. Some 33 
theories and 128 key theoretical constructs related to behaviour change were simplified 
into one single framework to assess behavioural problems and inform intervention design. 
This synthesis also resulted in exemplar questions for use in interviews or focus groups to 
allow assessment of theoretical implementation problems. TDF has been successfully 




interventions. For example, Dyson, Lawton, Jackson and Cheater (2013) conducted a study 
of the barriers and enablers related to hand hygiene amongst healthcare professionals using 
TDF. The use of TDF was also demonstrated by Taylor et al. (2013) who combined user 
feedback and theory in the successful implementation of evidence based guidelines to 
reduce the risk of feeding into misplaced nasogastric tubes. The authors therefore 
demonstrate that it is possible, and preferable, to combine theory and co-design 
approaches when designing strategies for implementing patient safety initiatives. 
 
Alongside consideration of a new innovations users, the role of the middle manager has 
recently been argued to be very important to the implementation process, yet currently 
poorly understood and utilised (Birken, Lee and Weiner 2012).  The authors argue that 
middle managers can be utilised to bridge the gap and mediate between frontline staff and 
top managers, and “sell” new innovations to staff. A tool to measure implementation 
leadership has been developed (Aarons, Ehrhart and Farahnak 2014). The implementation 
leadership scale (ILS) is a 12-item scale which aims to assess to what extent a person scores 
on four dimensions of successful implementation leadership: proactive, knowledgeable, 
supportive and perseverant. After pilot testing on 459 mental health professionals from 93 
outpatient departments in California, USA, the scale was reported to have high internal 
consistency, reliability and validity. The authors argue that the scale can be used, not only to 
strategically appoint staff to managerial positions during an implementation process, but to 
comparatively assess implementation leadership in order to increase the understanding of 
leadership as a predictor of successful implementation.  
 
Even when well implemented it is documented that initiatives may fail to be sustained 
(Ham, Kipping and McLeod 2003). The NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement 
designed a Sustainability Model to assist healthcare providers to identify and address issues 
which may affect innovation sustainability (Maher, Gustafson and Evans 2010). This tool can 
also be used prior to implementation to assess the likelihood of adherence to, and 
sustainability of, a new innovation before resources are invested into implementing it. The 





Table 4.2: Factors likely to contribute to initiative sustainability 
Domain Factor 
Process Benefits beyond helping patients 
Process Credibility of the benefits 
Process Adaptability of improved process 
Process Effectiveness of the system to monitor progress 
Staff Staff involvement and training to sustain the process 
Staff Staff attitudes towards sustaining the change 
Staff Senior leadership engagement 
Staff Clinical lead engagement 
Organisation Fit with the organisations strategic aims and culture 
Organisation Infrastructure for sustainability 
 
These items were derived from a review of healthcare management literature alongside 
consultation with clinicians and health care experts. Each factor can be scored by staff and 
the scores for each domain amalgamated in order to assess which areas require focus in 
order to increase the likelihood of sustainability (Maher, Gustafson and Evans 2010). 
Therefore, because these concepts can be measured, future research could use these as 
tools before and during patient safety QI implementation.  
 
In response to the recognised need for theory to inform implementation to a greater extent, 
Normalisation Process Theory (NPT) was developed (May et al. 2009). NPT focuses on the 
process of an intervention becoming normal practice through three stages; implementation 
(bringing a new process into practice), to embedding (the new process becomes routinely 
incorporated into practice) to integration (the new process is reproduced and sustained) 
(May et al. 2009). This theory helps researchers and clinicians to evaluate implementation 
of, and continued adherence to, new interventions or technologies by analysing the factors 
which inhibit and facilitate success. There has been a recent growing interest in applying 
NPT to healthcare interventions, and it is recognised that the theory is flexible and its use in 
shaping implementation processes is continually evolving (McEvoy et al. 2014). Alongside 
the theoretical application to help guide intervention design and process implementation, 
the NPT provides a toolkit to be used with clinicians to further understand likely barriers and 





The large existing literature on implementation suggests that whilst radiotherapy may 
benefit from more standardisation, implementing this change will need to be carefully 
considered to ensure adherence and sustainability. It is also clear that in the design of any 
new radiotherapy safety initiative, radiographers must be involved in the design, and the 
initiative must be derived from a firm evidence base. Therefore, user involvement and 
evidence-based requirements will remain central to the development of any initiative 
arising from this research. 
4.8 Chapter summary 
This review has highlighted that double checking is used in many areas of healthcare, yet 
there is a debate on the efficacy of double checking over single checking. However, this 
debate is not underpinned by a large body of empirical research. The majority of research 
into double checking in healthcare consists of retrospective analysis or viewpoints, not 
empirical or comparative research. There is very little research focussed specifically on 
double checking in radiotherapy, with the majority of research focussed on either nursing 
practice or anaesthesia. This means a critical safety defence is not currently evidence based, 
therefore this must be a research priority.   
 
In order to provide an evidence base, more human factors analysis is required in order to 
understand the factors contributing to human error during checking in radiotherapy. 
Existing literature on double checking has suggested some solutions to preventing errors 
passing undetected, especially when consulting the literature in the aviation field, for 
instance, checklists to lessen cognitive demands, challenge-response verbal checking and 
‘sterile’ environments. Previous research in aviation and healthcare appears to have focused 
on the role of attention during repeated double checking, and suggests that attention 
failures, specifically involuntary automaticity, could be a major cause of error detection 
failures. Therefore, research must investigate methods to combat attention failures during 
repeated double checking.  
 
The preceding three chapters have provided a review of the existing literature on patient 
safety, radiotherapy and double checking. From this is can be concluded that more research 




understand the factors which impact on error detection during the final treatment check. A 
summary of the key findings from the literature review are provided below: 
 
 Errors in radiotherapy have the potential to cause severe or fatal patient harm. 
 The final defence against errors in radiotherapy is a treatment check conducted by 
radiographers, during which values on the linear accelerator are confirmed as 
corresponding to the patients’ paper prescription. 
 There is limited existing guidance on how to conduct this final treatment check. 
 Double checking is advised, but this is prone to error itself. 
 There is limited research on the factors surrounding errors during checking in 
radiotherapy. 
 There is limited evidence to support the use of double checking over single checking. 
  There are recommendations from aviation and other areas of healthcare which can 
be embedded into improving the final treatment check in radiotherapy. 
 
Building on this literature review, the next section of the thesis details the empirical work 
undertaken to further develop the knowledge on the final treatment check in radiotherapy 
and how the safety of this process can be improved. The research objectives of the 
empirical work are to: 
1. Examine and review the checking process immediately prior to beam delivery 
and identify factors affecting the reliability of this process to detect errors 
2. Experimentally test the impact on performance of different approaches to 
checking in a laboratory setting, to develop an empirical evidence base  
3. Specify and design an evidence-based revised checking process for use 
immediately prior to beam delivery 
4. Evaluate the revised process to determine user acceptance 
 
The following chapter provides an overview of the methodology used to meet these 




5 Chapter 5- Methodology 
This chapter discusses the research methodology adopted in this thesis. The aim of the 
research was to understand the process and efficacy of the final treatment check in 
radiotherapy treatment, in order to improve the safety of this process. This research has 
adopted an interdisciplinary, mixed methods approach in order to meet the research aims. 
This chapter explains the guiding methodological approach taken.  The overall structure of 
the thesis is then provided, where the research methodologies are mapped against the 
research objectives. A discussion of reliability, validity and ethical considerations then 
follows. As each empirical chapter employs a different method, further operational method 
detail will be provided within each empirical chapter in order to aid the flow and clarity of 
the thesis. 
5.1 Mixed-methods approach 
This thesis has employed a mixed-methods, multi-disciplinary approach in order to 
understand the final treatment check process in radiotherapy treatment delivery and how it 
may be improved to increase safety. This mixed-methods approach fits within the pragmatic 
approach to research (Creswell and Plano Clark 2007). This approach allows the researcher 
the freedom to adopt research methods from either qualitative or quantitative research, 
depending on which is best suited to meeting the research objective, without being 
constrained by philosophical debates on the knowledge gained by these research 
approaches (Creswell and Plano Clark 2007). Each research method used is analysed in the 
appropriate manner, but it is recognised that both qualitative and quantitative methods are 
complementary, and can be used to inform the other. As well as allowing flexibility in the 
research, this approach is also considered to provide valid results, as it allows for a higher 
level of data, methodological and theory triangulation (Creswell and Plano Clark 2007), 
which increases validity.  As such this approach is believed to have struck the right balance 
between empirical and naturalistic research: 
“without naturalistic facts, experimental work may become narrow and blind: but 
without experimental research the naturalistic approach runs the danger of being 





5.1.1 Patient safety approach 
Patient safety is an applied science, which combines theory with improvement initiatives, 
yet there is no single unified research framework within the field (Pronovost et al. 2009). 
The purpose of patient safety research is to reduce the risks and hazards within healthcare 
which could lead to clinical harm. Battles and Lilford (2003) attempted to provide an 
overview and conceptual framework for patient safety research, and note that the aim of 
the discipline is achieved with a three step process: 
1. Identification of risks and hazards 
2. Design, implementation and evaluation 
3. Ensuring safe practice and a safe environment continue 
 
It is recognised that each stage requires different research methods. Each healthcare 
domain demands the utilisation of different research methods, therefore no single research 
method can be used for all patient safety research (Battles and Lilford 2003). Three main 
research methods are typically used within patient safety to identity risks and hazards; 
archival data analysis, observation and process mapping. The most commonly used method 
in patient safety research is retrospective analysis of error from incident reports, and other 
archival data, or through root cause analysis (Pronovost et al. 2009). This method is inherent 
to the issues surrounding reporting, as well as being time intensive due to the necessity of 
incident data collection (Battles and Lilford 2003). 
 
Due to the reactive nature of archival error analysis, Pronovost et al. (2009) advocate 
prospective analysis of the weaknesses in the system.  This can be conducted through 
observation of the systems in action, in order to understand the associated social and 
operational factors. Yet, as Battles and Lilford (2003) note, a patient safety incident may not 
occur during this period of observation. Process mapping is also increasingly being used to 
understand the weak points in a system, after being used successfully in other high risk 
industries. A further method which is gaining popularity, but not commonly used due to 
limited resources, is that of simulation studies (Pronovost et al. 2009). These are considered 
effective as they can map a process and observe errors, in a safe environment, whilst 





Small-scale patient safety initiatives often follow a Plan-Do-Study-Act model (PDSA). This 
involves planning the target for improvement and change is then trialled on a small, specific 
scale. This small scale change is then evaluated by comparing pre and post implementation 
data, before the cycle is either repeated again or implementation on a wider scale is 
decided upon (Langley, Nolan, Nolan, Norman and Provost 2009).  This allows a structured 
method to study iterative development of QI initiatives. However, it has been argued that 
not all studies adopting this method do so in a consistent manner, with many studies not 
fully adopting the key principles leading to limited learning and adaptation between each 
cycle (Taylor et al. 2013). This potentially means the PSDA model is not used optimally to 
improve patient safety.  
 
From this discussion it is concluded that a range of research methods are suitable in patient 
safety research, yet all have their own strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, a mixed 
methods approach is advocated in patient safety research, to ensure that the appropriate 
method is used to explore the specific healthcare domain (Battles and Lilford 2003).  This 
thesis has included methods advocated in patient safety research, such as: observation, 
interviews and laboratory based simulation. A PDSA model has not been adopted as it was 
not possible to implement a new treatment checking protocol into a department’s practice 
due to ethics. Furthermore, it is argued that there should be a process of iterative 
development in a simulated setting, involving user feedback, prior to the implementation of 
a QI in a real life setting. This minimises the potential for any unexpected negative 
consequences of the QI initiative. Yet, it is recognised that the PDSA model is valuable as the 
next step following simulation-based study when implementing a new QI initiative across an 
organisation. 
5.2 Thesis structure 
Table 5.1 displays which research methods have been used to address each research 
objective. As each empirical chapter employs a different method, further method detail will 
be provided within each empirical chapter in order to aid flow and clarity. Each chapter will 
provide the rationale for the study, detailed method, results and discussion of results along 
with a critique of the method used in that study.  Figure 5.1 provides an overview of the 




then informed either the next stage of the research process, and/or a resulting practice 
recommendation. 
 
Table 5.1: Overview of thesis content and relation to research aims 
Research Objective Methods Chapters 
Examine and review the checking 
process immediately prior to beam 
delivery and identify factors affecting 
the reliability of this process to detect 
errors 
 Literature review 
 Task analysis 
 Exploratory semi-
structured interviews 
2, 3, 4, 6 & 7 
Experimentally test the impact on 
performance of different approaches to 
checking in a laboratory setting, to 
develop an empirical evidence base  
 Laboratory based 
experiments 
8 
Specify and design an evidence-based 
revised checking process for use 
immediately prior to beam delivery 
 Protocol and 
interface design 
9 & 10 
Evaluate the revised process to 













5.3 Qualitative methodology 
The thesis both starts and ends with qualitative methodology, as shown in figure 5.1. 
Qualitative research is useful for gaining an understanding of a research topic, 
evaluation and aiding continued development, because participants are able to 
express their perceptions and beliefs which allows the researcher to understand their 
viewpoint (Coolican 2004).  
 
A qualitative approach is beneficial as an introduction to the topic, because as the 
literature review has demonstrated, checking within radiotherapy is currently an 
understudied topic. This qualitative approach was adopted at the start of the body of 
research to conduct observations and interviews which provided descriptive data and 
informed the later avenues of research, as shown in figure 5.1. A qualitative approach 
was also adopted as an evaluation tool to explore staff views on the new verbal 
checking protocol and proposed interface developed.  
5.3.1 Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were employed to evaluate the resulting protocol and 
proposed interface design. The use of semi-structured interviews allowed for 
interesting points raised by participants to be followed up on by the researcher. This 
flexible approach ensured the participants were able to adequately express their 
views, yet the interview allowed collection of the required data (Coolican 2004). This is 
why semi-structured interviews were chosen over closed or open interviews. 
5.3.2 Qualitative analysis 
Thematic analysis (TA) was chosen to analyse the data collected using the semi-
structured interviews, as this was an exploratory topic and thematic analysis allows 
identification and exploration of patterns across the data. TA is less interpretative than 
other qualitative methods such as Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA), but 
this was ideal considering the exploratory nature of this research (Braun and Clarke 
2006). This research was designed to collect staff views rather than develop an 




would have been better suited. Thematic analysis is a relatively new method of 
analysis, coined in the 1970s (Braun and Clarke 2006). The aim of TA is to identify and 
analyse patterns and can be used with smaller data sets. TA is a recursive and flexible 
process, hence the researcher can go back and change codes or themes to better 
describe the data. Although TA is flexible it is important to follow an established 
methodology. The process followed here is mapped against the stages described by 
Braun and Clarke (2006) which consists of the six steps detailed below. A second coder 
was involved in the analysis, in order to minimise subjectivity.  
5.3.2.1 Stage 1- Familiarisation with the data 
This was done both through transcription and re-reading of transcripts. During this 
stage initial thoughts about patterns arising were noted. This proved to be very useful 
for getting to know the data. As Bird (2005) notes, transcription is a key stage and not 
just functional because interpretation also begins at this stage. 
5.3.2.2 Stage 2- Initial codes 
Anything relevant to the research question was coded in this stage. Each transcript was 
coded individually. Each code thus became a piece of data. A second independent 
coder also coded a sample of the transcripts to check the reliability of coding, and 
codes were compared for agreement. 
5.3.2.3 Stage 3- Searching for themes 
All codes were then collated and, due to the high number of codes, these were 
grouped into similar categories. This allowed for a more manageable number of 
categories from which meaningful patterns relevant to the research question could be 
seen. The next stage was the start of analysis- grouping codes into meaningful themes.  
 
Similar codes were grouped together with themes constructed from them. Then 
thought was given to the use of over-arching themes and sub-themes. At this stage the 
second coder read all transcripts and reviewed the use of categories and themes and a 





5.3.2.4 Stage 4- Reviewing themes 
During this stage themes were reviewed and refined. As TA is a dynamic, recursive 
process codes and themes can be changed and altered. The themes were reviewed, 
some were split and others combined. Some themes were discarded due to lack of 
data to support them. It was ensured that every theme had been repeated more than 
once and that themes emerged from across data so that each interview was not 
treated as a separate data set. This continued until the researcher and second coder 
were confident that the themes ‘told the story’ of the data.  
5.3.2.5 Stage 5- Defining and naming themes 
Each theme was named and described. It was important that the description captured 
the participants’ views and essence of that theme succinctly and accurately. 
5.3.2.6 Stage 6- Writing up 
The themes were written up using quotes weaved amongst the theme’s description. It 
was ensured that this writing up of themes was not just a narrative but an answer to 
the research question. 
5.4 Quantitative methodology 
A quantitative experimental approach was adopted to comparatively evaluate 
different methods of checking and the impact of the interface design in a laboratory 
setting. This allowed the research to follow up the main findings from the initial 
qualitative interviews, as shown in figure 5.1. The use of quantitative techniques 
allows for numerical data to be gathered and analysed, which can be used as evidence 
for effectiveness or to test hypotheses (Coolican 2004). According to Karl Popper’s 
theory of falsification, a theory must be testable and found to be supported, or not 
supported, through empirical study (Popper 1959). Previous research into 
radiotherapy errors passing undetected during the final treatment safety check has 
been theorised to be due to involuntary automaticity (Toft and Mascie-Taylor 2005). 
Therefore, in order for this theory to be valid it needed to be falsifiable, and a 




vital when developing a new treatment checking protocol to ensure it was evidence-
based. 
 
The laboratory based experimental research in this thesis employed a paradigm 
designed to mimic the repetitiveness of the final treatment check in radiotherapy. This 
simulated experimental approach is useful as it allows for the variables of interest to 
be isolated, away from the confounding variables present in a real life scenario. It also 
allows for these variables to be studied in a much shorter timescale. Errors in real life 
settings are infrequent and unpredictable, therefore it is argued that it is of value to 
simulate errors in a laboratory setting in order to allow efficient and measurable 
assessment of the impact of different variables. Errors can also cause patient harm, 
therefore a simulated setting is required to measure the impact of variables on error 
occurrence so as not to cause potential harm to patients. The method is described in 
detail in section 8.2 to ensure transparency about how the experiments were run and 
to ensure they can be replicated. The participant instructions were standardised for all 
participants to ensure all participants received the same instructions so as not to 
influence their performance. However, it is recognised that there are potential 
limitations when applying laboratory findings to the real world.   
5.4.1 Use of lay participants 
The participants who took part in the laboratory based experiments in this body of 
research were undergraduate students at Coventry University and not trained in 
radiotherapy. Lay participants were recruited for two reasons. Firstly, there was a 
greater level of accessibility to lay participants. As the experiments were lengthy, it 
was not possible to recruit radiographers into the experiment. This is because taking 
them away from the department, in pairs, for upwards of 45 minutes at a time would 
have had negative resource, and therefore safety, impacts on the department. 
Participation at the end of a shift was also not considered methodologically sound, due 
to fatigue.  Secondly, the actual process of the final treatment check is a simple task, 
which requires no specific training in radiotherapy. That said, the participants in the 




experimental paradigm was mimicking, in order to place the task they were being 
asked to do in context.  Hence, it is argued that the use of lay participants does not 
affect the validity of the results. 
5.5 User centred design 
User centred design is a design philosophy which ensures that end-users remain 
central during the design process, by collecting their views, requirements, limitations 
and goals which are then considered in the design. User centred design is an iterative 
process, during which end-user feedback is continually sought between each draft of a 
design in order to aid further development (Garrett 2010, Norman and Draper 1986). 
As the users requirements are embedded into the design from the start of the process, 
this is believed to improve the usability and acceptance of the end product (Johnson, 
Johnson and Zhang 2005).  
 
This design philosophy has been adopted in this thesis, in a number of ways:  
 Drawing up user requirements through interviews 
 Mapping the activity through task analysis 
 Design of a protocol and interface features 
 Design evaluation with end-users of both the protocol and interface design 
 
As shown in figure 5.1, qualitative interviews with users informed the research 
directions, and the resulting outcomes were also evaluated with end users. This user-
centred approach has informed the design of a useable and effective checking protocol 
for use immediately prior to radiotherapy treatment delivery and interface design 
recommendations.  
5.6 Reliability and validity 
Research results must be valid and reliable before generalisation can be made. This 
thesis has employed a range of methods from both qualitative and quantitative 




of triangulation was used to ensure that the results gained were valid, as Webb, 
Campbell, Schwartz and Sechrest (1966:3) note: 
 "Once a proposition has been confirmed by two or more independent 
measurement processes, the uncertainty of its interpretation is 
greatly reduced."  
 
Validity is how well the research measures what it intended to measure (Coolican 
2004).  Reliability refers to the accuracy of the research measures or designs, and to 
what extent they are dependable and consistent (Coolican 2004). There are many 
forms of both reliability and validity which need to be considered throughout all stages 
of the research process. A discussion of the main concepts in regards to this thesis are 
discussed below.  
5.6.1 Sampling 
All participants in this thesis were self-selected which could have impacted upon the 
validity of the results. When recruiting for the interview studies, the invitation to 
participate was extended to a whole department, or training year group, yet 
participants put themselves forward to participate. As such, it is likely that the 
participant sample consisted of those radiographers and student radiographers who 
were interested in the subject and who possibly had stronger opinions on the subject 
matter than others who did not volunteer to participate.  
 
It is recognised that the sample in the interview studies was narrow, as qualified 
participants came from one of two departments and student radiographers from one 
education establishment.  The exploratory interviews were conducted with 
radiographers from one department and the evaluation interviews were conducted 
with radiographers from another department. This was not believed to have had an 
impact on the findings for two reasons. Firstly, the majority of participants spoke of 
having either trained or worked at a different department to the one they were 
working in when interviewed, and hence drew upon their experiences in all 
departments when interviewed. Consequently, the interview data provided was 




department the interviews were conducted in. Secondly, the attitudes of staff 
regarding safety and the final treatment check, and subsequent themes emerging from 
the analysis were similar between the exploratory and evaluative interviews despite 
participants coming from different departments. This suggests that the views of 
radiographers are similar across departments.  The views of student radiographer 
participants were also similar and in keeping with the views of qualified radiographers. 
Student radiographers had been on placement in a number of departments in the 
region and as each student radiographer had been on placement in at least two 
departments, this adds validity to the results found.   
 
The participant samples in the experiment studies were also self-selected, as they 
were all undergraduate psychology students at Coventry University and recruited via 
the university’s online experiment management system, SONA. Students receive 
credits for time spent participating in research, and are required to collect a certain 
number of credits during the academic year. However, they have the option of signing 
up to many studies on SONA, and receive the credits regardless of whether they 
choose to withdraw or not, so there is no issue of bribery.  This is similar to many 
schemes in other universities. As students need a set level of credits, it is likely that 
those students volunteering to participate towards the beginning of the academic year 
were conscientious students, which may have impacted results. However, participants 
took part in the experimental studies across the time span of academic years, thus 
random allocation to experimental condition is believed to have diluted any impact of 
personality traits on results. Hence, validity of results has not been affected.  
5.6.2 Research design 
The validity of the interview findings began with ensuring the interview schedule 
contained valid questions which would elicit useful and meaningful data. The interview 
schedule was derived from both the literature review, task analysis and the research 
aims. The interviews followed a flexible emergent design. That meant that if a 
participant brought up any points which proved interesting in regards to the research 




collection continued until data saturation was reached. This is the point at which 
participants were not providing new insights or findings. This suggests the participant 
sample was adequate to represent all views from the organisations involved.   
 
When conducting research on a potentially sensitive topic such as patient safety, there 
is always the risk that participants may not be entirely truthful. This risk was minimised 
during the interview by it being made clear to the participants that the researcher was 
an independent outsider who was not affiliated to the hospital or university they were 
working in. Furthermore, participants were assured that the data they provided would 
remain anonymous and confidential. It is believed that with these conditions in place, 
participants in this research were honest throughout the interviews.  
 
At each stage of the research the results and direction of the research were discussed 
with a qualified radiographer to ensure that the research direction was both valuable 
and that the research procedure was reliable. This was especially pertinent when 
designing the experimental laboratory paradigm, as it needed to be an accurate mimic 
of the final treatment check process. 
5.6.3 Analysis 
The researcher was not blind to the research aims, objectives and previous findings, 
because this was a PhD study and the researcher was responsible for all aspects of the 
research. Although not intentional, this may have influenced the findings, especially 
qualitative investigation which is inherently subject to some degree of subjectivity. A 
number of precautions were taken to limit any researcher bias, and resulting reliability 
issues.  
 
The interviews were all conducted by the same researcher to ensure consistency in the 
interviewing approach. Care was taken to ensure that leading questions were not 
used. The reliability of the data gained from the interviews was assisted by the 
researcher employing active listening techniques during the interviews. That is, the 




sought agreement from the participant that the summary accurately represented their 
views. Furthermore, a sample of interview transcripts were reviewed by an 
independent person to ensure the scrutiny of the questioning technique.  
 
An issue with the reliability of results gained from qualitative analysis is that of 
subjective and researcher bias. This issue was tackled with the use of a second coder 
who coded a sample of the transcripts. Inter-rater reliability was ensured through a 
discussion and subsequent agreement of the codes and themes arising from the 
analysis. Furthermore, it was ensured that every theme could be recognised in a 
number of interviews and not isolated to one participant in order to ensure the results 
were a true representation of participants’ views. The issue of subjectivity and validity 
in the task analysis was addressed, and believed to be minimised, by consulting 
radiographers to ensure what was depicted in the produced task analysis was an 
accurate representation of what happens. 
5.7 Ethical considerations 
All research was conducted in accordance with the British Psychological Society (BPS) 
code of ethical conduct. Each stage of the research was reviewed and approved by 
Coventry University Faculty of Health and Life Sciences Ethics Committee. Additional 
permission was sought and gained from Birmingham City University, Research and 
Development at University Hospital Coventry and Warwickshire and Research and 
Development at Northampton General Hospital before conducting evaluation 
interviews with qualified and student radiographers. 
5.7.1 Patient safety ethical considerations 
A number of additional ethical issues needed to be considered during this research. 
Patient safety can be a sensitive topic, and as such, healthcare proffessionals may have 
been unwilling to talk about these issues. Therefore, throughout the research process 
participants were assured that the researcher was independent to their workplace or 
university, and that the information they gave would remain anonymous. The 




which exposed an immediate risk to patient safety, this would have been reported to 
the appropriate department manager immediately, whilst respecting participants 
anonymity. No such event occurred during the research process, and participants 
appeared willing to talk about patient safety.  
 
The only exclusion criteria for participation in this research was that participants must 
not be under investigation for a patient safety incident. This is so that this research did 
not interfere with any on-going investigation, and no confidential details about such an 
incident or investigation was given during the interviews. 
 
Patient confidentiality was retained during observations in radiotherapy departments. 
The researcher did not have direct contact with any patients, and all observations took 
place outside of the treatment room. No patient details were recorded at any time. 
5.7.2 Informed consent 
Prior to participation in research all participants were invited to read an information 
sheet which described the research aims, what was involved, and their right to 
withdraw. Participants were also assured that their data would remain anonymous and 
confidential. After reading this participants were always given the opportunity to ask 
the researcher any questions before they signed and dated a consent form. The 
consent form for the exploratory interviews can be seen in appendix 4. The consent 
forms were similar for all studies, with the study title changed. 
5.7.3 Debrief 
Immediately following their participation participants were both verbally debriefed 
and handed a debrief sheet. The debrief contained information about the study aims, 
previous related research and the researcher’s contact details. Participants were given 
the option to withdraw their data up to two weeks after participation by quoting their 





All data remained anonymous through the use of alphanumerical participant codes. 
The only place these codes correlated with a participant’s name was on the consent 
forms. The consent forms were stored separately from any data in a locked filling 
cabinet. 
5.7.5 Data storage 
All data was stored confidentially and securely in accordance with data protection 
laws. Consent forms were stored separately from any data in a locked filling cabinet. 
Hard copies of experimental data were stored in a locked office, with digital files of 
results stored on a password protected computer. Data from interviews needed to be 
processed and stored with extra care to comply with data protection laws. Electronic 
recordings were stored on a password protected computer until transcribed and then 
deleted. Hard copies of transcripts were stored in a locked filing cabinet with digital 
transcripts stored on a password protected computer. The transcripts were only 
identifiable through the use of alphanumeric participant codes. 
5.8  Chapter summary 
This chapter has provided an overview of the methodology adopted in this body of 
research. It is believed that the use of mixed-methods has allowed the research 





6 Chapter 6- Study 1: Understanding the Final Treatment Check 
in Radiotherapy 
 
Building on from the literature review, this chapter seeks to understand and map the 
patient pathway and the process of checking immediately prior to beam delivery in 
detail, based on current practice. One of the objectives of the thesis was to examine 
and understand the nature of radiotherapy verification in order to improve safety and 
increase the likelihood of identifying errors before they have an opportunity to cause 
patient harm. It was aimed to map the patient pathway in order to place the final 
treatment check, which this thesis is focussing on, into context and to produce a 
framework to guide the empirical work and subsequent final treatment check protocol 
design. 
6.1 Method 
A hierarchical task analysis (HTA) was produced in order to contextualise and explore 
the final treatment check. HTA is a method used widely in the field of human factors, 
which provides a framework to map, examine and model an activity. HTA represents a 
task in increasing levels of detail, in order to analyse potentially vulnerable parts of a 
process, at the lowest levels of an activity (Shepherd 2001). As Drury, Paramore, Van 
Cott, Grey, and Corlett (1987: 371) note a task analysis, 
“Describes and analyses the performance demands made on the human 
element of a system. By concentrating on the human element in the system, it 
can compare these task demands with the known human capabilities”  
 
Evidence of an existing HTA for radiotherapy treatment checking has not been found, 
and is therefore a worthwhile endeavour to understand potential vulnerabilities, and 
areas for improvement, in the process. 
 
In order to produce a task analysis a detailed understanding of the patient pathway in 





 Over three days the delivery of treatment to 12 patients by six pairs of 
radiographers was observed at University Hospital Coventry and Warwickshire 
(UHCW) NHS Trust. The radiographers observed were of varying grades, and 
hence experience 
 At a later date a further period of observation of treatment being delivered to 
patients was conducted at Northampton General Hospital 
 Review of documentation, specifically Towards Safer Radiotherapy and the 
Radiotherapy Risk Profile in order to map the theoretical stages of treatment 
 The above sources of data were collated together and cross referenced to 
break down the process 
 The process was mapped using hierarchical task analysis (HTA)  
 It was then verified with qualified and student radiographers in interviews, 
detailed in section 7.2. 
 
Ethical approval for the observations was granted by the Faculty of Health and Life 
Sciences at Coventry University, and the R&D departments at UHCW NHS Trust and 
Northampton General Hospital. Confirmation of these approvals can be seen in 
appendix 1 and 2 respectively. The observations were conducted according to BPS 
ethical code of conduct and no patient details were recorded. 
6.2 Results 
6.2.1 The patient pathway 
The diagram presented in figure 6.1 below maps the patient pathway through 
radiotherapy treatment. Steps 1-4 are completed prior to the patient arriving for their 
first dose of radiation. Steps 5-7 are repeated over a series of days, sometimes more 
than once in a treatment session. Table 6.1 gives a brief explanation of what happens 
at each of these stages, along with professional responsibility, derived from the 





Figure 6.1: Task analysis of patient pathway 
Errors can occur at many stages of the patient treatment process. It is important to 
note that the final treatment check will not prevent any errors which have occurred 
prior to stage 3 of the treatment process. This is because these errors would be errors 
associated with diagnosis, or treatment planning. Exploration of these types of errors 
are beyond the scope of this thesis due to the complex nature of treatment planning 
and clinical decision making in radiotherapy. 
 
As discussed in section 2.3.4, stage 4 is vulnerable to error as this is the stage at which 
patients’ treatment information is uploaded onto the computers responsible for 
delivering the dose, for example due to transcription mistakes and technology failures. 
Errors are also possible at stage 5 or 6 as staff could pull up the incorrect patient file. It 
is these types of errors which the final treatment check immediately prior to treatment 
delivery should detect in order to prevent harm. The final treatment check prior to 
treatment delivery occurs during stage 6, activation of radiation; this is the treatment 






Table 6.1: Description of each stage in patient pathway 
 Stage Description Profession 
responsible 
1 Treatment request 
 
A decision is made to treat the patient with radiotherapy. Treatment plan decisions are made 
and the patient is booked in for treatment. 
Clinical oncologist 
2 Simulator positioning 
 
Patient attends radiotherapy department to receive CT/MRI scans to locate position of tumour 




3 Treatment planning 
 
Images from scanning are combined and treatment dose and treatment parameters are 
calculated and checked. This includes energy, monitor units, bed position and beam accessories 






4 Transfer of treatment 
parameters onto radiation 
delivery device 
All treatment parameters and patient details are entered onto the radiation delivery device in 
the radiotherapy department, usually through a record and verify programme. This programme 
negates the need for treatment parameters to be entered prior to every treatment. 
Radiographer 
5 Positioning of patient When the patient arrives for treatment, their file is pulled up on the computer. The patient is 
then collected from the waiting room, their identity checked and they are positioned on the bed 
in the precise location detailed on their paper prescription and on the computer system.  
Radiographer 
6 Activation of radiation 
 
The radiographer leaves the room where the radiation machine is located and returns to the 
nearby computer console. They check the parameters the machine is about to deliver, which are 
displayed on screen, match those on the patients paper prescription before turning on the beam. 
A patients’ treatment usually consists of many daily administrations of radiation and spans up to 
three weeks. The patient will attend for treatment every day during their treatment. Each 
administration of radiation is called a fraction and often more than one fraction will be given 
each day. Each fraction requires the dose parameters to be checked, although not all fractions 
require re-positioning of the patient. Therefore, this step is repeated at least once a day, and in 
many cases, more than once at a time. 
Radiographer 
7 In-vivo dosimetry 
 
This measures the radiation dose received given after the patient’s first dose to ensure the dose 





6.2.2 Activation of radiotherapy process 
During stage 6, the activation of radiation, is when the final treatment check prior to 
treatment delivery is undertaken. As earlier highlighted this is the final opportunity 
for an error in the treatment values entered into the radiotherapy machine to be 
detected, before it causes patient harm. This check, if done correctly and efficiently, 
should detect earlier errors in the treatment process to prevent erroneous 
treatment administration. Through observation of actual treatment a clearer 
understanding has been gained in how this treatment is given by radiographers and 
enabled a mapping of the individual task element.  Building on this, figure 6.2 details 









6.2.3 Variation in the final treatment check process 
As detailed on the diagram above, step 6.2.1 is when the final treatment check 
before treatment delivery is undertaken. From the review of documentation, 
detailed in section 6.1, this process cannot currently be mapped to a published 
protocol. The observations, also detailed in section 6.1, suggested that there is 
variability during this stage, both between and within radiotherapy departments. It is 
believed this variability is due to a lack of standardised treatment checking protocol.  
 
As recommended in Towards Safer Radiotherapy four parameters should be checked 
and confirmed during the final treatment check: energy, monitor units, wedge 
monitor units, and wedge position. The documentation review and observations 
revealed three methods of checking. The first two versions are how it is believed 
radiographers currently conduct this final treatment check, based on the results 
from the observations. The first version describes the process when both staff look 
at the linear accelerator interface and the paper prescription with no verbal 
interaction. One pair of radiographers, in one department were observed to 
complete the final treatment check in this way. The interview results, detailed in 
section 7.2, suggested that many radiographers complete the final check in this way, 
across many departments. This suggests this method of checking is common place 
across departments. The second method of conducting the final treatment check 
which was observed, is when radiographers do conduct a verbalised check, but 
‘chunk’ all the parameters together. Across both departments observed, the 
majority of radiographers completed the final treatment check in this way. The 
interview results, detailed in section 7.2, also confirmed that this is a common place 
method of current checking. 
 
The third version is a challenge-response check, with an active repeat back of 
treatment parameters. As discussed in section 4.4, challenge-response checking was 
identified in the literature review as being an effective method of checking, which, 
due to its safety merits, is employed by the aviation industry (Degani and Weiser 




Radiotherapy, although not in a high level of detail. The document simply states that 
treatment checks should be: 
 “active with a verbal response from the second checker” (Donaldson 2007). 
 
Therefore, this method of checking is currently proposed as best practice. During the 
observation period, no radiographers were seen to follow this method of checking. 
Although two pairs at one hospital were seen to conduct a challenge-response check 
without the active repeat back.  
 
The observations suggested variation in the method of checking used for the final 
treatment. It appeared that not everyone in the same department were checking the 
same way as each other, and there was no standardised approach between 
departments. Active challenge- response checking appears to be used less often than 
no verbalised or ‘chunked’ checking. The interviews, described in the following 
section, confirm this finding. Detailed below are the three step-by-step versions of 
the final treatment check stage, where these four parameters are verified: no verbal 
checking, ‘chunked’ checking, and active challenge-response checking. Following 
each version of the final treatment check is a review of the potential weaknesses of 
the check which may lead to a failure to detect errors, based upon theories of 
psychological processes. This allows comparison of the human elements 
requirements with human capabilities, in order to understand weaknesses and areas 
of improvement within the final treatment check process. 
6.2.3.1 No verbal checking 
The observations, and interviews described in the following chapter, revealed that 
some radiographers do not call out the parameters verbally when conducting the 
final treatment check. This method of current checking is detailed in figure 6.3. This 









There a number of reasons why this method of checking is vulnerable to errors 
passing undetected. Firstly, there may be an over-reliance on the other radiographer 
during the check which may lead to neither radiographer taking full responsibility for 
conducting a thorough check. Second, as the checking process is not verbalised, 
neither radiographer can be sure that the other has checked the parameters. This 
also makes the check vulnerable to deference to authority. This would be especially 
pertinent if a junior radiographer is delivering treatment with a senior radiographer. 
The interviews, in section 7.2, also detail this vulnerability. 
 
A further phenomenon this method of checking is vulnerable to is ‘see what you 
expect to see’ (expectancy bias).  This is a well-established notion in psychology that 
suggests various cognitive biases can influence perception: 
“Whilst part of what we perceive comes through our senses from the object 
before is, another part (and it may be the larger part) always comes out of 
our own mind” (James cited in Curry, Meyer and McKenney 2006).  
 
 Of note within the final treatment check in radiotherapy is the role of the cognitive 
bias, expectancy. Perception is malleable. The perceptual set theory of perception 
defines perception as an active process based upon inferences, interpretation and 
selection (Allport 1955). According to this theory of perception, previous experience, 
context or motivation (Balcetis and Dunning 2006), can influence what is perceived. 
If expectancy effects occur, radiographers may perceive the value which they expect 
to be there, based on experience or knowledge of the patient, not what is actually 
there. Therefore, it is important to minimise the effects of expectancy bias by 
ensuring that radiographers look at the linear accelerator machine first, and check 
that against the prescription. This is so that the expectancy of seeing what was 
written on the prescription does not influence the perception of the values which 
are about to be delivered by the machine.  
 
The phenomena of ‘see what you expect to see’ was also noted by Degani and 
Weiner (1990) in their review of aviation checklist use. They noted that after 
repeated checklist use, pilots would create a ‘mental model’ of the task which 




occurred much more quickly if the checklist was conducted in unfavourable physical 
and psychological conditions such as with a heavy workload or noisy environment. 
 
6.2.3.2 ‘Chunked’ checking 
This method of checking is illustrated in figure 6.4. The observations revealed that 
radiographers often did not verify parameters one-by-one. Instead, all four 
parameters were often called out as one. The interviews, detailed in the following 










This habit of ‘chunking’ checklist items together was also observed by Degani and 
Weiner (1990) in their review of aviation checklist use. Whilst this method of 
checking is verbal, there are a number of vulnerabilities of this method associated 
with memory and attention. This method of checking places a high cognitive load on 
the radiographer listening to the parameters being called out, which could lead to 
errors from a few theoretical perspectives. Firstly, this high cognitive load may lead 
to a failure of memory. The parameters to be verified must be held in the short term 
memory of the radiographer listening, in order to confirm they correspond with the 
parameters written on the prescription. The dominant models of memory suggest 
that the capacity of short term memory is very limited, limited to around five to nine 
items (Miller 1956, Reitman 1974 and Atkinson and Shiffrin 1968). As each 
parameter consists of multiple digits, this means the later parameters may displace 
the earlier parameters. This vulnerability to short term memory decay is also 
increased if there are distractions.  
 
The listing of parameters and high short term memory load may also have a negative 
consequence on attention. The phenomenon of inattentional blindness is thought to 
result from limited mental attention (Green 2004). Visual perception is reduced to a 
narrow field of focus when the brain is attending to another stimuli, which results in 
a lack of awareness for the stimuli presented in an unattended part of the field. 
There is a distinction between looking at a stimuli and attending to it. Todd, Fougnie 
and Marois (2005) found that an increase on visual short term memory load 
impaired the activity of the right temporoparietal junction which, in turn, prevented 
participants from perceiving a novel, unexpected stimuli. Hence, it can be inferred 
that increased visual load leads to inattentional blindness. This is of relevance to 
radiographers who are presented with a large amount of visual stimuli at the time of 
the final treatment check. Furthermore, there is a newer, related concept of 
inattentional deafness. The concept presented by Macdonald and Lavie (2011) 
suggests that stimuli may not be heard accurately when there is a high visual load. 
This can be applied to the final treatment check as, if the person responding to the 
call is looking at the screen or prescription, and hence exposed to a high visual load, 





Finally, due to a number of parameters being verbally called out in a list, it is possible 
that the second radiographer may be looking at the written parameters whilst 
listening. If this is the case, there is a possibility of errors due to cross modal 
attention. When audio and visual events happen simultaneously they can integrate. 
It has been suggested that this is not automatic and can be prevented by retaining a 
high level of attention (Koelewijn, Bronkhorst and Theeuwes 2010). This has 
implications in radiotherapy because if radiographers are looking at visual 
information when the values are perceived audibly (read out by the other 
radiographer), there is the possibility for these two stimuli to integrate and for 
radiographers to erroneously perceive to have heard the value which they were 
reading. In order to prevent this attention must be maintained at a high level. 
6.2.3.3 Active challenge-response checking 
This is the ‘active’ checking method recommended as current best practice in 
Towards Safer Radiotherapy. This document states that active checking is sufficient 
to overcome involuntary automaticity and is defined as; 
“Verifying should be active and elicit a specific detailed response rather than 
a “yes” (Donaldson 2007: 35) 
 
This method is detailed in figure 6.5. Within this method of checking there are two 
chances at error detection as each checker hears the other announce the value. This 
method of checking is known as challenge-response and, as discussed in section 4.4, 
is widely used within aviation due to its safety benefits. This method of checking was 
not seen during the observations and no participants reported this method being 
used in their department during the interviews presented in the following chapter.  
Radiographers where observed using this method without the active repeat back 
infrequently during the observations. As such, it is believed that this method of 









This method of checking is verbal, and there is less cognitive load placed on the 
radiographer listening and responding to the parameters, as they are verified one by 
one. However, as the literature review and observations have indicated the final 
treatment check is regularly repeated and therefore vulnerable to involuntary 
automaticity. By definition involuntary automaticity is when a regularly repeated 
behaviour is conducted on autopilot without the need for conscious attention (Toft 
and Mascie-Taylor 2005). This is clearly beneficial for certain behaviours, yet when 
conducting safety critical tasks, attention needs to be maintained. In these 
circumstances, involuntary automaticity would be considered a failure of attention. 
However, attention has three parts; orientating, executive control and alerting 
(Bonnefond et al. 2010). Even a momentary lapse in attention can result in a lack of 
endogenous behavioural control which could easily lead to a catastrophic error. In 
radiotherapy sustained attention is required to detect infrequent and often minor 
errors, which meets the definition of vigilance, as defined by Wickens (1992:605): 
 “Vigilance is a state of readiness to detect and respond to certain specified 
small changes occurring at random time intervals in the environment” 
 
Sustained vigilance over a long period of time can lead to work fatigue which in turn 
leads to errors. This phenomenon of vigilance decrement has been demonstrated in 
many studies. The issue of sustained vigilance was first investigated by Mackworth 
(1950) who asked participants to watch a clock and detect when the second hand 
missed a beat. It was found that performance started to deteriorate after 30 
minutes, and more missed seconds went undetected as time went on. The majority 
of vigilance research has been conducted within signal detection, during which 
attention must be focussed upon a single stimuli. Radiotherapy is a little different in 
that radiographers must detect errors, but this vigilance task is punctuated by other 
tasks. However, the findings from attention and vigilance research should be 
considered in respect to radiotherapy, for example through regular breaks, or 
change of task, to break up monotony and help prevent fatigue and vigilance 
decrement.  
 
There is a debate in literature as to what causes vigilance decrement. Various 




and Resource Theory (Hancock and Warm 1989).  The Arousal Theory draws upon 
the ‘inverted-U’ model of arousal attributed to Yerkes and Dodson (1908). According 
to this model, arousal increases an individual’s level of task performance up to a 
point, beyond which performance decreases. Performance decrement therefore 
either results from under-arousal or over-arousal resulting from stimulation from the 
task. Easterbrooke’s cue-utilisation hypothesis (1959) also adopts this model of 
performance, stating that an individual’s level of emotion mediates the perception of 
visual and auditory cues. According to this theory, an individual’s stress levels may 
also mediate task performance. 
 
A modern theory of attention adapts this inverted U shaped model to attention. The 
overload and underload theory of attention also represents attention as an inverted 
‘U’ shaped graph, with an optimal level of arousal on performance, above which and 
below which, attention drops off. It has been theorised from a meta-analytic review 
of the neural mechanisms of vigilant attention that vigilance or attentional 
decrements may be more likely if a task is repetitive and simple (Langer and Eickhoff 
2013). This phenomenon of underload is also thought to be more likely if there is a 
high level of automation in the system, which reduces human input further (Young 
and Stanton 2002a).  
 
In regards to the process of the final treatment check, it is suggested, and further 
supported by the findings from the interviews (see section 7.3), that attention may 
fail due to underload. The final treatment check task is repetitive, simple and staff 
may feel bored when conducting repeated final treatment checks. It is not believed 
that radiographers suffer from cognitive fatigue as a result of overload because the 
final treatment check task itself is not cognitively demanding. Therefore, there is a 
need to prevent underload during repeated final treatment checks, perhaps by 
making the task fractionally more difficult to increase arousal. Less research has 
been conducted on underload, as compared to overload (Pattyn et al. 2008), even 
less on repetitive tasks which are punctuated by other tasks. However, research has 




monotonous tasks. For instance, asking drivers to answer trivia questions has been 
shown to alleviate driver fatigue during monotonous driving (Gershon et al. 2009).  
 
Automation of systems (such as R&V) are in some senses considered beneficial as 
they reduce operator work load. However, this automation may be detrimental if the 
task is already simple, as it could lead to underload which can be just as detrimental 
as overload. The Mallleable Attentional Resources Theory (Young and Stanton 2002b) 
states that attentional capacity shrinks in line with demand. Therefore, automation 
systems, arguably, reduce the cognitive demand required of humans in the system. A 
further danger with computer operated systems requiring human input is the 
challenge associated with knowing when and how to switch between user and 
computer control (Bainbridge 1983). Within radiotherapy this can be compared to 
the introduction of R&V systems, which check patient’s treatment parameters, 
which may lead radiographers to believe that the final treatment check is 
unnecessary. Therefore, it is ironic that the introduction of computer systems, such 
as R&V systems, designed to increase reliability may have actually made humans 
more prone to error. 
6.3 Chapter discussion 
This chapter has presented a HTA for the final treatment checking process prior to 
beam delivery in radiotherapy. This has been formed by combining observations 
with published radiotherapy guidance. The task analysis has mapped the patient 
pathway in order to contextualise the importance of the final treatment check prior 
to beam delivery. There was variation found in how the final treatment check was 
conducted. This variation was unexpected, but is believed to be due to there being 
no standardised, published protocol for this process.  
 
This HTA has detailed three different methods of final treatment checking, non-
verbal, chunked and challenge-response. Each of these methods has been reviewed 
for effectiveness based on theory and literature. This highlights that the methods of 
checking currently believed to be in use are not effective at detecting erroneous 




response checking as both radiographers have an equal and active involvement, 
making it a more robust verification.  
 
It is recognised that the development of this HTA may have been vulnerable to 
researcher bias as the observations were conducted by the researcher alone. As the 
observations were overt, there is a possibility that the radiographers may have 
exhibited demand characteristics and deviated from their usual behaviour during the 
period of observation. However, these biases are believed to have been minimised 
by the triangulation of the observation data with the published literature and 
guidance from Towards Safer Radiotherapy. The HTA as an initial model will be 
further validated and built upon through the interviews conducted with qualified 
and student radiographers, which are presented in the next chapter. The different 
methods of checking, alongside radiographers’ views and experience of error and 
checking accuracy will also be explored.  This will then allow for initial 
recommendations surrounding the design of a safety protocol for use immediately 




7 Chapter 7- Study 2: Exploring current practice and the 
experiences of qualified and student radiographers 
 
The literature review suggested that more research is needed into the efficacy of the 
final treatment check in radiotherapy and the factors contributing to its efficacy.  
Chapter 6 explored different methods of checking which appear to be in use based 
on observations and literature. This chapter details exploratory interviews 
conducted with qualified and student radiographers which aimed to explore 
radiographers’ views and experiences of how the final treatment check was 
conducted currently, why errors may pass undetected and how it might be 
improved. Participants’ views on wider patient safety issues were also sought. The 
interviews also aimed to verify the content of the HTA, presented in the previous 
chapter.  
7.1 Method 
Exploratory interviews were undertaken to further understand the process of the 
final treatment check and perceptions of wider patient safety issues within 
radiotherapy, as they are considered valuable for accessing end-users perceptions 
and opinions as discussed in section 5.5.  
7.1.1 Design 
Semi-structured interviews were chosen because they allow a flexible interview 
schedule to be followed. This interview schedule covered the topics necessary for 
the research question whilst allowing the researcher to follow up on any interesting 
points raised by the participants. 
7.1.2 Participants 
Qualified radiographers were approached to take part in this research to enable an 
understanding of the situation on the ground, from those practising in the field. It 
was intended that the participants would represent a range of experience and views. 
Therefore, student radiographers were also approached as they were at the 
beginning of their career and may have a different viewpoint from qualified 




believed to provide a range of experiences as they had been on placement in various 
different hospitals across the region. Teaching staff from the university were also 
recruited to provide views on training and academic aspects. 
 
Participants were recruited via opportunity sampling. An email invitation was sent to 
potential participants who were asked to contact the researcher to arrange a 
convenient time for interview if they were interested in taking part. All 
radiographers from University Hospital Coventry and Warwickshire (UHCW) NHS 
Trust and all third year student radiographers from Birmingham City University’s 
(BCU) radiography department were invited. These locations were chosen as they 
were local to the researcher. The only exclusion criterion for this study was that 
participants must not be under investigation for a patient safety incident. 
Recruitment continued until data saturation was reached, this was the point at 
which participants provided no new data. 
 
Six qualified therapy radiographers were recruited from UHCW NHS Trust 
radiotherapy department. Nine student radiographers in their final year of training 
were recruited from BCU. Two academic teaching staff from the same university 
were recruited (who were still practising clinically). This group was believed to 
represent a range of experience and views. A summary of participant experience is 
provided in table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1: Exploratory interviews participant experience 
Grade Number of participants 
Band 5 radiographer 1 
Band 7 radiographer 5 
Academic teaching staff 2 
Third year student radiographer 9 
7.1.3 Procedure 
The interviews took place in a quiet room, away from any distractions in which the 
researcher was able to conduct the interview one to one. Interviews at BCU took 




private office. Interviews lasted between 30-60 minutes. The interviews were voice 
recorded to allow the production of a verbatim transcript and to allow the 
researcher to focus on what the participant was saying and ask probing questions. 
These interviews were transcribed verbatim by the researcher and the transcripts 
used for analysis. 
7.1.3.1 Interview schedule 
All interviews were conducted following the same interview schedule which can be 
seen in appendix 5. A description of the interview content is presented in table 7.2.  
 





 Initial demographic questions to allow comparison of 
participant responses in the analysis.  
3-7 Patient Safety 
 Experience of patient safety and patient safety incidents.  
 Patient safety awareness amongst staff 
 Common errors or weak points in the radiotherapy process. 
8-14 Checking 
 Checking and verification in daily practice  
 Checking methods and perceptions of effectiveness 
 Factors that contribute to checking effectiveness  
15-20 Improving verification 
 Potential improvements to the final treatment check 
 
Questions were developed to build upon the findings of the literature review. As 
attention and deference to authority had been suggested as potential reasons 
underlying checking efficacy in the literature review, these were specifically included 
in the interview schedule. Questions were also guided by the observations 
conducted in departments, and detailed in section 6.2. Throughout data collection 
the questions followed a flexible emergent design- that is, if an unexpected topic 
arose during an interview it was added to the schedule for subsequent interviews. 
This allowed for the addition of some interview theme questions such as the impact 





This study was reviewed and approved by Coventry University Faculty of Health and 
Life Sciences Ethics Committee and approved by UHCW NHS Trust’s Research and 
Development department. Approval was also sought and gained from BCU. 
Confirmation of these approvals can be seen in appendix 1, 2 and 3 respectively. The 
interviews were conducted according to BPS ethical code of conduct. 
7.1.5 Analysis 
Thematic analysis (TA) was chosen as this was an exploratory topic and thematic 
analysis allows identification and exploration of patterns across the data, as 
discussed in section 5.3.2.  The analysis process detailed in section 5.3.2 was 
followed. Examples of coding, and a table of themes, sub-themes and codes can be 
found in appendix 6 and 7. 
7.2 Results 
Participants gave many reasons as to why double checking may fail to detect errors. 
Thematic analysis of the interviews led to these reasons being clustered into seven 
themes to potentially explain why the final treatment check checks may fail to detect 
errors. These were; lack of standardised protocol, lack of training in patient safety 
and treatment checking, difficulty maintaining attention, working environment, 
interface design and authority structures and team culture. These are discussed in 
turn. 
7.2.1 Lack of standardised protocol 
A prominent theme to emerge was the lack of standardised protocol when 
conducting final treatment checks both between departments and within the same 
departments. This was of particular concern to student radiographers. Some 
students were unaware of any protocol for the final treatment check in their 
department: 
“I’m not aware of a set protocol, everyone seems to know what it is that 
they’re for and you just do it whatever way, as long as you’ve done it I think it 
doesn’t matter how you’ve done it” Third year student radiographer 
 
There was also some debate over whether single or double checking was more 




for their actions, yet the majority viewpoint was that double checking provided 
reassurance that the checks are thorough.  Respondents reported that, all but one 
department, conducted double checks, but there was variation in how these were 
conducted. Five students reported that their departments conducted unstructured 
double checks whereby no values were read out and verified, instead both staff 
members looked at both the screen and prescription together and signalled 
agreement: 
“Two members of staff will kind of look at the sheet, look at the screen and 
they’ll just go “happy?” and then one will say “happy” and they’ll just switch 
on”. Third year student radiographer 
 
Participants believed that an unstructured check could allow responsibility to be 
passed to the other checker as there are no clearly defined roles. For this reason 
students reported they would have to be even more vigilant to compensate for 
others. Another concern for students when staff used this unstructured method of 
checking was that they were done too quickly, with staff seemingly only glancing at 
the screen. Students were in agreement that this unstructured method of checking 
was potentially unsafe: 
“I would definitely be uncomfortable being treated by them!” Third year 
student radiographer 
 
A challenge-response method was believed to be safer by students and qualified 
radiographers as both radiographers know the other is checking. It was suggested 
that the verbal callout was effective as it engaged more senses. Participants were 
unanimous in their appreciation for a standardised protocol. They believed this 
would be especially beneficial if they have been away from practice and ease the 
transition period when moving to a new department: 
“Sometimes you come back into department after ages and think “Oh what 
do I check?” It would help with a set way or set order to check it in and not 
everyone just doing it their own way” Third year student radiographer  
 
Participants suggested a “gold standard verification protocol” would not only 
improve safety but also emphasise the importance of the final treatment checks. 
However, participants warned that this may be met with resistance from senior staff 




should be evidence-based and must strike a balance between time and 
effectiveness: 
“If someone tells you to do something and you don’t know why, people won’t 
pay attention. You’ve got to provide the support- why you’re doing it and 
what benefit it has. Otherwise there’s no point changing it” Third year student 
radiographer 
7.2.2 Lack of training in patient safety and verification 
A lack of training both around patient safety and specifically about how to conduct 
the final treatment checks was reported by both qualified and student 
radiographers. Students reported not having been taught how to do a final 
treatment check and reasoned this was due to the perception that the checks were 
simple to do and hence overlooked. Participants were very aware of the dangers and 
responsibilities associated with their job: 
“You know you can’t take back a dose that you’ve given somebody and 
mistakes can be catastrophic”. Third year student radiographer 
 
However, it was apparent that this ‘fear factor’ can wane after qualification and that 
safety reminders were needed to maintain it: 
“I guess you get more and more confident you perhaps lose that element of 
fear factor to get it right” Third year student radiographer 
 
A suggested reminder was knowledge about errors and near misses. Aside from 
hearing of errors from colleagues no specific patient safety training was reportedly 
given. The majority of participants were unable to explain exactly what patient 
safety was, referring only to procedures for manual handling and ensuring their own 
safety was maintained through wearing lead vests to block radiation. Training is 
delivered mainly whilst students are on placement, yet there is variation in the 
quantity and approach to training: 
“We don’t actually have an actual lesson over it all, anything like that. We 
just go into department and you kind of rely on the senior on the room to 
explain things to you {…..} That’s why different students know a bit more and 
some people know a bit less because it really depends who’s on the room 
with you and of they bother going over it” Third year student radiographer 
 
Students reported that they would appreciate more error training, to understand 




delivered through case studies to maintain interest.  Furthermore, both students and 
qualified staff noted that, not only is there no specific patient safety training but that 
there is no discussion on the course about variation in local protocols. Both students 
and senior staff expressed that this would be beneficial as discussion of protocol 
variation would not only prepare students for working elsewhere but also stimulate 
critical thinking and understanding of why things are done the way they are: 
“I think being able to go to other departments and see how they go about 
their checking would help with that level of “ok, yes”, so they can make their 
own judgement then as to what is appropriate” Academic teaching staff  
7.2.3 Difficulty maintaining attention 
Attention was a major theme, with sub-themes of boredom due to the repetitive 
nature of the job, a sense of number overload, fatigue, assuming the treatment is 
already correct and overreliance on technology all possibly leading to inattention.  
Both staff and students acknowledged that the job, especially newly qualified roles, 
can be perceived as repetitive and boring. They believed this monotony could lead to 
lapses in concentration: 
“If you do it every day then obviously it gets a little bit mundane and perhaps 
people don’t pay as much attention to it.” Band 7 radiographer 
 
Participants noted that they had personal responsibility to maintain attention, and to 
look past the numbers and observe the person being treated. Yet it was also noted 
that the high concentration demands easily leads to fatigue.  
 
Participants reported that often treatment machines treat only one anatomical 
region to increase productivity. However, when treatment machines treated a 
variety of anatomical regions participants reported that it alleviated the monotony 
and staff became more engaged: 
“when there are different things you do go “yippee!” Band 7 radiographer   
 
Staff also reported being less engaged during the mid-stage of a patient treatment as 
it is presumed that all details are correct because the treatment has been checked 
multiple times and any changes will be alerted to staff by the system.  Participants 




vulnerable stage of treatment because they are expecting certain values to be read 
and hence may hear only what they expected to hear: 
“Sometimes you hear what you’re expecting to hear. Especially if the patient’s 
been on treatment for several weeks you think, well it’s been checked that 
many times, you’re not expecting a problem. So perhaps you’re less likely to 
pick it up”. Band 7 radiographer  
 
It was believed that this risk could be alleviated by having a new staff member join 
the team, as “a fresh pair of eyes” who was considered to be more vigilant. 
 
It also emerged that the job is very number-orientated, which requires concentration 
and has detrimental effects on attention: 
“You’re just getting numbers thrown at you all day long and while you’re in 
the room setting the patient up you’re looking at all the numbers. You come 
out the room and you’ve got all the number there and you’re recording the 
numbers. So you do thirty, forty times a day, every day. Yeah it would all 
become a blur”. Third year student radiographer 
 
Due to this repetition of checks participants observed that the checks could easily 
become automated, or “second nature”. Participants reported that they believed 
this automated checking was increased by relying on technology. Technology 
promotes inattention as the computer is believed to be correct and hence checking 
redundant: 
“If the computer threw up some little bit of info that was wrong, would you 
notice?” Third year student radiographer 
 
This increase in computer responsibility was illustrated by a divide between the 
younger generation of radiographers who had never worked without R&V systems 
and those who had. The former were apprehensive to work without R&V and 
refused to manually enter parameters when technology failed. Although R&V 
systems were unanimously considered safer, participants believed that manual input 
of data was a much more active process which ensured attention levels were 
maintained. This led some participants to suggest an interface which mimicked 





“If you had to physically type it in and it has to correspond then that would 
make a difference, keep you more on your toes.” Third year student 
radiographer 
 
Maintaining attention is clearly challenging, however, participants noted that it was 
their personal responsibility to maintain attention, but also the role of the senior 
radiographer on duty to ensure staff had adequate breaks. A suggestion to maintain 
attention was switching roles; both tasks and role of challenger and responder 
during final treatment checks: 
“Where I train they do take it in turns to alternate switch on. I think that is 
quite important and it does break up the monotony a bit” Third year student 
radiographer 
 
Another suggestion to maintain attention was the use of alerts, calling out 
something unexpected as a ‘test’ to ensure staff are not just signalling agreement to 
every value: 
“It’s completely wrong but it would be nice now and again to have a little 
something thrown in where you think, hang on, that’s not right!” Band 7 
radiographer  
7.2.4 Working environment 
The working environment was perceived to have an impact of checking efficacy with 
atmosphere, distraction and workloads varying. Whilst primarily for patient benefit, 
the issue of music was mentioned as having both a positive and negative effect on 
concentration and hence checking efficacy- either making the staff more engaged or 
distracting staff. Participants reported there are many distractions around the 
machines; phones ringing, colleagues talking, patient enquiries and other staff 
interrupting, with distractions from fellow staff mentioned more frequently: 
“If you’ve got a patient in the waiting room who’s suddenly poorly or fits or 
something then you’ll be distracted. Similarly somebody coming in saying “do 
you want some chocolates?” Academic teaching staff 
 
Aside from distractions, radiographers are under pressure to treat patients quickly 
due to machine breakdowns, sick patients, and to reduce waiting times: 
“In my department we’re always in a rush. There’s always a queue. Patients 




These factors, especially machine breakdowns, where reported to increase the 
workload on remaining functioning machines, and have a negative impact upon the 
working environment for staff. Heavy workloads were reported to increases stress 
which participants suggested can lead to concentration lapses and potential errors: 
“I think the more chaotic things are the more potential there is for someone 
just not registering that someone’s said 131 instead of 113.” Third year 
student radiographer 
 
7.2.5 Interface design  
Participants reported that the interface used for the final treatment check was not 
user friendly. The information was too densely presented; as a result information 
cannot be easily extracted. Participants suggested the interface would benefit from 
an improved layout, increased font size, more use of colour and highlighting of key 
information: 
“when you first look at it, you think, “oh my god!” It’s just a bank of 
numbers”. Third year student radiographer 
 
Additionally, participants believed that active engagement with the interface, for 
example active data entry, this would help to prevent errors. 
7.2.6 Authority structures and team culture 
Issues of authority arose frequently, both in regards to participants feeling able to 
speak up to a senior radiographer, and the senior radiographer setting the team 
culture. Participants reported that there was variation in attitudes amongst 
colleagues in terms of the importance of the final treatment check. Some staff 
placed more importance on the final treatment check than others: 
“But I know some people don’t see it as important and I wondered if that’s 
because they’ve never been involved in an error.” Academic teaching staff  
 
It was also noted that the composition of the team working on each machine 
changes frequently which results in the team culture subtly changing each time. All 
participants asserted that they would not defer to authority, and would be willing to 
question current practice and speak out about errors. However, they reported that 




“some of the newer, less confident individuals may well say, I can’t question 
here. So that is something that we would discourage but it’s difficult to stop” 
Band 7 radiographer  
7.3 Chapter Discussion 
Chapter 4 highlighted that there is lack a research on checking practise and 
effectiveness in radiotherapy. Here that has been addressed by exploring the use of 
double checking in practise and the perception of effectiveness in radiotherapy 
specifically. The aim of this study was to explore how the final treatment check was 
currently conducted and gather radiographers’ views on how final treatment check 
could be improved to be more effective at error detection.  
7.3.1 Current practice 
The interviews revealed how the participants currently conduct the final treatment 
check immediately prior to beam switch on. The interviews indicated that 
radiographers employ differing methods of checking, both within and between 
departments. The methods of checking discussed in the interviews supports the 
findings from the task analysis presented in section 6.3. There was little knowledge 
of any existing protocols for the final treatment check which undoubtedly 
contributes to this variation. The majority of participants reported that no verbal call 
out was performed during the final treatment check. As indicated in the task analysis 
in section 6.3, and literature reviewed in section 6.3.3, a verbal method of checking 
is considered more effective at error detection.  Without this, the check may not be 
carried out independently, as one radiographer may rely on the other to check.  
 
Section 4.1 discussed the guidelines for two radiographers to be responsible for 
switching on. These interviews indicated that sometimes the final treatment checks 
are conducted by one radiographer only, violating these published guidelines. The 
literature in chapter 4, highlighted the debate surrounding single or double checking. 
Here participants’ views on this issue were explored. The effectiveness of double 
checking over single checking was debated by many participants who all agreed that 
double checking was more effective and accurate. This contradicts previous research 
which reported medical staff preferred single checking (Jarman, Jacobs and Zielinksi 




this present research staff appreciated the verbal call out and felt reassured by using 
it, as the final treatment check was not rushed through when verbalised. 
 
The findings of these interviews point to the need for a standardised safety protocol 
for the final treatment check. Participants reported that this would reduce variation 
in final treatment checks, and ensure all radiographers were conducting a verbal 
check which was preferred as it was perceived to have safety benefits. A need for a 
written policy on double checking has been suggested before from other healthcare 
domains (Dickinson et al. 2010) and this research also suggests a clearly defined final 
treatment check policy is required. Previous research within the patient safety field, 
suggests that standardisation of procedures helps to prevent errors, as discussed in 
section 4.6 
7.3.2 Performance shaping factors 
The lack of a standardised method of final treatment checking was the main reason 
cited for errors passing undetected. Yet, other potential reasons were given by 
participants as to why the final treatment check may fail to detect treatment errors.  
 
The issue of automatic responding when double checking had previously been 
recognised in healthcare broadly (Armitage 2009) and radiotherapy specifically (Toft 
2005, Toft and Gooderham 2009) and was also supported by participants’ perception 
in this study. Participants were very aware that because the final treatment checks 
were repeated regularly they were susceptible being conducted on “auto-pilot”. This 
reflects Leape’s view that double checking can become a “ritualistic chant” 
(Armitage 2007).  Maintaining attention and interest, to prevent involuntary 
automaticity, is challenging in radiotherapy as the checks are repeated regularly. The 
interviews revealed that the radiographer’s role is sometimes repetitive and 
monotonous. The job requires concentration which, when combined with the need 
for accuracy, can be demanding, as discussed in the task analysis in section 6.3.3. 
The danger of conducting final treatment checks on auto-pilot was highlighted by the 
radiographers who recognised that errors were more likely to occur during the 




the treatment parameters should be. Furthermore, the interviews suggested that it 
is common practice for each linear accelerator to treat one particular anatomical 
area. As such, during a shift radiographers will treat the same anatomical area. This 
is of consequence for the ‘see what you expect to see’ phenomena, as the 
parameters will be similar for each anatomical region, for example the monitor units 
for breast treatments will be similar for all breast treatments. 
 
A further issue identified in the interviews as affecting the accuracy of the final 
treatment check, and related to attention is boredom. Boredom can be defined as: 
 “thrawted engagement of attention” or “inability to maintain attention” 
(Cheyne et al. 2009:580) 
 
It is well known that a monotonous task or a task requiring sustained vigilance can 
lead to boredom (Grandjean 2009). Boredom can be defined as an experience in a 
situation with too few stimuli which leads to a decrease in central nervous system 
activity, and decrease in alertness. This has clear implications for the final treatment 
check in radiotherapy where alertness is important to detect errors. There is known 
to be individual differences in how prone people are to boredom. Factors known to 
increase likelihood of boredom include: fatigue, low motivation or interest, high level 
of education, knowledge and ability, and extrovert characteristics (Grandjean 2009). 
Factors known to decrease boredom vulnerability include: continuation of learning 
and job contentedness (Grandjean 2009). Baschera and Grandjean (1979) conducted 
a study in which participants were asked to complete a monotonous task, picking 
nails. This task was dull and repetitive and quickly led to boredom. Boredom was 
measured through subjective ratings and physiological measures. When the difficulty 
of the task was increased, boredom decreased. However, this only happened up to a 
point, there was an inverted U relationship, in that beyond a point of difficulty 
boredom increased once more. The findings of this research can be applied to the 
final treatment check task, perhaps by fractionally increasing the difficulty of the task 





As demonstrated in the above interviews, and task analysis from the previous 
chapter, there are many factors which could induce errors during the final treatment 
check immediately prior to beam delivery. There is currently variation in the way 
these treatment checks are currently conducted, yet all current methods of checking 
are vulnerable to allowing errors to pass undetected. Table 7.3 summarises the 
performance shaping factors that have been identified through interviews and task 
analysis, and supported by existing psychological literature. These factors are argued 




Table 7.3: Performance shaping factors during the final treatment check 
Factor Observations Interviews Potential error/impact of performance Possible solution 
Over-reliance on the other checker   Diffusion of responsibility Verbal check with clearly 
defined roles requiring 
equal input 
Looking at the value on the prescription sheet 
before looking at the screen 
  ‘See what you expect to see’ Look at screen first 
Parameters to be verified combined together   High cognitive load/demand on memory Verify one parameter at 
a time 
Responder looking at screen when the 
parameters are announced 
  Cross modal attention 
Inattentional deafness 
Responder to not look at 
screen whilst parameters 
are announced 
High authority gradient between the checkers    Deference to authority Culture change 
Noisy environment/distractions   Diffused concentration Checking to be done in a 
quiet environment 
Patient in the middle of treatment   ‘See what you expect to see’ Maintain vigilance 





The task analysis, interviews, and related review of literature have suggested that a 
challenge-response check is likely to be more effective as it reduces the vulnerability 
to some of these error inducing factors. Yet, this method of checking is still 
vulnerable to allowing errors to pass undetected due to fatigue, attention deficits, 
boredom and involuntary automaticity. These factors are all interlinked and in order 
to reduce the impact of these factors there is a need to increase the cognitive 
demand and active engagement in the task, according to the attentional theory of 
underload. Some strategies such as role rotation, and treating different anatomical 
areas on each machine were suggested by participants. These can potentially go 
some way to mitigating the damaging nature of involuntary automaticity, as they 
break up the monotony. These will be explored experimentally later in chapter 8. 
7.3.3 Latent factors influencing accuracy of the final treatment check 
Alongside these performance shaping factors, a number of latent factors have been 
identified surrounding the final treatment check. Thorough investigation into the 
impact of these factors is beyond the scope of this thesis, however, these factors 
have been translated into preliminary practice based recommendations, as detailed 
in table 7.4.  
 
The team structure and culture was suggested to contribute to failures during the 
final treatment checks with possible deference to authority and differing team 
perceptions on the importance of verification. This supports findings by Armitage 
(2009) that deference to authority and reduction of responsibility during two person 
checking can potentially contribute to ineffective checking. As presented in the 
literature review, Armitage (2009) reported that double checking was often not 
conducted due to lack of time. Time also featured in this research as participants felt 
they had to rush the final treatment check due to time pressure from machine 
breakdowns or urgency to treat patients. Although time pressure did not prevent 
double checking from being undertaken, it is clear that if the process is rushed or 
takes too long to complete, it may not be undertaken properly. This must be 
considered in the design of any new treatment checking protocol. The similarity of 




described here with radiographers, suggest that double checking errors are not 
domain specific and the perceived risk factors for error are similar to other 
healthcare domains.  Therefore, any developed checking protocol can potentially be 
transferrable to other areas of healthcare. 
 
There also appeared to be a lack of understanding around what patient safety is, and 
what the term encompasses. This may be due to the lack of training dedicated 
specifically to patient safety and errors, as suggested by participants in these 
interviews. Furthermore, students in this research were not aware of the process 
involved in error reporting. This may also be linked to the paucity of patient safety 
curriculum content. This may also be due to local variation in error reporting policies 
and differences in the induction processes for students. These processes were 
clearer to the qualified radiographers in a department. As well as the need for 
standardised processes and training, increased profile of patient safety in 
radiotherapy would be beneficial and contribute to an increasing awareness of 
safety culture. 
 
The interviews revealed that there is perhaps a slightly lax attitude towards the final 
treatment check in qualified radiographers, which may be linked to the lack of 
training in, and awareness from staff about, patient safety. Fraass (2008) noted that 
record and verify systems may lead to staff not checking thoroughly. This is reflected 
in this research as staff believed the technology to be infallible. Furthermore, 
qualified radiographers reported that they frequently knew what the treatment 
parameters were going to be before they were called out. Hence, they were more 
“blasé” about checking mid-treatment as they believed treatment parameters could 
not have been changed and must be correct. Training dedicated to how errors 
propagate earlier on in the patients’ treatment pathway may help reinforce the 
importance of the final treatment check. Participants also suggested that a new 
protocol could provide a tool for a cultural shift in the appreciation of safety and the 
final treatment check.   Hence, a new protocol may be the first step to changing the 





The interface used to verify was also reported to impede effective checking of 
treatment parameters. Participants reported a sense of “number overload” which 
impacts upon attention, alongside the use of small font sizes on the information they 
need to conduct the final treatment check and having to search for these required 
values. This issue is explored further in chapter 10 through consideration of the 
interface design.  
7.3.4 Practice recommendations 
This research has identified a number of active failures, latent failures and error 
producing conditions surrounding the final treatment check in radiotherapy which 
pose a potential safety risk. These are detailed in figure 7.1, which is an adapted 
version of Reason’s model of accident causation (Reason 1997), applied to final 
treatment check in radiotherapy.   
 
Figure 7.1: Adaption of Reason’s error model to show factors which impact upon effective checking 
Table 7.4 makes some preliminary practice based recommendations to potentially 




Table 7.4: Practice recommendations 




 The interviews suggested that radiographers may believe 
the final treatment checks are unnecessary. Yet, a final 
manual verification is necessary regardless of whether a 
RV system is used or not. 
 May lead to either rushing the final treatment check or 
conducting it without vigilance.  
 May increase with experience, as newly qualified 
radiographers are safety conscious and aware of making 
mistakes. 
 Qualified radiographers to undergo regular refresher 
training surrounding patient safety and the 







 Literature review suggested error reporting and learning is 
continuing to improve 
 Increased reporting and learning may increase 
radiographers’ perception of the importance of final 
treatment checks. 
 Continuation of reporting errors and near misses 
associated with the final treatment check 
 Sharing of lessons learned from previous errors 
within and between departments. 
Lack of 
training 
 The interviews suggested patient safety and human 
factors education is missing from the curriculum of 
student radiographers. 
 Increased training may lead to more awareness of own 
working practices and what supports error prevention.  
 May also lead to radiographers taking more responsibility 
for the final treatment checks 
 Increased embedding of human factors and patient 
safety into education.  
High 
workload 
 The interviews suggested radiotherapy departments treat 
increasing numbers of patients, which increases stress 








 The interviews revealed radiographers are under pressure 
to treat patients quickly, so rush the final treatment 
checks  
 This directly impacts on the efficacy of the final treatment 
check  
 The stress which accompanies time pressure makes 
attention more likely to lapse. 
 More time allocated to treating each patient, subject 
to resource limitations.  
 Fair culture- radiographers not blamed for mistakes 
when working under pressure. 
 The final treatment check to become a protected 
task, with an adequate length of time allocated to it.  
 Regular audits to ensure the final treatment check is 
not skipped. 
Fatigue  It has been recognised in Towards Safer Radiotherapy that 
checking can be tiring and result in fatigue. 
 Treatment delivery is a repetitive task, increasing risk of 
fatigue 
 Radiographers to take frequent breaks.  
 Radiographers to rotate round different tasks 
throughout their shift such as; treatment delivery, 
inputting data into RV systems, patient advice, 
patient follow ups. 
Boredom  The interviews suggested radiotherapy can be a repetitive 
job.  
 Many departments dedicate one linear accelerator 
machine to each anatomical treatment region, in order to 
streamline the treatment process.  
 This increases the repetitiveness of treatment delivery.  
 The parameter values are similar when treating the same 
anatomical region, increasing the chance of involuntary 
automaticity occurring. 
 Departments should not assign treatment machines 
to anatomical regions, but ensure treatment teams 




 The interviews and task analysis suggested there is a high 
level of variation in how radiographers conduct the final 
treatment check immediately prior to beam delivery. 
 A standardised checking protocol to be employed 
immediately prior to beam delivery 
 Audits to measure adherence 
Noise  The interviews and observations suggested the area 
surrounding the treatment console is often crowded, and 
 A limit enforced on the number of staff in the area 




noisy.  This area should be reserved for treatment only, with 
other areas provided for radiographers conducting 
tasks not directly relating to delivering treatment.  
 When departments undergo renovations it is 
suggested that thought is giving to sound proofing 
the area where final treatment checks are conducted.  
Distractions  The interviews and observations suggested there are 
many distractions from colleagues, patients and phones, 
in the area surrounding the treatment console. 
 Whilst final treatment checks are being conducted, 
the surrounding environment is silent 
 The encouragement of a culture in which all staff 
respect the need for silence.  
 Phones and patient enquiries re-routed to another 
area of the department which is not so safety critical. 
Diffusion of 
responsibility 
 The interviews and the literature suggested when there 
are two checkers, one may rely on the other to maintain 
vigilance during a check 




 The interviews and the literature suggested radiographers 
may defer to their senior and not speak out either about 
an error they believe is present  
 An open culture to be encouraged, to enable 




 The interviews and experiments suggested the design of 
the interface may impede effective checking due to; small 
font size, number overload, inability to quickly perceive 
required values 
 The usability of the software to be reviewed, with a 




 The interviews, literature and experiments suggest this is 
likely to occurs as the final checking task is repeated 
regularly, in the same way, allowing the behaviour to be 
conducted without attention.  
 The final treatment checking process needs to be 
varied with repetition minimised. The protocol 






Any form of qualitative analysis could be argued to be subjective. In order to ensure 
valid and reliable results were gained the interview schedule was informed by the 
research aims and literature, active listening techniques were used by the researcher 
and a second-coder was involved in the analysis, as discussed in section 5.6.3. 
 
The participant sample for the interviews consisted of varying grades of therapy 
radiographers, reflecting a range of experiences. A potential limitation of this 
research is that participants included qualified radiographers from only one 
department. This was partially addressed through the participation of students 
trained at a number of different hospitals in the region and there were no noticeable 
differences in viewpoints between them. It is recognised that the interviews used a 
small sample size, which, whilst normal in qualitative research, may limit the 
generalisability of the results. 
7.4 Chapter conclusion 
The interviews in this study, in combination with a review of existing literature and 
the task analysis, have allowed the variability in how the final treatment checks are 
currently conducted to be understood. This research has demonstrated that the 
current methods of checking during the final treatment check are highly vulnerable 
to errors passing undetected. Whilst the challenge-response method of checking, as 
recommended in Towards Safer Radiotherapy, may minimise some error inducing 
factors, it remains vulnerable to the issue of involuntary automaticity. The 
attentional theory of underload, discussed in section 6.3.3, suggests the effects of 
involuntary automaticity could be reduced by increasing cognitive demand during 
the repeated final treatment checks. Some methods to maintain attention have been 
suggested by participants in interviews which will need empirical investigation. 
Participants reported that any checking protocol would have to be evidence-based. 
Currently there exists little experimental evidence to support the use of challenge-





Following the findings detailed in this chapter and the previous chapter, a series of 
practice based recommendations have been made with the aim of improving the 
safety surrounding the final treatment check in radiotherapy, detailed in table 7.4. A 
significant finding was the need for a standardised method of conducting the final 
double check to reduce variability and cognitive load, thereby increasing safety. 
Therefore, the following chapters will explore the creation of a new standardised 
protocol which will attempt to incorporate methods to maintain attention when 
conducting the final treatment checks, as detailed in figure 5.1.  Table 7.5 provides 
the requirements for a checking protocol for use immediately prior to beam delivery, 
which have been extracted from the research presented in this chapter, the task 
analysis and the literature review. 
  
Table 7.5: Summary of requirements for checking protocol 
Checking protocol requirements Source 
Verifies energy, monitor units, wedge 
monitor units and wedge position 
Towards Safer Radiotherapy 
Standardised Interviews, literature review 
Challenge-response Interviews and task analysis, 
literature review 
Evidence based Interviews, literature review 
Time efficient Interviews 
Maintains attention Interviews and task analysis 
Involves two radiographers Interviews and task analysis, Towards 
Safer Radiotherapy 
Verbalised Interviews and task analysis, Towards 
Safer Radiotherapy 
Vary anatomical region being treated Interviews 
Role rotation Interviews 
 
These protocol requirements will be taken through to the next stage of the thesis. As 
the protocol needed to be evidence based and there was little empirical evidence to 
support either single or double checking, empirical investigation into the most 
effective method of checking, to form the basis of a checking protocol was needed. 





8 Chapter 8 - Study 3: Experimental exploration of checking 
methods 
Chapter 7 concluded that the development and use of a standardised checking 
protocol immediately prior to beam delivery would have safety benefits in 
radiotherapy. Table 7.5 summarises the requirements of a checking protocol drawn 
from the research findings described so far. This current chapter presents the 
method and results of two experimental studies which explore and evaluate the 
protocol requirements identified, with the aim of investigating the most effective 
method of checking and future design of a checking protocol. The first experiment 
engages with the debate surrounding single and double checking. The second 
experiment investigates methods of maintaining attention during repeated final 
treatment checks. Recommendations are produced that guide the design of a 
checking protocol for use immediately prior to beam delivery, and will be applied in 
chapter 9. 
8.1 Method 
Most of the research on double checking in healthcare consists of qualitative studies, 
retrospective incident reviews or expert opinion, as discussed in chapter 4. Here, an 
experimental approach is taken to systematically explore checking effectiveness. As 
discussed in section 5.4, use of laboratory-based studies to recreate and test 
scenarios are useful within patient safety research in order to provide an empirical 
evidence base.  
8.2 The experimental paradigm 
An experimental paradigm was designed to mimic the process of the final treatment 
check in radiotherapy, as identified in the task analysis in chapter 6, but in a 
laboratory, controlled environment. Based on the assumption that automaticity is 
one of the main sources of checking errors, as discussed in section 4.3.1, the 
objective of the experimental design was to induce automaticity within the limited 
time span of a laboratory experiment. The task involved repeated presentation of 
information on screen that required comparison with information presented on 




information was of the same type as the information that radiographers encounter 
in the real life final treatment safety check. Both experiments presented in this 
chapter used this paradigm, which is detailed below. 
8.2.1 Setting 
The experimental paradigm was run in a quiet room, free from distractions, so that 
there were no confounding variables from noise. 
8.2.2 Equipment 
The focus of this research was on the process of the final safety check of treatment 
before treatment delivery. It was decided to isolate this particular task and remove 
surrounding environmental distractors. The only equipment present was therefore 
the screen image which displayed the treatment values and the paper prescription 
with the treatment values on. An iPad was used to display the radiotherapy 
interface.  A direct replica of the interface of the record and verify system, MOSAIQ, 
was recreated. This system was reported by the majority of the exploratory 
interview participants to be in use in their departments.  
 
The interface was static, that is a screen shot, rather than a system that required 
input from the user. A series of screen shots were developed that represented a 
treatment for a patient with prostate cancer. The decision was made to not vary the 
anatomical area being targeted, as the interviews revealed this is typical of what 
happens in the radiotherapy department where each linear accelerator machine is 
used for one specific anatomical area. Seventy variations were developed that had 
differing values for each parameter and these values were altered for every trial 
using Adobe Photoshop, so that the static image of the interface remained intact and 
identical for every trial. An example screen can be seen in figure 8.1.  
 
Each screen had a corresponding paper prescription which was based upon those 
used in a radiotherapy department. Seventy iterations of these paper prescriptions 
were filled out by hand, scanned and printed by the researcher. Figure 8.2 shows an 





This paradigm was designed to mimic radiotherapy practice, in terms of multiple 
final treatment checks, punctuated by either collecting a patient or arranging them 
on the bed, but with much shorter timeframes than in clinical practice. The aim was 
to make the experiment boring and tedious in order to induce involuntary 
automaticity. This paradigm allowed for errors to be planted within the materials 
and the impact of the different methods of checking on error detection measured.   
 
The task required participants to conduct a number of screen-to-paper prescription 
checks to ensure there was no discrepancy between the values displayed on the 
screen, and those written on the prescription. Participants were asked to check that 
the energy value, monitor units, wedge monitor units and wedge status on screen 
were correct according to the paper prescription. The wedge status always read 
either ‘in’ or ‘out’. The monitor units and energy were numerical values ranging from 
100 to 999. These values are highlighted on an example screen and paper 
prescription in figures 8.1 and 8.2. 
 
Participants were seated in front of the iPad and asked to swipe the screen once to 
reveal the first set of values. Next to the iPad were a pile of paper prescriptions in 
the order that they were needed to be checked. After verifying the first pair of 
materials, participants were asked to sign the prescription sheet if there were no 
discrepancies between the screen values and paper prescription for any of the 
parameters they were required to check, and place the prescription sheet to one 
side. If there was a discrepancy, participants were told not to sign the prescription 
sheet. Participants were then required to stand up and walk a few steps over to a 
table on the other side of the room to complete a distractor task (see below). Upon 
completion of this task they returned to their seat in front of the iPad and swiped 






All participants were given a standardised briefing on the experiment and the final 
treatment checks in radiotherapy, followed by standardised instructions on how to 














8.2.4 The distractor task 
Between each screen-to-paper check, participants were asked to complete a non-cognitively 
demanding task. This task was designed to mirror the break between checks that 
radiographers get when undertaking other duties between treatments, such as collecting a 
patient or arranging them on the treatment bed. The distractor task in the experiment was 
the un-stacking of Russian dolls, and placing them in a prescribed height order, before re-
stacking the dolls. Participants walked to an adjacent room and arranged the five dolls in the 
order displayed on a height order plan. The plans altered each time. This task was chosen as 
it is not cognitively demanding and forces participants to stand up and do a physical task, as 
in radiotherapy. Figure 8.3 shows an example Russian Doll plan. 
 
Figure 8.3: An example Russian Doll plan  
 
8.2.5 Participant motivation and time pressure 
As this experiment was likely to be perceived as repetitive and tedious, it was vital that 
participant’s motivation was maintained. Participants were told that there would be 
between zero and five errors randomly planted within the checks in order to ensure they 
took the task seriously. Also, to encourage motivation participants were told they had to 
complete a minimum of 60 checks within 45 minutes, but for any checks they completed 
above this they would receive a reward. The reward was in the form of wrapped sweets 
which they were invited to choose from a selection. This also placed time-pressure upon the 
participants, which mimics radiotherapy. To ensure participants had the motivation to do 
the checks well they were told that for every error missed and every false alarm they would 




motivation is vital so that the check is not meaningless but has consequence, as in 
radiotherapy. Klein (2001) found evidence through a database error detection task that 
expectations of error rate and performance based incentives increased error detection. 
Esterman, Reagan, Liu, Turner and DeGutis (2014) have since published a paper suggesting 
that performance on a sustained attention task is maintained if participants are rewarded 
either with monetary or early completion rewards. Yet, these rewards do not have an 
impact on performance decrement over time. This suggests that performance on a 
sustained attention task is affected by both motivational lapses and cognitive resource 
depletion, yet the former can be overcome with rewards. Hence, it can be assumed that by 
using such a reward system in the current paradigm participants’ motivation and 
performance was increased without affecting performance decrements over time, that is, 
without interfering with the effect of involuntary automaticity, that these experiments were 
designed to address. 
8.2.6 Pilot testing 
Pilot testing was conducted, using 12 psychology students accessed through the university’s 
SONA system, to assess if the directions given to the participants were clear and allowed the 
paradigm to be followed. Participants were randomly assigned to an experimental condition 
based on order of presentation and took part in the paradigm as detailed above for 45 
minutes. Four participants took part alone, two pairs of participants did double checking 
and two pairs of participants did challenge-response checking. After completion they were 
invited to comment on the task ease, the clarity of task instructions, and the use of sweets 
as a motivator. Participants commented that the task instructions were clear, and the 
sweets motivated them to act quickly but thoroughly, however they found the checking task 
was too easy. Subsequent analysis of the results from pilot testing revealed that using 
numbers without decimals resulted in a ceiling effect, with all participants but one detecting 
all errors, regardless of experimental condition. Therefore, the decision was made to 
increase task difficulty by including decimal places in the materials. Results also showed that 
all participants in all experimental conditions were able to complete 60 checks of materials 
within 45 minutes, with no more than 70 completed. Hence, it was decided that 60 trials 
were the optimal number of trials required for 45 minutes of testing, with a maximum of 70 




8.3 Experiment 1: Comparison of checking methods 
8.3.1 Rationale 
The research discussed in chapter 4 demonstrated that opinion is divided in the literature as 
to whether single or double checking is more effective at error detection. The interviews 
presented in chapter 7 suggested that radiographers themselves consider challenge-
response checking to be more reliable than non-verbalised or single checking. This is 
supported by research from other domains such as aviation, as discussed in section 6.3.3. 
The experimental research described here aims to inform that debate. 
 
This experiment aimed to directly compare the effectiveness of single checking, non-
verbalised double checking and challenge-response checking. These three methods of 
checking were chosen as they are the three ways of checking which are used in radiotherapy 
departments currently, as discussed in chapter 6 and 7. It was important to empirically 
investigate the effectiveness of these checking methods, to provide evidence for best 
practice, as it was identified that compliance with a new protocol increases when supported 
by evidence. The decision was made to investigate challenge-response checking when the 
values are not chunked together, as the task analysis had already identified the risks when 
chunking values together. 
 
One specific factor affecting checking reliability, as discussed in section 6.3.3, and 7.3.3, is 
involuntary automaticity. Research has suggested that repeated actions can become 
habitual and this issue has already been identified as an issue in the final treatment checks 
in radiotherapy (Toft and Mascie-Taylor 2005). This was supported by the interview findings 
in chapter 7, and will also be explored here. 
8.3.2 Hypotheses 
It was hypothesised that: 
 Challenge-response checking would be more effective at detecting errors than both 
unstructured double checking and single checking, in line with the findings described 
in the task analysis 
 The errors placed towards the end of the experiment will be missed more often than 




 When conducting challenge-response checking, participants reading the values from 
the screen will have a lower accuracy score than participants reading the values from 
the prescription sheet, as the interface was discussed in the exploratory interviews 
as not being user friendly. 
8.3.3 Method 
8.3.3.1 Design 
This experiment employed a between groups design, with participants allocated to one of 
three experimental conditions: 
1. single checking 
2. non-verbal double checking 
3. challenge-response checking.  
The independent variable was the method of checking used and the dependent variables 
were the number of errors, false alarms and accuracy. 
8.3.3.2 Participants 
Participants were undergraduate psychology students at Coventry University, recruited via 
opportunity sampling. Participants responded to a call for participants on the university’s 
online experiment management system and received course credits for participating. The 
only inclusion criteria were that the participants must have normal or adjusted to normal 
eyesight. Participants were excluded if they had taken part in the pilot study, as this may 
have introduced practice effects. Sixty participants were recruited and allocated to one of 
the three conditions based on order of presentation. There were 20 participants in the 
single-check condition, and 20 paired participants in each double-check condition. Table 8.1 
describes each of the three conditions. 
Table 8.1: Checking methods experimental conditions 




One participant is assigned the 
challenger and reads the values from 
screen. The other checks these 
against the paper plan and responds.  
20 pairs 
2 Unstructured double 
checking 
Two participants are asked to check 
together but not told how to check 
20 pairs 





There were 70 different interface displays presented on an iPad with 70 corresponding 
paper prescription plans, one pair of materials constituted one trial. These were displayed in 
the same order for every participant. A set of Russian dolls consisting of five stackable dolls 
were used with 70 laminated sheets with differing height arrangements of these dolls. 
8.3.3.4 Planted errors 
Four errors were planted, in four different pairs of materials (a pair was a corresponding 
paper prescription and screen). There was one wedge error, one monitor units error, one 
wedge monitor units error, and one energy error. When an error was planted the value 
displayed on screen differed from that displayed on the paper prescription. The errors were 
minor, for instance a wrong digit or erroneous decimal place. Figures 8.1 and 8.2 displayed 
an example trial with an error planted in the wedge monitor unit (wedge MU) parameter. 
Errors were planted on trial 10, 17, 55 and 60. The errors towards the end of the experiment 
provided an opportunity for involuntary automaticity to have built up.  
8.3.3.5 Procedure 
Participants were invited to read the participant information sheet and sign the consent 
form. The procedure was then explained to them, to ensure consistency this was read from 
the same participant instructions presented in appendix 9.  
 
If participants were in the single checking condition they checked the parameters by 
themselves (i.e. compared the paper prescription to the values displayed on the screen and 
indicated if they matched). If they were in the double checking condition, both participants 
checked the parameters, but did not verbalise the check. If in the challenge-response 
condition, one participant was assigned the challenger and the other the responder. The 
challenger read the values from the screen one by one, and waited for the responder to 
confirm and repeat the value back before moving onto the next value. All participants 
completed the distractor task. Appendix 9 details the verbal instructions given to 
participants on the checking task for each experimental condition.  
 
 Participants were provided with two practise trials (two checks to conduct) to ensure they 




completed the experiment as per the description of the paradigm. Throughout the 
experiment the researcher was seated in the corner of the room so that participants did not 
feel as though they were being observed. 
8.3.3.6 Data recording 
In all three conditions and for each trial, a signed paper prescription indicated that 
participants deemed the trial “correct”, an unsigned prescription sheet indicated that they 
deemed the trial “erroneous”. After the experiment, participants’ responses were coded as 
detailed in table 8.2. 
 
Table 8.2: Categorisation of trial responses 
Trial code Description 
Hit Signed sheet on a correct trial 
Correct rejection Unsigned sheet on an error trial 
Miss Signed sheet on an error trial 
False alarm Unsigned sheet on a correct trial 
 
Additionally, a record sheet was used by the researcher in the challenge-response condition 
which listed what the challenger and responder should be saying (it listed the on-screen 
values the challenger should be reading for each trial, and if it was a trial with a planted 
error). The researcher circled if either the challenger or responder made a mistake (i.e. if the 
challenger announces a value incorrectly or responder responds incorrectly). This allowed 
for identification of where errors occurred and whether they were the fault of the 
challenger or responder.  
8.3.3.7 Data metrics 
Performance in each condition was measured in the following ways based on the data 
collected from the signed prescription sheets and response sheet: 
 Missed errors- a discrepancy between the screen and paper prescription was missed 
 False alarms- participants thought there was a discrepancy when there was not 
 Accuracy- the percentage of correct trials (combining hits and correct rejections) 
 Challenger accuracy- the percentage of mistakes the challenger made when reading 




 Responder accuracy- the percentage of mistakes the responder made when deciding 
if there was an error or not (Challenge-response condition only) 
 
Percentages were used for missed errors and false alarms, as participants would complete a 
varied number of trials over the minimum required, based on how quickly they completed 
each trial.  
8.3.3.8 Ethics 
This study was reviewed and approved by Coventry University Faculty of Health and Life 
Sciences Ethics Committee, see appendix 10. The research was conducted according to BPS 
ethical code of conduct. 
8.3.4 Results 
The data for each participant or pair of participants were entered into SPSS and aggregated 
according to experimental condition. SPPS was used to conduct the descriptive and 
inferential statistics on the data. 
8.3.4.1 Effect of checking condition on error rates 
Comparison of the three conditions, based on missed errors and false alarms, suggests that 
there is variance in how effective each method of checking is. Figure 8.4 displays the mean 
percentage of errors detected and mean percentage of false alarms broken down by 
condition. It can be seen that those in the challenge-response condition missed the least 
percentage of errors. Those single checking missed the highest percentage of errors. The 
means (and standard deviations) are displayed in Table 8.3.  
 
Table 8.3: Mean percentage errors missed, false alarms and accuracy per condition 
Condition Mean % errors 
missed (SD) 
Mean % false alarms 
(SD) 
Mean % accuracy 
(SD) 



















Figure 8.4: Graph displaying percentage of misses and false alarms per condition 
 
As the data met parametric assumptions, one-way ANOVAs were conducted to assess if the 
differences between the checking conditions were significant. 
 
No significant differences were found between checking conditions in the number of false 
alarms, F(2,57) = 0.42, p= .959. 
 
In contrast, the number of errors missed differed significantly between conditions, F(2, 57)= 
5.393, p= .007. Post-hoc Tukey tests confirmed the difference to be both between single 
checking and challenge-response checking, and unstructured double checking and 
challenge-response checking. There was no significant difference between single checking 
and unstructured double checking. Therefore, the first hypothesis is supported, challenge-
response checking resulted in significantly less planted errors passing undetected. 
 
























8.3.4.2 The effect of involuntary automaticity 
To investigate the second hypothesis, that errors towards the end of the experiment are 
more likely to be missed due to involuntary automaticity, the number of participants 
missing each error was analysed by checking condition. Figure 8.5 shows that the final 
planted error was missed more often than the prior three errors. Importantly, although this 
trend was very clear in the single and the double checking condition, it was absent in the C-R 
checking condition. 
 
Figure 8.5: Graph to show the percentage of participants in each condition who missed the error 
 
This provides evidence for involuntary automaticity occurring and supports the second 
hypothesis. It also suggests that involuntary automaticity was prevented, or at least 
prevented from affecting performance, in the C-R group, lending support to this method of 
checking being most effective.  
8.3.4.3 Differences between challenger and responder role accuracy 
The accuracy of challengers and responders in the challenge-response checking condition 
were also compared.  This score was obtained by calculating the number of times the 
participants said a value or responded incorrectly. This included instances where they went 
back to correct what they originally said. These scores were then converted into a 
percentage accuracy score. Figure 8.6 shows that participants in the role of the challenger 






































Figure 8.6: Difference between challenger and responder accuracy 
An independent t-test showed that this difference was significant, t(38)= 4.985 p <.001. This 
suggests that errors, false alarms and near misses were more likely to be due to the 
challenger making a mistake in reading the values from the screen, and not the responder. 
Participants reading the values out loud from the screen made more mistakes than those 
confirming the values on the prescription sheet, this supports the third hypothesis. 
8.3.5 Comparison of checking methods discussion 
The results have shown that, in this experiment, single checking was least effective at error 
detection and challenge-response checking was most effective. This may be because during 
challenge-response checking both participants have a clearly defined role and are therefore 
unable to avoid taking responsibility for completing the check. Accuracy was also higher in 
the double checking condition and lowest in the single checking condition, although the 
difference was not significant. All the groups’ percentage accuracies were around 97% 
meaning the majority of trials were completed correctly.  
 
However, if this percentage is translated into patient treatments it becomes unacceptable. 
A 97% accuracy rate would mean that three in every 100 fractions are potentially delivered 
incorrectly.  Furthermore, it makes the difference between single checking accuracy and 
challenge-response checking accuracy appear clinically important, as the 0.38% difference in 
























response method of checking resulting in less errors passing undetected and higher 
accuracy, it is worth noting that errors still went undetected and accuracy was only 98.2% in 
this condition. This suggests that, in a laboratory setting, there is still scope to improve the 
efficacy of challenge-response checking. 
 
It has been suggested that the final treatment checks in radiotherapy are prone to 
involuntary automaticity (Toft and Mascie- Taylor 2005). This experiment lends support to 
this theory, as the final error in the materials, after almost 45 minutes of checking, was 
missed more frequently than earlier errors. An unexpected result was that the third error 
was most likely to be spotted. This went against the involuntary automaticity hypothesis as 
the third error was planted on trial 55, after 38 correct trials had occurred, allowing 
automatic responding a chance to build. However, error three was a wedge error so perhaps 
participants just found the wedge error easier to spot than numerical errors. The final error 
was a wrong digit in the monitor units and hence harder to spot.  This automatic responding 
seemed to lessen when participants were challenge-response checking, lending more 
support to using this method of checking. Perhaps this prevention of involuntary 
automaticity was the underlying reason for the challenge-response checking group having a 
higher accuracy score.  
 
This experiment provided support to the notion of involuntary automaticity occurring during 
repeated checking. However, as challenge-response checking seemed to lessen the effect of 
involuntary automaticity this does not seem to support the views of Armitage (2009) who 
stated that double checking is reduced to an ineffective ritualistic chant. The findings 
challenge research which calls for single checking in medicine (Jarman, Jacobs and Zielinski 
2002). As challenge-response checking is a form of double checking, the results seem to 
support the notion that double is more effective than single checking, at least in a 
laboratory setting. Furthermore, unstructured double checking was better than single 
checking. This experiment has provided empirical evidence to further encourage the debate 
surrounding single and double checking. 
 
The finding that there was a significant difference in accuracy of the two checkers during a 




role during checking, and support them through a protocol to do an effective check. It was 
found that the challengers displayed a significantly lower accuracy rate than the responders. 
This suggests the challengers’ attention lapsed more often than the responders. Hence, any 
further improvements to the method of checking should consider ways to support the 
challenger.  
 
There are limitations to the transferability of these results. The experiment only lasted for 
45 minutes. Further research is needed therefore to determine the direct applicability if 
these results to radiotherapy and different healthcare settings. 
8.4 Experiment 2: Maintaining attention during repeated checking 
8.4.1 Rationale 
The first experiment established that challenge-response checking was the most reliable 
method to detect errors. However, this type of check did not totally prevent errors, so it was 
decided to take this a stage further by considering how to prevent involuntary automaticity 
during repeated challenge-response checking.  
 
This also builds upon the literature and the interview findings that highlight the risk 
presented by involuntary automaticity. In particular, the challengers in the previous 
experiment were found to be prone to mistakes when reading the values aloud from the 
screen. Therefore, the aim of this experiment was to explore ways that attention can be 
improved during repeated final treatment checks in order to reduce the risk of involuntary 
automaticity.  
8.4.2 Maintaining attention 
From the task analysis conducted in chapter 6, it seems that errors passing undetected 
during final treatment checks could be due to underload, because the checking task is not 
cognitive demanding. Therefore, it is argued that there may be a need to increase cognitive 
demand slightly in order to help maintain attention, whilst ensuring the cognitive load is not 
too much to induce overload, which would be equally as detrimental to safety. A number of 
potential mechanisms to maintain attention, thereby mitigating the risk of involuntary 




presented in chapter 4, in addition to mechanisms suggested by participants in the 




Table 8.4: Potential mechanisms to maintain attention 
Mechanism Explanation How identified 
Involve the kinaesthetic sense 
 
 Radiographers point at values whilst reading them to  engage 
additional sense  
 Suggested by Degani and Weiser (1990), pointing to checklist 
items combines muscle memory with mental sequencing 
 May not be well received  by radiographers, and not followed  
 Literature 
Random or changing order of the parameters 
 
 Barshi and Healy (1993) suggest varying the order that stimuli 
were presented in, slowed down performance, but increased 
accuracy 
 Reading the parameters out in the same order each time adds 
to the routineness of the final treatment check 
 Literature 
 Interviews 
Pre-engaging task prior to the final treatment 
check 
 
 Schell (2004) found that a cognitively demanding task 
completed prior to a checking task increased error detection 
 Time implications 
 Literature 
Different responses to each parameter call 
out 
 This would be less routine, if the required response was ever-
changing response 
 May appear irrelevant 
 Time implications 
 Could not be built easily into practice 
 Interviews 
Simultaneous task   Used in driving simulation tasks 
 Gershon et al. (2009) found that asking drivers trivia questions 
during monotonous driving reduced driver errors 
 Literature 
Switching roles of challenger and responder  Variation introduced if the two radiographers were to switch 






The number of potential methods to maintain attention which are able to be integrated into 
a safety checking protocol are limited, as the solutions also need to be feasible and practical 
to work into practice. There must be a clear rationale for inclusion and the radiographers 
must feel they are able to easily integrate it into their practice without it requiring extra 
time or appearing irrelevant.  
 
As table 8.4 highlights, the majority of potential solutions are not feasible for 
implementation. Furthermore, anything introduced to maintain attention and overcome 
involuntary automaticity (such as use of the kinaesthetic sense by pointing to parameters) 
could become automatic itself over time. Therefore, a method which continually changes 
and minimises routine is likely to be most effective. As such, the chosen mechanisms to 
maintain attention to be tested are: 
 Varying the order of the parameters to be verified 
 Switching the roles of challenger and responder regularly 
 
These methods to maintain attention during repeated final treatment checks will be 
investigated in the following experiment. 
8.4.3 Experimental design decisions 
The above mechanisms were chosen for two reasons. First, because they were suggested by 
radiographers themselves during the exploratory interviews. Second, because they are 
practical and can be done in practice.  It was decided to switch roles every 15 minutes 
because this length of time was deemed sufficient to prevent involuntary automaticity from 
building up. 
 
This second experiment will also address some potential methodological limitations of the 
previous checking methods experiment, as discussed below. The previous experiment 
suggested challenge-response checking was most effective at detecting errors. As the 
previous experimental method worked well to mimic final treatment checks in radiotherapy 
it was used again for this study but with improvements to address some of the limitations of 
the previous study. The length of the experiment was doubled from 45 minutes to 90 




were doubled from 60 pairs of materials to check, to 120. This increase in time spent 
verifying is more representative of the real life scenario.  
 
A potential limitation of the previous experiment was the type and placement of errors. All 
participants were required to spot the same errors in the same order. The fourth and final 
error was an incorrect decimal place. The third error, which was spotted more frequently 
than the final error, was a wedge error. Therefore, as the percentage of participants 
detecting the final error towards the end of the experiment was lower this may be because 
the final error was harder to spot, rather than a suggestion of involuntary automaticity. 
There are four parameters which must be verified: energy, monitor units, wedge monitor 
units and wedge position. Aside from wedge position, which is either ‘in’ or ‘out’, the other 
parameters are all number values and hence errors will be similar, either an erroneous 
decimal place or digit. Therefore, errors can be defined as either a word error or a numerical 
error. As the wedge parameter was the only word error, it was an unique error which 
always occurred in the same position in the experiment. As such, it is not possible to infer 
whether it was its uniqueness or position which leads to the relatively high detection rate. 
 
Therefore, this experiment varied the placement of these two different error types to 
ensure that the conclusions from the experiment surrounding involuntary automaticity are 
defendable. All errors were presented in the same error trials (i.e. the same point in the 
experiment for all participants), but within each experimental condition, the ordering of 
error type varied, in order to minimise the effects of error type on performance. The errors 
were presented during trials 45, 66, 89, 92, 109 and 120. There were two wedge errors, two 
energy errors and two errors in monitor units. As there were six planted errors this means 
15 combinations of where the planted word errors are. Each experimental condition has 15 
participant pairs, and hence the order of materials is used once in each condition. Only the 
placement of the one word error needs to vary as the number errors are all similar. This 
then allows for an analysis of the accuracy for detecting each planted error and whether this 






It was hypothesised that: 
 Switching the roles of challenger and responder will result in greater checking 
accuracy than simple challenge-response checking  
 Varying the order of the checked parameters will result in greater checking accuracy 
than simple challenge-response checking 
 Combining these two factors into challenge-response checking will result in the 
greatest accuracy.  
8.4.5 Method 
8.4.5.1 Design 
All participants undertook challenge-response checking in pairs, and a between subjects 
factorial design was employed with participants allocated to one of four conditions:  
1. challenge-response 
2. challenge-response with role rotation 
3. challenge-response with varying the order of parameters 
4. challenge-response with varying the order and switching roles.  
This factorial design allowed the interaction between varying the order of parameters and 
rotating roles to be investigated. The independent variable was the method of challenge-
response checking used, and the dependent variables were the performance, measured by: 
percentage errors missed, percentage false alarms and measures of accuracy (as detailed in 
section 8.4.3.6). 
8.4.5.2 Participants 
Participants were undergraduate psychology students at Coventry University and were 
recruited via opportunity sampling. Participants responded to a call for participants on the 
university’s online experiment management system and received course credits for 
participating. The only inclusion criteria were that the participants must have normal or 
adjusted to normal eyesight. Participants were excluded if they had taken part in one of the 
other experiments run as part of this thesis, as this may have introduced practice effects. 




order of presentation. There were 15 paired participants in each of the four conditions. 
Table 8.5 describes each of the three conditions. 
 
Table 8.5: Checking methods experimental conditions 
 Condition Description Number of 
participants 
1 Challenge-response (C-R) Simple challenge-response as 
described previously 
15 pairs 
2 C-R with role rotation Roles of challenger and responder 
swapped every 15 minutes 
15 pairs 
3 C-R with varying the order Parameters read out in a different 
order every time 
15 pairs 
4 C-R with role rotation and 
varying the order (both) 
Roles of challenger and responder 
swapped every 15 minutes and 
parameters read out in a different 
order every time 
15 pairs 
8.4.5.3  Materials 
There were 140 different screens displayed on an iPad with 140 corresponding paper 
prescription plans, one pair of materials (one paper prescription and one screen for 
comparison) constituted one trial. These were displayed in the same order for every 
participant. An example of these materials can be seen in figure 8.1 and 8.2. A set of Russian 
dolls consisting of five stackable dolls were used with 140 laminated sheets with differing 
height arrangements of these dolls. 
8.4.5.4 Planted errors 
Six errors were planted, in six different pairs of materials. There were two wedge errors, 
two monitor units error, and two energy errors. When an error was planted the value 
displayed on screen differed from that displayed on the paper prescription. The errors were 
minor, for instance a wrong digit. Errors were planted in trials 45, 66, 89, 92, 109 and 120. 
The errors towards the end of the experiment provided an opportunity for involuntary 
automaticity to have built up.  
8.4.5.5 Procedure 
Participants were invited to read the participant information sheet and sign the consent 
form. The procedure was then explained to them, to ensure standardisation the participant 




a challenge-response check, as in the previous experiment. If in the ‘role rotation’ condition, 
participants were told to switch roles every 15 minutes. They were then prompted by the 
researcher to switch roles every 15 minutes. If in the ‘varying order’ condition participants 
were told to vary the order they verified the parameters for every trial. The researcher 
monitored this and provided a reminder if it was needed. If in the ‘both’ condition, 
participants did both of the above. Appendix 9 details what was said to participants when 
instructing them on how to check the materials, depending on the experimental condition 
they were in.  
 
Participants were provided with two pairs of materials to check as a trial run in order to 
check they understood the task.  Participants then took part in the experiment as per the 
description detailed in section 8.2. However, the length of time spent checking was doubled 
to 90 minutes, and the number of materials also doubled. Participants were told that they 
had to complete a minimum of 120 checks within 90 minutes, but that for any checks they 
completed above this, they would receive a reward. Participants were told there were five 
errors within the materials. Although there were six errors, this prevented participants who 
may have performed well to remain vigilant for the final error. Throughout the experiment 
the researcher was in the corner of the room so that participants did not feel as though they 
were being observed. 
8.4.5.6 Data recording 
A record sheet was used by the researcher which listed what the challenger and responder 
should be saying (it listed the on-screen values the challenger should be reading for each 
trial, and if it is a trial with a planted error). The researcher circled if either the challenger or 
responder made a mistake (i.e. if the challenger announces a value incorrectly or responder 
responds incorrectly). This allowed for identification of where errors occurred and whether 
they were the fault of the challenger or responder. There was also a column for the 
researcher to indicate if a participant corrected what they originally said. Participants were 
also voice recorded to check for accuracy in the researcher’s data recording. 
8.4.5.7 Data metrics 
Errors missed and false alarms were recorded, to allow calculation of percentage accuracy 





These types of trial category responses were combined to provide an overall accuracy rate 
for challengers and responders separately. Furthermore, as what participants said was being 
recorded, instances when participants made a mistake but then corrected themselves 
before the next trial were also recorded. These instances were combined to give a 
percentage accuracy score including corrections. These have been included as they still 
indicate a lapse of attention and in real life situations where the check is conducted so 
quickly, the beam may have been switched on before the mistake was realised.  
 
The categorisation of trial responses was used to calculate accuracy, challenger accuracy, 
challenger accuracy including corrections, responder accuracy, responder accuracy including 
corrections, as detailed in table 8.6. Percentages were used for errors and false alarms, as 





Table 8.5: Data metrics 
Trial category Participant response on the trial Accuracy contribution by checking role 
Challenger miss 
 
Error was missed due to challenger miss-reading Challenger accuracy 
Challenger false alarm 
 
False alarm due to challenger miss-reading Challenger accuracy 
Challenger near miss 
 
Challenger miss-reads but corrects themselves on an 
error trial 
Challenger accuracy including corrections 
Challenger near false 
alarm 
 
Challenger miss-reads but corrects themselves on a non-
error trial 
Challenger accuracy including corrections 
Triple error 
 
Challenger miss-reads but responder does not notice on 
an error trial 
Challenger accuracy and responder accuracy 
Double error 
 
Challenger miss-reads but responder does not notice on 
a non-error trial 
Challenger accuracy and responder accuracy 
Responder miss 
 
Responder says there is no error incorrectly Responder accuracy 
Responder false alarm 
 
Responder says there is an error incorrectly Responder accuracy 
Responder near miss 
 
Responder says yes incorrectly but then corrects 
themselves on an error trial 
Responder accuracy including corrections 
Responder near false 
alarm 
Responder says no incorrectly but then corrects 
themselves on a non-error trial 






This study was reviewed and approved by Coventry University Faculty of Health and Life 
Sciences Ethics Committee, see appendix 11. Due to the length and repetitive nature of this 
study, participants were given a £5 voucher upon completion of the study. Participants 
would have received this voucher even if they had withdrawn during the study, as it was 
considered a thank you and not an incentive. The research was conducted according to BPS 
ethical code of conduct. 
8.4.6 Results 
The metrics for each pair of participants was entered into SPSS and aggregated according to 
experimental condition. SPPS was used to conduct the descriptive and inferential statistics 
on the data. 
8.4.6.1 Effect of condition on accuracy 
The mean percentage of errors missed across all experimental conditions was fairly low. It is 
worth noting that, as seen in table 8.7, the percentage of errors missed in all conditions was 
higher than the missed error rates in the previous experiment. It is thought this is due to the 
increased number of errors and the much longer time spent checking.  
 
Table 8.6: Descriptive statistics for each condition 
Condition Mean % errors 
missed (SD) 





Mean % accuracy 
with correction  
(SD) 
All participants 10.27 (15.67) 1.24 (1.21) 98.36 (1.39) 92.16 (1.13) 
C-R 10.00 (13.8) 
 
2.1  (1.8) 97.55 (1.77) 88.80 (4.42) 
C-R with role 
rotation 
6.66 (8.45) 1.19 (0.73) 98.56 (.89) 92.01 (2.97) 
C-R with varying 
order 
15.55 (23.11) 1.18 (.79) 98.17 (1.49) 92.20 (3.95) 
C-R with both 8.89 (13.89) 0.47 (.57) 99.17 (.72) 95.63 (1.67) 
 
As table 8.7 and figure 8.7 shows, participants missed a greater percentage of planted errors 






Figure 8.7: Mean percentage errors and false alarms across conditions 
 
There were differences between groups on how accurate they were when reading the 
values and responding correctly. As table 8.7 shows accuracy was higher when participants 
rotated roles and varied the order of parameters. The difference was more pronounced 
when including instances where participants made a mistake but corrected themselves 
before the next trial. This is shown in figure 8.8. 
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The accuracy of both challengers and responders was higher when participants rotated roles 
and varied the order of parameters. The difference was also more pronounced when 
including instances where participants made a mistake but corrected themselves before the 
next trial, as shown in figure 8.9.  
 
 
Figure 8.9: Challenger and responder accuracy across conditions 
 
As there were two factors under investigation, varying the order and rotating roles, each 
with two levels, either present or not present, a 2x2 MANOVA was conducted. A MANOVA 
was chosen as there were multiple dependent variables: percentage errors missed, 
percentage false alarms and measures of accuracy, as detailed in section 8.4.3.6. The data 
for all dependent variables displayed an unacceptable level of skew, with no homogeneity of 
variance, as demonstrated by a significant Levene’s test. Therefore, the data were 
transformed in order to meet the parametric assumptions needed to conduct a MANOVA 
(Tabachnick and Fidell 2007 and Howell 2007). The data for the ‘miss’ and ‘false alarm’ 
dependent variables displayed severe positive skew and had some zero values so the 
command LG10(x+C) was used, where C= 1 so that the smallest value was 1. The remaining 
dependent variables displayed severe negative skew so the command LG10(K-x) was used 









































Once transformed all data met parametric assumptions allowing a safe MANOVA to be 
conducted. In order to avoid a type I error, alpha was adjusted to 0.00625, as there were 8 
dependent variables (0.05 divided by 8, Coolican 2004). Only the dependent variables 
displaying a probability value of less than this alpha value were accepted as significant. The 
full MANOVA results can be seen in table 8.8. 
 
The MANOVA showed a significant main effect of ‘role rotation’ on ‘percentage accuracy 
with corrections’, F(1,56)= 16.34, p<0.001, ‘false alarms’, F(1,56)= 8.13, p = 0.006,  
‘challenger accuracy with corrections’, F(1,56)= 8.13, p=0.006, ‘responder accuracy with 
corrections’, F(1,56)=13.25, p=0.001, and ‘challenger accuracy’, F(1,56)= 19.88, p<0.001. 
This shows that when participants conducted a challenge response with role rotation, their 
accuracy with corrections, challenger accuracy with corrections, and responder accuracy 
with corrections were increased, yet the number of false alarms were decreased.  
 
The MANOVA showed a significant main effect of ‘varying order’ on ‘accuracy with 
corrections’, F(1,56)= 20.62, p<0.001, ‘false alarms’, F(1,56)= 8.63, p=0.005, and ‘challenger 
accuracy with corrections’, F(1,56)= 23.81, p<0.001. This shows that when participants 
conducted a challenge response with varying the order, their accuracy with corrections and 







Table 8.7: MANOVA results 
 Dependent variable F  p value 
Role rotation Percentage accuracy 7.41 0.009 
Percentage accuracy with corrections 16.34 <0.001 
Percentage miss 0.31 0.58 
Percentage false alarm 8.13 0.006 
Challenger accuracy with corrections 11.12 0.002 
Responder accuracy with corrections 13.25 0.001 
Challenger accuracy 19.88 <0.001 
Responder accuracy 7.44 0.008 
Varying order Percentage accuracy 4.04 0.049 
Percentage accuracy with corrections 20.62 <0.001 
Percentage miss 0.01 0.921 
Percentage false alarm 8.63 0.005 
Challenger accuracy with corrections 23.81 <0.001 
Responder accuracy with corrections 0.25 0.618 
Challenger accuracy 9.97 0.007 
Responder accuracy 0.22 0.641 
Role rotation * 
varying order 
Percentage accuracy 0.13 0.716 
Percentage accuracy with corrections 1.38 0.245 
Percentage miss 0.01 0.945 
Percentage false alarm 0.44 0.510 
Challenger accuracy with corrections 1.51 0.225 
Responder accuracy with corrections 1.03 0.314 
Challenger accuracy 1.75 0.191 
Responder accuracy 1.46 0.232 
 
8.4.6.2 Differences between challengers and responder accuracy 
The previous experiment showed a difference between the accuracy of challengers and 




significantly lower than responders’ accuracy. Table 8.9 displays the accuracy of challengers 
and responders in this second experiment. 
 
Table 8.8: Challenger and responder accuracy across conditions 












98.10 (1.56) 93.20 (3.65) 98.48 (1.85) 98.08 (1.95) 
C-R 97.12 (1.75) 90.39 (4.21) 98.35 (1.57) 97.39 (1.94) 
C-R with role 
rotation 
98.23 (1.24) 92.59 (2.80) 98.99 (1.0) 98.75 (2.9) 
C-R with 
varying order 
97.74 (1.51) 93.64 (3.01) 97.40 (2.79) 97.05 (2.66) 
C-R with both 99.31 (0.81) 96.17 (1.6) 99.16 (1.05) 99.11 (1.02) 
 
As figure 8.10 shows, the difference between challenger and responder accuracy was also 
present in this experiment. As data was not normally distributed, and therefore did not 
meet parametric assumptions, a Mann-Whitney U test was used to test this difference for 
significance. The Mann-Whitney U test showed that the difference between challenger and 
responder accuracy was not significant, U=1439, p= 0.56. However, the difference between 
challenger and responder accuracy including corrections, was significant, U= 298, p=<0.001. 
This suggests that challenger’s accuracy, when including corrections, was significantly lower 
than responders when looking at all experimental conditions in aggregate. 
 



























As can be seen in the earlier figure, challenger accuracy when including corrections, was 
lower across all four conditions, than responder accuracy. Table 8.10 displays the results of 
Mann Whitney U tests which show that this difference was significant across all four 
experiment conditions. This suggests that no matter what method of checking was used, the 
challengers’ accuracy including corrections was significantly lower than responders’ 
accuracy with corrections. 
 
Table 8.9: Mann-Whitney U test to compare differences in role accuracy 




Accuracy 66.5 0.056 
Accuracy with correction 4 <0.001 
 
C-R with role rotation 
Accuracy 71 0.089 
Accuracy with correction 1 <0.001 
 
C-R with varying order 
Accuracy 102.5 0.683 
Accuracy with correction 32 <0.001 
 
C-R with both 
Accuracy 102 0.683 
Accuracy with correction 12.5 <0.001 
8.4.6.3 The effect of involuntary automaticity  
This experiment also demonstrated an effect of involuntary automaticity. The final planted 
error on trial 120, towards the end of the experiment, was missed more frequently than any 
of the other errors. This effect was present whether the error was a numerical error or 
wedge error, as displayed in figure 8.11. Although this was more pronounced when the 
error was numerical parameter, suggesting it is harder to spot a numerical error. As such the 





Figure 8.11: Error placement and frequency of error missed 
  
Figure 8.12 displays an analysis of the error position and error detection in each condition. It 
can be seen that the final error was detected more frequently when participants were asked 
to rotate roles, and use both methods. Therefore, these methods appear to minimise the 
effect of involuntary automaticity. 
 
Figure 8.12: Missed errors by experimental condition 
8.4.7 Maintaining attention discussion 
The experiment investigating methods to maintain attention during repeated challenge-
response checking adopted the same methodology as the first checking methods 
































































to increase the reliability of results, as it was more like the final treatment checks in 
radiotherapy departments which are done for long periods of time.  The types of planted 
errors (numerical or wedge errors) were also varied in order to ensure that it was the time 
placement of the error, rather than the error type, which made it more likely to be missed. 
It is believed that this allows conclusions surrounding involuntary automaticity during 
repeated final treatment checks to be valid.  
8.4.7.1 Effect of method on accuracy 
There was no significant difference between checking methods on percentage of errors 
missed. This is believed to be because challenge-response checking is an effective method of 
error detection. The focus of this experiment was on measuring attention, indicated by 
accuracy rates.  It was observed that both ‘varying the order of parameters’ and ‘rotating 
roles’ on their own led to a significantly increased accuracy score. This suggests that either 
method helps to maintain accuracy.  As accuracy was higher, it is assumed that attention 
was maintained to a higher extent, resulting in fewer attention lapses. It is theorised that 
this is because these methods of checking required slightly more cognitive demand, as 
participants had to be focussed on either altering the order of parameters every time or 
rotating roles, thus the phenomena of underload did not occur. The parameters being 
varied also introduced variation into repeated final treatment checks, preventing routine. 
The switching of roles of challenger and responder every 15 minutes also prevented routine 
and ensured each checker did not become susceptible to involuntary automaticity in their 
role.  
8.4.7.2 Comparison of role accuracy 
As with the previous experiment, the challenger’s accuracy rate was lower than the 
responders. This difference was present even when switching roles and varying the order of 
parameters. It is argued that this may be the interface design which is making it difficult to 
read the values correctly and therefore forcing the errors. Varying the order in which the 
parameters were read significantly improved challenger’s accuracy. Therefore, this should 




8.4.7.3 Involuntary Automaticity effect 
The results suggested that involuntary automaticity does occur doing repeated final 
treatment checks as the final error was missed more frequently than the other errors, 
regardless of whether it was a numerical value or a wedge error. When an error went 
undetected this suggests attention failed, and involuntary automaticity is one interpretation 
of this. This effect appears to have been reduced when participants were asked to switch 
roles and vary the order of parameters, suggesting that these methods help to prevent 
involuntary automaticity from occurring. 
8.5 Chapter discussion 
This chapter has sought to explore experimentally the effectiveness of different methods of 
final treatment checking through laboratory based experimental studies. A novel 
experiment was devised to simulate some of the demands of checking in radiotherapy. It 
combined understanding of radiotherapy with the literature on checking and attention. The 
experimental design sought to determine the effectiveness of different methods of checking 
and the potential for involuntary automaticity during repeated final treatment checks. It 
also explored ways attention can be maintained during repeated final treatment checks, to 
minimise the likelihood of attention lapsing and involuntary automaticity occurring.  
 
The chapter results have suggested that there is a difference in error detection and accuracy 
across different checking methods. Evidence has been provided to suggest that more errors 
are detected when a challenge-response method of checking is employed, compared to 
single or double (non-verbal) checking. Furthermore, the experiments have suggested that 
attention is still vulnerable to lapses during repeated challenge-response checking, but that 
changes to the way a challenge-response check is conducted can limit these attentional 
lapses, thereby improving checking accuracy. These changes are switching the roles of 
challenger and responder every 15 minutes, and varying the order the required parameters 
are checked in.  
 
These methods were demonstrated in a laboratory setting to increase the accuracy of 
checking. The results are believed to be because the challenge-response forces both 




introduction of switching roles and varying the order is believed to prevent attention lapsing 
as it places slightly more cognitive demand upon checkers. These findings can potentially be 
incorporated into a checking protocol, in order to optimise error detection during the final 
treatment check in radiotherapy. This will be explored in the following chapter. 
 
The results of these experiments also suggest that the materials used in radiotherapy 
departments would benefit from a re-design in order to support users to check treatment 
details effectively. This is because the results suggested that during repeated challenge-
response checking the accuracy was mostly affected by the attention of the challenger when 
reading the values from the screen. This effect was also present even when participants 
switched roles of challenger and responder. This finding mirrors the views of qualified and 
student radiographers who, as discussed in section 7.3.5, reported that their software 
systems’ interface is not user-friendly at the point of the final treatment check, and could be 
utilised further to help engage users and prevent involuntary automaticity. Therefore, these 
results suggest that research on the design of the interface used to conduct the final 
treatment check could be beneficial. This will be further explored in chapter 10. 
8.5.1 Critical evaluation of experimental method 
This experiment successfully employed a novel paradigm designed to mimic radiotherapy in 
order to investigate and compare the efficacy of several checking methods. Although the 
paradigm was designed to mimic radiotherapy the process was still not fully reflective of 
real life. Foremost, there was no danger of causing harm due to ineffective checking which is 
ever present when delivering radiation. Also, the number of errors planted was highly 
artificial because errors at the final treatment check are rare. This is because the frequency 
of planted errors needed to be high in order to compare the effect of checking methods. 
Participants only checked for a maximum of 90 minutes, whereas in real life this is done for 
hours. Furthermore, the time between each final treatment check is likely to be much 
longer in radiotherapy departments.  
 
The values used in the experiment for the numerical parameters were also artificial. This 
was done to reduce the ceiling effects observed in the pilot study of the paradigm, and to 




An important point to note here is that monitor units are often similar and staff quickly 
become accustomed to what the values for each parameter should be, although this would  
have additional consequences for automatic reading in real life settings.  
 
It could be argued that the use of lay participants is a limitation of these experiments as 
they are not trained in radiotherapy treatment delivery. This may have meant they were not 
checking as conscientiously as would happen in real life due to their being no human danger 
from erroneous approval of treatment parameters. However, as detailed in section 5.4.1 
this is not believed to be an issue as participants were briefed on radiotherapy treatment 
delivery prior to the study commencing, students were also provided with an incentive to 
check thoroughly in these studies, in the form of sweets. The use of lay participants has 
been further discussed and justified in sections 5.4.1 and 5.6.1.  
 
Independent groups were used in both experiments in order to prevent either fatigue or 
practice effects in participants. All participants were assigned to the experimental 
conditions based on order of presentation, to help minimise individual differences in the 
experimental conditions. Despite the possible limitations of this experiment, it is believed 
that this novel approach to exploring patient safety provided interesting results that would 
warrant further exploration of the findings in a more realistic setting. This further 
exploration would help ensure that the results observed can be transferred and applied to 
real life scenarios. 
8.6 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has concluded that, in this experimental context, challenge-response is the 
most effective method of checking to detect errors. Rotating roles and varying values during 
repeated treatment checks also helps to maintain attention, thereby limiting errors from 
passing undetected during repeated final treatment checks.  
 
Results from this chapter will be taken forward in chapter 9 and used to inform the design 
of a new checking protocol for use immediately prior to beam delivery, as detailed in figure 





The second conclusion to be drawn from this chapter, and the interviews in chapter 7, is 
that the design of the interface needs to be further considered to ensure that the design is 
optimal in supporting the user when conducting a challenge-response check. This is because 
the results in this chapter suggested that challenger’s accuracy was significantly poorer than 
responders. Chapter 10 builds on these findings and presents the design and evaluation of a 




9 Chapter 9 – Study 4: The development and evaluation of a checking 
protocol 
 
The results of the literature review, exploratory interviews and task analysis (chapters 2-7), 
suggested that there is currently variation in how the final treatment check prior to 
treatment delivery is conducted. The exploratory interviews (chapter 7) suggested that 
radiographers would value a standardised checking protocol which details an evidence-
based and effective method of checking. To inform the design of this protocol, laboratory 
experiments in chapter 8 explored the most reliable method of checking to detect errors in 
a simulated checking task. It determined that a challenge-response check, with parameters 
checked one by one would be beneficial. The experiments also suggested that changes to 
the checking process, regularly switching the roles of challenger and responder and varying 
the order in which the four parameters are checked, can help to maintain attention on the 
task. This new knowledge will therefore be applied to the evidence based protocol design in 
this chapter. 
 
Standardised checking protocols are available in other areas of healthcare, for instance the 
surgical safety checklist, and other safety critical industries such as aviation. The work in 
aviation suggests that a well-designed checklist which elicits an active challenge-response 
check improves safety (Degani and Weiser 1993). However, rather than directly transferring 
an existing checklist from one of these domains, it is argued it is valuable to apply learning 
from other domains, but develop a domain specific protocol that maps directly to the 
context and domain specific requirements. This will increase the likelihood that it will work 
effectively when integrated into practice.   
 
The research described in this chapter aimed to embed the findings derived from earlier 
chapters and apply these to the development of a protocol to assist radiographers maintain 
attention during repeated final treatment checks, and hence prevent involuntary 
automaticity and errors potentially passing undetected. The research also sought to 




9.1 Development of the checking protocol 
This checking protocol seeks to provide a standardised work instruction, to minimise 
variation in how the final treatment check is conducted.  
9.1.1 Method 
Requirements for the development of the protocol were informed by: 
1. The literature review 
2. The HTA in chapter 6, see section 6.3 
3. The exploratory interviews in chapter 7, see table 7.5 
4. Results from the experimental findings in chapter 8 
The requirements were compiled (see section 7.4) and used to inform the development of 
the protocol. Once the protocol design had been drafted, a radiographer was consulted to 
ensure that the content of the protocol was sufficient and in keeping with what needed to 
be done at the point of the final treatment check.  
9.1.2 Emerging requirements 
As a result of the above methods, the following requirements emerged regarding the 
purpose of the checking protocol: 
 Communicate to radiographers exactly what treatment parameters need to be 
checked and how to check them effectively 
 Provide a standardised operating procedure to minimise variation in how the final 
treatment check is conducted 
 Minimise variation on checking practice both within and between radiotherapy 
departments 
 Provide a short checklist, in which both users of the checklist can ensure they have 
checked all required parameters prior to beam switch on 
 Focus radiographers’ attention and therefore increase the likelihood of error 
detection during repeated final treatment checks 
 
In addition to the purpose indicated above, a number of required features of the protocol 
have emerged from the methods detailed in section 9.3.1. Table 9.1 details these 





Table 9.1: Requirements of the checking protocol 
Requirement Explanation Supporting evidence 
Inclusion of only energy, monitor units, 
wedge monitor units and wedge position 
These are the parameters which must be verified 
at this point in treatment 
Literature- Towards Safer Radiotherapy 
(Donaldson 2007) 
Verbal checking Considered to be more effective Task analysis 
Literature review- Towards Safer 
Radiotherapy (Donaldson 2007) 
Interview findings 
Challenge-response format Considered to be more effective Task analysis 
Literature review- Degani and Wesier (1993) 
Interview findings 
Experimental findings in chapter 8 
Vary the order of parameters for each 
final treatment check 
Helps to maintain attention by minimising 
repetition and introducing variation  
Experimental findings in chapter 8 
Switch roles of challenger and responder  Helps to maintain attention by minimising 
repetition and introducing variation  
Role switching every 15 minutes is suggested as 
this should mean they are switching roles 
between every patient. 
Experimental findings in chapter 8 
One parameter checked at a time Prevents ‘chunking’, which places too much 
demand upon memory 
Task analysis, section 6.3.3 
Active repeat back of value Prevents responder just saying yes, helping ensure 
active checking.  Also provides a second chance at 
error detection for each parameter, as both 
checkers hear the value and say the value.  
Task analysis, section 6.3.3 
Told to listen Makes explicit that both radiographers must 
remain involved in the check 
Interview findings 
Read from screen The machine is giving the dose, therefore the 
value should be read from the machine and not 
the prescription 





Requirement Explanation Supporting evidence 
Check against prescription sheet This is the source documentation and what the 
dose should be verified against 
Literature- Towards Safer Radiotherapy  
(Donaldson 2007) 
Explanation of why it is important to swap 
roles and vary the order of parameters 
A reminder of the safety reasons for this is 
intended to increase adherence.  
Literature review – Simons et al. (2010) 
Fits current workflow This was found to help compliance in the SSC Literature review – Evley et al. (2010) 
Interview findings 
Time efficient If it takes too much time it will not be followed Interview findings 
Not forcing the user to rely on memory Principle from good aviation checklist design Literature review- Degani and Wesier (1993) 
Critical items placed at the beginning Principle from good aviation checklist design Literature review- Degani and Wesier (1993) 
Items presented in a logical order Principle from good aviation checklist design Literature review- Degani and Wesier (1993) 
Silence during critical safety phases Principle from good aviation checklist design Literature review- Degani and Wesier (1993) 
Use of ‘ standard phraseology’ Principle from good aviation checklist design to 
formalises the process and provides a distinction 
from other communication. 
Literature review- Degani and Wesier (1993) 
The roles of both challenger and 
responder made explicit 
Principle from good aviation checklist design as 
distinct roles in a checklist co-ordinate actions and 
communication. 
Literature review- Degani and Wesier (1993) 
Written protocol To provide more detail and a brief explanation of 
why it is important to swap roles and vary the 
order of the parameters, because compliance 
increased if the reasons explained 
Literature review – Simons et al. (2010) 
Interviews 
Diagram to provide a visual reminder  Shown to be effective at explaining double 
checking in anaesthesia. 






9.1.3 The protocol 
The requirements detailed in table 9.1, were developed into a protocol. The written form is 
shown in figure 9.1, and the diagrammatic in figure 9.2. 
Protocol for the final treatment check in radiotherapy 
Immediately prior to beam delivery, having set-up the patient up on the bed, two qualified 
radiographers are required to ensure that the parameters displayed on the linear 
accelerator machine screen correspond exactly with those which were prescribed by the 
patient. To do this the values on screen must be checked against the patient’s original 
prescription. The parameters which must be checked are energy, monitor units, wedge 
monitor units and wedge position. 
 
The two radiographers must conduct an active check by following this method: 
 The first checker reads a parameter value aloud from the screen 
 The second checker waits to hear the value and then looks at the prescription and 
confirms this is correct, then repeats aloud the energy value from the prescription 
 The first  checker waits to hear the value and confirms it is correct by looking again 
at the screen 
 This process is repeated for the remaining parameters 
 Only when all four parameters have been verified this way can the beam be switched 
on 
 
 For any subsequent beams, or for the following patient to be treated, the verification 
is to be repeated in the same way, but the order in which the parameters are 
checked must be altered. Radiographers must ensure they continually vary the 
order in which the four parameters are checked. 
 Radiographers must ensure that they regularly alternate the roles of first checker 
and second checker. Role rotation for every patient is ideal, with a maximum of 15 
minutes to pass before a role rotation. 
 Varying the order of parameters and alternating roles is vital to ensure involuntary 
automaticity during the final treatment checks does not occur. Involuntary 
automaticity makes the final treatment check vulnerable to error.  
 











9.2 Evaluation of the final treatment check protocol 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness, strengths, and weaknesses of this new protocol, 
group interviews were conducted with qualified and student radiographers. The aim of this 
study was to evaluate the usability and potential effectiveness of the new protocol by 
understanding qualified and student radiographers’ views of the protocol’s strengths, 
weaknesses, benefits, effectiveness, and possible improvements to be made.  
9.2.1 Method 
A qualitative approach to the evaluation of the protocol was taken as it was important to 
gather the views of the potential end users of the protocol, so that they could feedback into 
the development of the protocol, as discussed in section 5.5. Furthermore, the protocol 
could not be put in place ‘live’, due to ethical considerations surrounding service delivery in 
the NHS. 
9.2.1.1 Design 
Semi structured group interviews were used to conduct the evaluation, so that participants 
had an opportunity to use the protocol by verifying example treatment details in pairs. 
Additionally, group interviews provided an opportunity for participants to stimulate 
discussion amongst themselves, thereby providing richer data. 
9.2.1.2 Participants 
Participants were recruited via opportunity sampling. An email invitation was sent to 
potential participants who were asked to contact the researcher to arrange a convenient 
time for interview if they were interested in taking part. All radiographers from 
Northampton General Hospital and all second and third year student radiographers from 
Birmingham City University’s radiography department were invited. Student radiographers 
were chosen has they were believed to provide a range of experiences as they had been on 
placement in various different hospitals across the region. These locations were chosen as 
they were local to the researcher. The only exclusion criterion for this study was that 
participants must not be under investigation for a patient safety incident. Recruitment 
continued until data saturation was reached- this was the point at which participants gave 





Sixteen qualified therapy radiographers were recruited from Northampton General 
Hospital’s radiotherapy department. Twelve student radiographers were recruited from 
Birmingham City University. This group was believed to represent a range of experience and 
views. Details of participant experience are provided in table 9.2. 
Table 9.2: Evaluative interviews participant experience 
Grade Number of participants 
Band 5 radiographer 4 
Band 6 radiographer 4 
Band 7 radiographer 4 
Band 8 radiographer 2 
Second year student radiographer 5 
Third year student radiographer 7 
 
9.2.1.3 Procedure 
Participants took part in interviews in small groups of two or three. One participant took 
part alone. In this instance the researcher worked through the final treatment check 
protocol with the participant. The number of participants per interview was dictated by 
staffing levels on the department at Northampton General Hospital, it was always ensured 
that participation did not have a negative impact on staffing in the department. The 
interviews took place in a quiet room, away from any distractions. At the start of the 
interview participants were invited to read the protocol and trial it in pairs in order to allow 
them to become familiar with the checking detailed. After all participants said they 
understood the protocol and had no more questions, a semi-structured approach was used 
to conduct the interviews.  
 
The length of the interviews ranged from 15-55 minutes. The interviews were audio 
recorded to produce a verbatim transcript and to allow the researcher to focus on what the 
participant was saying and ask probing questions. These interviews were transcribed 




9.2.1.4 Interview schedule 
The semi-structured approached allowed a flexible interview scheduled to be used which 
covered the topics necessary for the research question, whilst allowing the researcher to 
follow up on any interesting points raised by the participants.  The interview questions were 
designed to elicit responses which would allow exploration of the strengths, weaknesses, 
likely effectiveness, implementation, barriers to use and design of the protocol. 
 
Questions were designed based on the previous research, and informed by the research 
aims. Questions about the implementation of the new protocol were derived from the 
factors surrounding SOP implementation identified in the literature review. Throughout 
data collection the questions followed a flexible emergent design- that is, if an unexpected 
topic arose during an interview it was added to the schedule for subsequent interviews. All 
interviews were conducted following the same interview schedule which can be seen in 
appendix 14. A summary of the interview content is presented in table 9.3.  
 





 Initial demographic questions to allow comparison of participant 
responses in the analysis 
2-9 Design of the protocol 
 Were both version of the protocol clear? 
 Were roles of both checkers explicit in both versions of protocol? 
 Was the diagrammatic representation of the protocol clearly 
communicated and easily understood?  
 What was liked and disliked?  
 Any improvements to be made 
10-15 Using the protocol  
 How effective would the protocol be at error detection? 
 Would it help maintain attention during repeated final treatment checks? 
 Comparison of this protocol with current practice 
16-22 Implementing the protocol  
 Would the participants use the protocol?  
 Their perception of others adopting this new protocol 




9.2.1.5 Data analysis 
As these were exploratory interviews, thematic analysis (TA) was chosen as it allows 
identification and exploration of patterns across the data (Braun and Clarke 2006).  The 
analysis process detailed in section 5.3.2 was followed. Examples of coding and a table of 
codes, themes and sub-themes can be found in appendix 15 and 16. 
9.2.1.6 Ethics 
The research protocol was approved by Coventry University Faculty of Health and Life 
Sciences Ethics Committee and permission sought from Birmingham City University and 
Northampton General Hospital’s Research and Development department. Approvals can be 
seen in appendix 12, 13 and 14 respectively. The interviews were conducted according to 
BPS ethical code of conduct. 
9.2.2 Results 
Participants were largely positive about the protocol, both in terms of likely error trapping 
through use and likely adherence to the protocol. Alongside discussion of the strengths, 
benefits and implementation of the protocol, a few improvements were also suggested, 
mainly the design of the treatment systems to work in tandem with the protocol. Thematic 
analysis of the interviews led to these results being clustered into six themes. These were: 
challenge-response method valued, preference for the process illustrated on a diagram, 
implementation of new protocol, error prevention, secondary benefits and design 
improvements. These will be discussed in turn. 
9.2.2.1  Challenge-response method valued 
 A challenge-response method of checking treatment details was widely valued. Participants 
believed that this structured method of checking was safer, and more likely to detect errors 
because it was more active due to its verbal nature, during which a “yes” or “no” would not 
suffice: 
“Having been on an audit, I’d have to say this method is better, because I am far from 
convinced, even though you remind people to actively engage in the check, it 
happens. There’s almost a ritualistic calling out of numbers, and then a yes” Band 8 
radiographer 
 
Participants recognised that if the final treatment check was done in this way it would mean 




nature of the check means that both radiographers were aware if the other was paying 
attention, forcing both to remain on task rather than leaving the responsibility of 
verification to the other radiographer: 
“At the moment you don’t actually have to listen. They just wait for someone to stop 
talking and do their bit of talking. Whereas if you’ve got to mirror the order that the 
person that has told it to you, you’ve got to find them in the right order.” Band 5 
radiographer 
 
Feedback on how the final treatment check procedure was laid out on the protocol was 
positive with participants appreciating that both of the checker roles were clearly defined. 
Student radiographers especially reported appreciating the clearly defined roles of both the 
challenger and responder. They felt that it helped with their training, as they could follow 
what the qualified staff were doing when observing and knew what to do when they were 
switching on the treatment beam. The absence of any ambiguity was appreciated as it 
allowed student radiographers to be clear on what they were expected to do at this point in 
the patient’s treatment.  
 
Whilst feedback on this structured method of checking, with a repeat back and parameters 
checked one at a time was positive, it was also noted that there would be time implications 
to its adoption. Some participants thought this active call back would take too much time, 
and negatively impact on treatment times. It was believed that reading and verifying the 
parameters individually would especially take too much time and may lead radiographers to 
revert back to checking them all together. Conversely, some participants argued that it was 
worth spending a few extra seconds if it prevented even one error: 
“It would probably only increase a patient’s treatment time by a minute, if you’ve got 
40 patients a day, that’s 40 minutes at the end of the day. On the other hand, if it 
could prevent even a single error….” Third year student radiographer 
 
Some participants reported a positive benefit of the check taking extra time. They felt that if 
it took longer to do the final treatment check it would slow the process down, which would 
be of benefit, as it is normally rushed. Therefore, extra time would allow them to pay more 





9.2.2.2  Preference for the checking process illustrated on a diagram 
Whilst feedback on both the written and diagrammatic protocol were positive, all 
participants preferred the protocol presented on a diagram, as opposed to the written 
prose, as it was perceived to be clearer, quicker to read and easier to digest. It was 
recognised by participants that the diagram was very different to other work instructions in 
their departments, which were almost without exception, written: 
“Even at a cursory glance at the diagram would be very straight forward. The 
alternate protocol description is like the million others I’ve seen and I would have to 
sit down and really scrutinise it for it to go in.” Third year student radiographer 
 
Due to the clarity and simplicity of the diagram, participants did not perceive reading the 
diagram to be an arduous task. In contrast, many participants reported that the written 
protocol was not appealing and they would struggle to find the time whilst in the 
department to read, or remind themselves of, the protocol if it existed only in prose form.  
It was reported that this difference in the protocol design would capture their attention and 
assist in the successful implementation of the protocol: 
“There’s something about it which just draws your attention to it, you know. If it’s 
just right there in front of you, maybe it’s the colours on the diagram but it does drag 
your attention more than this paper. You tend to push these written things to the 
side.” Third year radiographer 
 
Some participants drew parallels with the infection control posters around the department, 
due to the visual nature of the diagram, which had been successful in changing the ways 
staff and patients approached hand-washing. A further benefit of the diagram protocol 
recognised by participants was that it is visual and hence suited to being displayed on a wall. 
Participants suggested that this diagram could be positioned on a wall next to the treatment 
console in order to act as a constant reminder on final treatment check best practice: 
“It would be ideal to have on a wall, because you can just glance at it.” Band 8 
radiographer 
 
It was believed that the step-by-step nature of the diagram would allow staff to remind 
themselves of the final treatment check process. This would help during the implementation 
stage and particularly when staff returned to therapy treatment from leave or working 
elsewhere in the department, without having to go and consult the written departmental 




remember the process, whereas they sometimes struggled to recall other departmental 
protocols. A further perceived benefit of the diagram being present near the treatment 
machines was when training student radiographers. As senior staff could then, not only tell 
them what to do, but students can see what to do and understand it for themselves, whilst 
at the same time ensuring staff are doing it properly. This method of training is currently 
lacking in radiotherapy: 
“Student training is very much based on the principle of monkey see, monkey do.” 
Band 8 radiographer 
 
All student radiographers reported that they would like being able to view the protocol at 
the same time as listening to the check being done by staff when they were observing. 
Furthermore, all qualified staff reported that it would be easier to refer student 
radiographers to a nearby diagram when explaining how and why to conduct the final 
treatment check.   
 
Whilst the diagrammatic version of the protocol was preferred, all participants 
acknowledged that the optimal effect of the new protocol would come with the written and 
diagrammatic protocol versions being used together. The written protocol contains the 
reasons why staff should vary the order and swap roles, whereas the diagram highlights 
these points and provides a prompt with exclamation marks. Participants universally agreed 
that the explanation of why, whilst simple, would help bolster adherence to the protocol: 
“The written protocol explains what we need to do and then how to do it, and there’s 
things in bold, but the diagram is a short and sweet version.” Band 6 radiographer 
 
All participants came to the conclusion that both versions of the protocol should be used; 
the written included in departmental policies and procedures which have to be read and 
signed off by all staff during induction and annually, then the diagram positioned as a 
constant visual reminder near the treatment console. 
9.2.2.3  Implementation of a new protocol 
 Participants were not only positive about the content, reasons underlying and design of the 
protocol, but they also gave largely positive feedback surrounding the feasibility of the 
implementation of the new protocol. A standardised method of conducting the final 




standard method of conducting this final treatment check prior to beam switch on and that 
this part of the treatment was open to local departmental interpretation: 
“It’s a significant step forward to have something formally set out and standardised.” 
Band 8 radiographer 
 
Standardisation of this process was believed by all participants to be an improvement over 
current procedures. It was recognised that standardisation of processes was absent in all 
areas of radiotherapy with departments writing their own protocols and procedures. It was 
reported again that there was variation in how the final treatment check was conducted 
across departments: 
“Where I’m on placement, I’ve seen it done on different units, I’ve seen it done 
different ways, but the more common method would be the “have you checked it?” 
“yes” “alright then, press go”. Rather than making a sort of effort.” Third year 
student radiographer 
 
Participants reported that implementing this protocol as a standard protocol across all 
departments would emphasise the importance of the final treatment check and would 
ensure all radiographers were working to best practice. It was also believed to assist when 
staff and students moved department and allow for an easier transition period: 
“Yeah it brings in that uniformity in radiotherapy which we lack really. Most 
departments they have their own way of doing things but it would be ideal knowing 
that whether you’re working at one department, or go to another department, their 
method of verification is quite the same regardless of which software they use, you 
still know what roles you have in double checking. I think that would be ideal.” 
Second year student radiographer 
 
For some participants this method of checking was similar to current departmental practise. 
Whereas some participants recognised that the final treatment check was often not done as 
a double check, or as a verbalised check, in departments they had worked in or visited. 
Nearly all participants who verified in a similar way, using a two person verbal check, 
recognised that their current method of checking did not include the second verbal repeat 
back, or double confirmation. All participants who expanded on how they checked currently 
reported that they did not vary the order of parameters to be checked. Some participants 
reported that they did vary the roles of ‘challenger’ and ‘responder’, yet this was not a 





“Staff would switch roles depending on how sits down in the chair first, rather than, 
any sort of conscious effort on their part.” Third year student radiographer  
 
As the protocol would not require a radical change in practise it was suggested that only a 
gentle introduction of the new protocol would be needed to ensure it was followed. It was 
suggested by many participants that the new protocol should be introduced during 
lunchtime seminars with small group training sessions during which staff are explained the 
reasoning behind the new protocol and given a chance to practice using it before it went 
‘live’: 
“I think too much, with protocols, new protocols. It’s just been here’s a paper, read it. 
You know. I think it needs to be fully introduced and why.” Third year student 
radiographer 
 
It was strongly suggested that the protocol would require the full support of seniors and 
technical leads in the department to ensure others embraced the new protocol: 
“It depends how it was enforced by the technical leads. The technical leads are very 
well respected and they’re kind of separate to the staff base, as they should be, they 
write the policy, a lot of the protocol, as well as approving it. So if they took it 
seriously it would trickle down even if there was some resistance” Third year student 
radiographer 
 
Trial periods were suggested by many participants as being a useful way to incorporate staff 
feedback into the implementation and support willingness to adhere. It was also suggested 
that regular, internal, informal audits would be beneficial to ensure the protocol was being 
adhered to and ensure its longevity: 
“It’d be, we adopt it, we write into procedure, we’d run very short training sessions 
with staff, just literally running through the protocol with a couple of members of 
staff, each one, take them off two at a time, run them through the protocol and off 
you go, you’re off and running.”  Band 8 radiographer 
 
Other participants suggested that the protocol would need higher support from the 
Department of Health if it was to be standardised successfully across all departments: 
“If it needs to be rolled out, then it’s got to come from the government, it’s got to be 
made mandatory rather than something that different radiotherapy managers can 
pick and choose from. If you’re going to roll it out and say this is worthwhile doing it’s 
got to come from the top, Department of Health, this is what you’re doing and it’s 
been proven to work. I think if it’s come from the government as well it would really 




they’re more concerned with getting through the patients rather than treating 
them.” Band 7 radiographer 
 
The majority of participants indicated that they would be willing to embrace and follow the 
new protocol as they could envisage the safety benefits. However, it was noted that there 
may be some resistance from experienced staff: 
“If you gave some people this in gold, they still wouldn’t follow it would they! We’ve 
always got that group of people who just want to do what they’ve always done. But I 
think the majority would follow it.” Third year student radiographer 
 
The potential resistance was believed to be due to the change in habits that adherence to 
the protocol would require. It was recognised that following this protocol would get easier 
with time. This is primarily because it would become more ‘second-nature’ to check each 
parameter individually with an active repeat back. Although, if this would lead to the same 
issues of involuntary automaticity the protocol seeks to avoid, would remain to be tested by 
further research. Furthermore, the adoption of the protocol was expected, by participants, 
to become easier with time, as the numbers of student radiographers who could be trained 
in this way of verifying increases, and they progress through the qualified grades, they 
would be in positions to train the next generation of radiographers, thereby creating a 
cultural evolution in final treatment checking: 
“Once you get it ingrained in your students and then they become radiographers then 
you’re starting to build that process up right from the ground level” Band 7 
radiographer 
 
Whilst the future adoption of the protocol seems promising, it was also acknowledged that 
adoption is not a linear process, as staff may revert to checking all parameters together, as it 
would be quicker. Participants spoke a little about the potential for application of this 
protocol to other areas of cancer treatment where there are double checks in place as a 
safety measure, such as radiotherapy pre-treatment imaging and planning, and 
chemotherapy drug administration.  
9.2.2.4  Error prevention 
 All participants believed that this structured method of checking, with role rotation and 
varying the order of parameters, would help to detect any errors during the final treatment 




of ‘challenger’ and ‘responder’ would act as a “speed bump to automation” and help to 
maintain attention during repeated final treatment checks, especially when patients had 
long treatments consisting of many treatment fractions. This was believed to be because the 
addition of varying the order and switching roles forces them to think just a little bit more 
about what they are doing: 
“You have 30, 40 patients a day, if you’re just the second checker throughout, you’re 
bound to know the order, and might end up saying yeah, yeah. If you’re changing 
back and forth, starting with one thing, finishing with another, that would keep you 
on your toes” Second year student radiographer 
 
As positive as the feedback was from the participants about the protocol preventing errors, 
it was recognised that this protocol could not address some issues associated with checking 
errors: a lack of human factors training, time pressure, distractions, design of the treatment 
areas and authority gradients.  Time pressure and staffing levels were recognised by many 
participants as impacting negatively upon effectiveness of the final treatment check. 
Participants reported that there is an increased throughput of patients in radiotherapy 
departments, which is having a negative impact on the amount of treatment time dedicated 
to treat each patient. This may, in turn, have an impact on how stringently the final 
treatment check, and other protocols, are followed: 
“I’m in my second year and even since I started training it’s becoming more 
noticeably busy and waiting lists are going up and up and that’s had an impact on 
the treatment units I’ve been on where it’s much busier, you’ve got less catch up slots 
as well so it’s easier for you to fall behind, so I think that’s when corners start getting 
cut.” Second year student radiographer 
 
A further negative impact on the final treatment check accuracy, which participants noted 
would be easier to change than time pressure, is distractions. Participants noted that no 
matter how good a protocol was, it could not prevent the staff who are checking from being 
distracted by colleagues, other professional staff, patients and patient families. Whilst the 
NHS department in which these interviews with qualified radiographers were conducted in 
had recently tried limiting the number of phone calls being routed to the treatment 
consoles, it was recognised that there was still too much noise and distractions in the same 




“I think if you want to reduce the number of errors, if there are a number of errors, I 
think you need more focus and more time to do it and less distractions.” Band 5 
radiographer 
 
The issue of distractions is closely related to the design of the department, which some 
senior radiographers also noted had a negative impact on the final treatment check. Some 
senior radiographers reported that the area around the treatment console was too crowded 
and that some work which was being done there could be located elsewhere to minimise 
disturbances: 
“It does invite that whole question about actually how to structure the work on the 
unit. You’ve got 4, sometimes 5, staff on that unit, no matter how small or how big 
that space is. Is 4 or 5 actually healthy or should they be on activities elsewhere in the 
department? Which again that’s another thing which comes down to resources and 
availability of space.” Band 8 radiographer 
 
These participants also suggested that ensuring that the area around the console was a 
quiet, protected and perhaps screened off area, would improve their concentration during 
final treatment check: 
“You kind of almost need a screen behind where you’re switching on, to separate the 
rest of the control area where conversations are happening and need to be 
happening” Band 5 radiographer 
 
A further issue which all participants noted was a challenge to eradicate, was deference to 
authority. Whilst it was recognised that the detailed protocol with clearly defined roles may 
go some way to preventing this, junior staff may still feel uncomfortable questioning a 
senior: 
“That’s actually one of the key safety measures isn’t it, because always the risk is that 
people will defer to the senior person and the senior person is just as prone to making 
a mistake as anyone else is.” Band 8 radiographer 
 
A further issue that senior radiographers felt needed to be addressed to ensure effective 
checking was human factors and patient safety training for both student and qualified 
radiographers.  The senior radiographers who spoke about this believed that if staff and 
students had more of an understanding around error propagation  and causation they 
would be more willing to alter their own and other’s work behaviours and embrace safety 




“I think it all comes back to the training culture as well, planting human factors in the 
training which I think is lacking at the moment.” Band 7 radiographer 
 
Student radiographers also noted areas in which they felt their training had been lacking. 
They reported feeling like they were “thrown in at the deep end” when going out on 
placement, and that they would like an opportunity to practice clinical skills in a non-
threatening environment at their university before going on placement. This checking 
protocol was identified as an ideal aspect of clinical practice which could be introduced at 
university: 
“We don’t have anything much related to practical inside our university, we do the 
academic, but yes, we know we need to go out there practically, but it’s not like a 
nurse where you have a clinical setting and they learn before they go in. They throw 
you out there, everything’s new, you’re learning everything” Second year student 
radiographer  
9.2.2.5  Secondary benefits of introduction of the protocol 
Many participants believed that this protocol had some additional benefits above error 
prevention including: increasing awareness of the importance of the final treatment check, 
improving team work and increasing staff confidence. The greatest benefit to individuals 
reported was the positive improvement this would make when student radiographers begin 
their training, as the protocol would serve as a useful introduction to this particular aspect 
of patient treatment. Many participants believed this protocol would benefit all staff, on an 
individual level, as having it positioned nearby would increase confidence to speak up if 
another member of staff was deviating from the protocol. Some participants, especially 
student radiographers, also recognised that having the protocol forcing them to speak 
would increase confidence, especially as it was so simple they could not get it wrong: 
“Especially if you’re a newly qualified band 5 working with a high band 7, it would 
help break the ice as such and help us to not feel as small.” Second year student 
radiographer 
 
The protocol was also reported to have some team benefits; improving working 
relationships between staff and improving team working. Participants also believed that 
having a formal and visible final treatment checking protocol may have the secondary 
benefit of increasing, not only radiographer’s perceptions of the importance of the final 




that this may prevent these other staff from distracting them when verifying, and increase 
their understanding on the need for silence during the final treatment check. 
9.2.2.6  Design improvements  
Whilst feedback on the protocol was largely positive, some improvements were suggested 
by participants. Firstly, participants wanted the software to support and assist them in 
varying the order of parameters. Participants believed that varying the order of the four 
checked parameters every time would be too difficult to do and that they would forget the 
order they had done previously. Some believed having to remember to vary the order may 
take their focus away from the patient or from checking effectively. Some participants were 
also concerned that one parameter may get forgotten: 
“I do think where it says that they should vary the order in which the four parameters 
are checked may create errors. Because I think people may forget which ones they 
have checked.” Third year student radiographer 
 
Consequently, participants suggested that they would like support to vary the order of 
parameters. It was noted that paper prompts would not be ideal as there was already too 
much paper around. Instead software prompts were preferred, perhaps in the form of tick 
boxes on screen next to each parameter which were ticked as they were checked. However, 
some participants noted that this may lead to the final treatment check being reduced to a 
tick box exercise. An alternative solution suggested, and supported by participants, was the 
software randomly varying the order of the four parameters for them, so that for each 
fraction the parameters were presented in a different order. Participants believed this 
would force them to read them out in a different order, hence following the protocol 
without having to focus on remembering to vary the order. Participants believed this would 
still retain the advantage that they would read them out in a different order, forcing the 
second checker to remain alert, but they would not have the focus taken away from the 
patient and the act of checking: 
“I think that would help the keeping it up and keeping it random, because I’m not 
very good at random! I settle into a pattern if I can. Yeah if it comes up in a different 





Another suggestion was that the software could prompt staff to swap roles, perhaps with 
the background colour of the interface changing every 15 minutes to signal a role rotation 
had to take place: 
“That might be the prompt that you need to change the role. “It’s a different colour 
this time we need to change roles.” Band 6 radiographer 
 
Some participants whose department swapped roles informally noted this may be quicker 
as sometimes staff forget whether they should be swapping roles or not: 
“I think some kind of prompt is needed, because a lot of time we have two 
radiographers, who walk out the room and once goes “you switch on” and the other 
“no you do it”, and that can take a minute!” Second year student radiographer  
 
Participants also suggested some valuable additions to the protocol. Some noted that it 
would be useful to have all parameters which are going to be checked denoted at the top of 
the diagram, as it is on the written protocol. A further possible addition was an additional 
check of the patient details, name, date of birth, fraction number and anatomical area being 
treated. Many participants noted this would be a good introductory check before launching 
into the check of the treatment numbers. Furthermore, this would be especially beneficial if 
they were treating in DICOM mode, which is when there is a software fault and there is 
consequently no safety net of a record and verify system. It was noted that this would 
reduce the ‘distance’ between them and the patient, as they would be referring to them by 
name rather than a series of numbers: 
“Yes, because one of our big sins, is that we do tend to talk about the prostate or the 
lung, rather than Mr Smith and Mrs Jones.”  Band 8 radiographer 
9.3 Chapter Discussion 
  
This chapter has presented the development and qualitative evaluation of a standardised 
‘best practice’ checking protocol for use immediately prior to treatment delivery. This 
protocol has been developed from a sound evidence base and presented in both written 
form and diagram form to aid understanding. The aim of the protocol development was to 
produce a standardised operating procedure which would minimise variation and help to 
maintain radiographers’ attention during repeated final treatment checks. The standardised 




who perceived it to have safety benefits. Radiographers also perceived the protocol to help 
maintain attention through minimising routine. 
9.3.1 Protocol strengths 
The interview findings suggested there is much strength to this protocol. As with the 
preceding research, discussed in chapter 6 and 7, it was found that there is currently 
variation in how the final treatment checks are done, both across and within departments, 
which appeared to lead to some confusion amongst students around how to conduct this 
final treatment check. Consequently, this standardised protocol would help to reduce this 
confusion and ensure all staff are conducting the final treatment check according to best 
practice. It appeared that the method of checking described in the protocol is similar to 
current methods of checking in some instances, but with the addition of switching roles and 
varying order, which are sometimes done but informally. Therefore, this protocol has the 
benefit of sharpening current practise, yet not being radically different from current practice 
in some departments, which may make it easier to implement in these departments. 
However, it is acknowledged that this similarity may mean staff revert to their current way 
of checking and therefore the protocol should be implemented alongside considerations of 
how to maintain adherence.  
 
The research presented in chapter 7, suggested that a new standardised method of 
conducting the final treatment check was needed in order to aid understanding on how to 
conduct an effective check and emphasise the importance of the final treatment check. 
Student radiographers believed this protocol would help aid their understanding of why and 
how the final treatment check should be conducted. Furthermore, standardisation of the 
protocol across the profession was considered a benefit when staff move between 
departments and to ensure all departments follow best practice.  
 
In this evaluation, some participants revealed that they had wanted to do a challenge-
response check but did not feel able to if others do not feel it is necessary. The presence of a 
formalised standardised protocol would help to ensure a consistent approach and highlight 
the importance of the final treatment check, which could wane after qualification. This 




variation in the conduct of final treatment checks and highlighted a variety of factors that 
affect effectiveness, i.e.  environment, distractions and hierarchy. 
 
Participants believed the protocol would help maintain attention and increase the likelihood 
of error detection prior to treatment, by interrupting this final treatment check becoming a 
ritualistic chant.  This supports the findings from the experimental, laboratory-based study 
in chapter 8. In the interviews in chapter 7, radiographers suggested switching roles to 
maintain attention. Experimental work supported this approach and here the 
implementation of this approach was regarded as effective and feasible during clinical 
practice.  
 
Varying the order and remembering to switch roles may place slightly more cognitive 
demand on participants, preventing their levels of attention from dropping. However, it was 
suggested here, and supported by the experimental findings in chapter 8, that requiring 
each checker to vary the order of parameters would be challenging.  Therefore, 
radiographers may need support varying the order of parameters, and the interface varying 
the order for them could be the solution.  
 
The feedback on the protocol was mostly positive in terms of trapping errors, focusing 
attention, student training and standardisation. However, no matter how good a protocol is 
there are additional factors which can negatively impact on error detection such as; 
distractions, education, authority gradients and workplace design. Therefore, in order for 
this protocol to be successful these issues also need to be targeted at the point of, or prior 
to implementation. 
9.3.2 Barriers to use 
Evaluation of the protocol suggested a few potential weaknesses in the protocol. It was 
recognised that it would be easy for staff to slip back into old habits where parameters are 
not checked individually or there is no active repeat back. Hence, there is a need for regular 






The lapsing into old habits is likely at times due to time constraints and pressure. 
Radiotherapy departments are under increasing strain; this new checking approach may 
take a few seconds longer than current practice. However, the impact of this will depend on 
how the final treatment checks are currently undertaken. In departments where there is no 
verbal checking immediately prior to treatment delivery, staff may be more likely to not 
follow the protocol due to the increased time required. Herein lies a paradox, in that it is 
during these pressured times that errors are more likely to occur, but that a process put in 
place to prevent errors is likely to be cut in order to save time. 
 
In order to overcome potential cutting of corners to save time, staff would need to be 
convinced on the protocol’s potential to detect errors, thereby preventing potential patient 
harm. Following these interviews it is recognised that despite the majority of radiographers 
being willing to adopt this method of checking, there is likely to be resistance from some 
staff, particularly more senior radiographers. Hence, there may be a need for simultaneous 
initiatives to alter cultural perceptions around the importance of this final treatment check 
alongside implementation of the protocol. 
9.3.3 Improvements 
Two improvements to the protocol were suggested by participants. It is recommended that 
the following amendments are made to the protocol: 
 All parameters to be checked are listed at the top of the diagram 
 Additional patient identity, and anatomy to be treated, to be added at the start of 
the final treatment check 
 Design software to prompt staff to vary the order of parameters 
 Design software to prompt staff to regularly swap roles of challenger and responder 
9.3.4 Implementation 
This research also provided insight into the best method of implementing this new protocol. 




progressive introduction is required. The interviews suggested that a directive approach, 
such as giving staff a lengthy protocol or work instruction, may not result in adoption, 
especially if they do not believe in the reason why it is necessary. This fits with the models 
of implementation reviewed in section 4.7. Therefore, an explanation of why this protocol is 
being introduced is required from the outset. It was suggested by some participants that the 
best method of introduction and long-term adherence to the protocol would be to 
introduce it and audit adherence informally. Introducing the checking protocol could be 
done either during lunchtime seminars or small group training.  This could be followed by a 
trial period with an opportunity for radiographers to give feedback, alongside internal audits 
with results fed back to radiographers. It was suggested that it is important also to have 
buy-in from senior staff to ensure adherence. This is also in line with implementation 
theory, reviewed in section 4.7. However, some senior radiographers recognised that 
perhaps more support from the Department of Health would be needed to ensure 
standardisation across all departments. Otherwise the protocol may be implemented 
inconsistently, particularly if it is allowed to be voluntary and open to interpretation by 
individual departmental managers. These barriers and facilitators to use were similar to 
those uncovered by Russ et al. (2015) when interviewing healthcare staff about the 
implementation of the surgical safety checklist, who also found resistance from senior staff 
was the main barrier to implementation. The methods to aid implementation suggested by 
participants in these interviews were also similar to those identified by Russ et al. (2015) 
such as education, strong leadership and accountability.  
9.3.5 Study limitations 
This evaluation provides an early evaluation of the protocol, and suggests an initial 
acceptance of it by the target user group. As qualitative research is vulnerable to 
subjectivity, the interview schedule was informed by the research aims and literature, active 
listening techniques were used by the researcher and a second coder was involved in the 
analysis to ensure validity and reliability, as discussed in section 5.6. 
 
A limitation of the protocol evaluation is that a limited number of qualified radiographers 




the participation of student radiographers trained at a number of different hospitals in the 
region and there were no noticeable differences in viewpoints between them. The current 
evaluation only involved direct users. The inclusion of the viewpoints of other stakeholders, 
such as departmental managers and patients would also be important, especially as the 
protocol was determined to take more time to conduct than current practice. 
 
A further potential limitation is that the checking protocol evaluated is similar to what is 
already done in the NHS department from which the qualified radiographers were recruited 
in this study. This might affect feedback on the protocol should it be more widely evaluated. 
Future work will explore the wider acceptability of the protocol. The department from 
which the qualified radiographers were recruited, was reported by the participants to be 
quite “safety conscious” and the interviews revealed they were willing to embrace change. 
This may have impacted upon the results given, as the protocol will seem familiar to the 
group’s working processes, and therefore more acceptable, than to a group that currently 
employ a very different method of checking. However, the effect was minimised by the 
inclusion of student radiographers, none of whom were in placement at this NHS hospital, 
yet their results mirrored that of the qualified radiographers. Furthermore, many of the 
participants had worked at other departments and drew upon their experiences elsewhere.  
 
The aim of this study was to use the feedback to make recommendations about further 
development, rather than be conclusive, in which case a range of subjective views from 
participants of different experience levels are important. Further evaluation following 
implementation of the protocol would be needed to assess more robustly the views of 
radiographers, and the effectiveness of the protocol to maintain attention during repeated 
final treatment checks. 
9.3.6 Further research 
A number of areas of further research have emerged. Firstly, the evaluation of the protocol 
design was only subjective, and only sought the views of the end users. Therefore, before 
implementation, an assessment of the readability of the protocol needs to be assessed, 
along with the use of colour, typeface and layout to ensure it adheres to optimal usability. 




current practice would be valuable.  Due to the variation and lapses in reporting and lack of 
firm error rates in the past it would be challenging to compare pre-implementation error 
rates with post-implementation error rates. Therefore, this could be conducted in a 
simulated laboratory setting as in chapter 8. This evidence may help to convince those who 
are reluctant to adopt this protocol. Alongside an evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
protocol in reducing errors, there is an opportunity to conduct an improvement science 
study into the optimal method of implementation to sustain adherence to a new checking 
protocol in radiotherapy. 
Second, there is a need to ascertain if the new protocol does take much longer to do, as this 
may have time and resource implications. It should only be a few extra seconds but it 
depends on how thoroughly the checks are done currently as to how much extra time it 
would take. This may vary both between and within departments due to the variation in 
how the checks are done currently. Evidence supporting the additional time may help 
convince reluctant staff or departments to follow the new protocol, if it is shown that the 
extra time required is not significant. 
Finally, it is important that the protocol sits within context of the wider task, system and 
related software. A systems approach is needed to consider the interlinking role of the 
radiographer, the software, the prescription sheet and the environment, to ensure they 
work together to be conducive to effective checking. An integrated human factors approach 
to address the environmental and work design issues would be of value in this domain. 
Implementation of human factors training for staff would also be beneficial to increase 
awareness and understanding of the impact of variables on their own work performance. 
One element of the system, the interface is discussed in more depth in chapter 10. 
9.4 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has brought together the research reported in earlier chapters in the form of 
requirements for a standardised checking protocol for use immediately prior to treatment 




diagrammatic form has been developed. This has been evaluated by exploring qualified 
radiographers’ and student radiographers’ views of the new protocol.  
 
The feedback on the new, standardised protocol was positive and encouraging. It is believed 
that this more active checking method would help to maintain attention, thereby increasing 
the likelihood of detecting errors before treatment is administered. As a result of these 
findings it can be concluded that the implementation of this standardised checking protocol 
across radiotherapy departments could be beneficial for patient safety.  
 
The successful implementation of this protocol is likely to be influenced by how 
departments currently verify and hence there may be variation in adoption. It is envisaged 
that implementation will be easier in those departments with a good safety culture and 
which employ verbal checks already, and more difficult in those departments which allow 
variation in checking, with perhaps only single or two person checking conducted silently. 
The gap between this protocol and current practice in these latter instances is much greater. 
Hence, these departments may require more support when implementing this protocol.  
 
Alongside implementation of this protocol, the results suggest there are other ways to 
improve the effectiveness of the final treatment check. Formal practice-based 
recommendations, including distraction free environments, specific patient safety and 
human factors training and addressing issues of authority structures would be of benefit as 
presented in table 7.4. Additionally, it is argued that the software could be further 
developed to support the final treatment check. The role of the interface is further explored 






10 Chapter 10 – Study 5: Improving checking through interface design 
 
The research presented in this chapter builds on the earlier findings that the design of the 
interface may affect the efficacy of the final treatment check. This was suggested through 
the interviews in chapter 7 and further supported by the experimental findings in chapter 8. 
The results of the experiment suggested that participants made more mistakes when 
retrieving and reading values from the screen, than responding to the call out. This suggests 
that consideration of the design of the interface, specifically in respect to the final 
treatment check, would be worthwhile. The research thus far has directed the design of a 
new standardised checking protocol but it is also important to consider the role of 
technology in causing and trapping errors. A human factors systems approach advocates the 
exploration of human interaction with all elements of a system. Therefore, the aim of the 
research described in this chapter is to consider the role of the interface in terms of 
checking accuracy. The chapter details the re-design of the current interface used to 
conduct the final treatment check, and the results of comparative testing of the current and 
proposed interface. The broader implications of the interface design are then discussed. 
10.1 Rationale for a new interface design 
As detailed in the radiotherapy treatment delivery process, see figure 2.1, during the final 
treatment check, radiographers are required to check that the values displayed on the linear 
accelerator interface correspond with the patient’s paper prescription. There are currently 
three software programmes in use in the UK, the most common of which is MOSAIQ, 
designed by Elekta, and used by the majority of the participants interviewed during this 
research. An image of the interface used during the final treatment check can be seen in 
figure 10.1. Chan et al. (2010) conducted a workflow analysis of the radiotherapy process in 
one department in Canada and, through a heuristic evaluation of the software in use 
(MOSAIQ), showed that the software did not adequately fit workflow or support the final 
treatment check process. The software was found to have poor usability as users had to 
click onto multiple different screens to see all the required information.  The authors used 
Zhang et al. (2003) heuristic evaluation method. This method combines the two 
predominant interface heuristics models, Nielson’s 10 interface heuristics and 




safety to create a heuristic evaluation to be used in the safety evaluation of medical 
software. Zhang’s 14 heuristics are displayed below in table 10.1. To complete a heuristic 
evaluation experts ‘walk through’ the system and identify any elements which violate the 
heuristics. Results are then triangulated with a number of evaluators to ensure reliability. 
Zhang et al. (2003) argues that this method, which has been used extensively to test 
websites and software, can effectively be used to test the safety of medical devices with low 
costs. 
 
Table 10.1: Zhang’s user heuristics for medical systems (Zhang 2003: 25-26) 
Heuristic  Description 
Consistency Users should not have to wonder whether different words, 
situations or actions mean the same thing. Standards and 
conventions in product design should be used. 
Visibility Users should be informed about what is going on with the system 
through appropriate feedback and display of information 
Match The image of the system perceived by users should match the 
model the users have of the system 
Minimalist Any extraneous information is a distraction and a slow down 
Memory Users should not be required to memorise a lot of information to 
carry out tasks. Memory load reduces users’ capacity to carry out 
the main tasks 
Feedback Users should be given prompt and informative feedback about 
their actions 
Flexibility and efficiency Users always learn and are always different. Give users the 
flexibility of creating customisation and shortcuts to accelerate 
performance 
Message Messages should be informative enough such that users can 
understand the nature of errors, learn from errors, and recover 
from errors 
Error It is always better to design interfaces which prevent errors from 
happening in the first place 
Closure Users should clearly be notified about the completion of a task 
Undo Users should be allowed to recover from errors.  
Language The language should always be presented in a form 
understandable by the intended users 
Control Do not give users the impression that they are controlled by the 
system 
Document Always provide help when needed 
 
Using Zhang’s (2003) categorisation of user heuristics, 75 violations were found in the 




classed as high severity, with the possibility to cause harm to a patient. The most vulnerable 
part of the process, demonstrated by more violations of user heuristics on the interface, 
was patient set-up (Chan et al. 2012). Yet it was found that all processes in radiotherapy 
violated some usability heuristics such as consistency, visibility and increased cognitive load 
(Chan et al. 2012). The interface involved in beam delivery (the process during which the 
final treatment check is conducted) had five low severity violations and six medium severity 
violations. 
 
 As patient set-up violated the most user heuristics, Chan (2010) conducted a usability test 
of re-designed components of the interface used during patient setup, recruiting student 
radiographers as participants. The re-designed interface was created using a user-centred 
approach and aimed to meet all user heuristics by; assisting the checking process with the 
inclusion of an automated checklist, combining all required information on one screen and 
reducing the number of steps required to check all information. A mock-up of the interface 
was created and simulated in the radiotherapy department. Three common errors were 
planted in the simulation and participants’ rate of committing them using the re-designed 
interface was compared to previous real life error rates from the same department.  The re-
designed interface improved the error rate, shortened the time taken to complete patient 
set up and increased user satisfaction.  
 
These two studies by Chan highlight the usability issues within radiotherapy systems, 
specifically the MOSAIQ system. However, the authors only looked at patient set-up in 
detail, which occurs before the final treatment check, and only compared three checking 
errors during this stage (overlooking an important note, overlooking changes in approval 
dates and shifting the treatment couch). Building upon this study, the research described 
here will focus specifically on the final treatment check. Similarly to Chan et al. (2012) a 
comparative simulated method will be used to investigate the impact of the interface, as 
will the use of planted errors.  
 
This chapter will explore the role the design of the linear accelerator interface plays in the 
reliability of the final treatment check. This research aims to: 




2. Evaluate the resulting interface through subjective feedback and objective 
comparative testing with the existing display 
10.2 Method 
 The aims will be met using the following methods, each of which will be detailed in turn: 
Design: 
 A review of user feedback given during the exploratory interviews in chapter 7 
 A review of the current interface design against ISO design recommendations 
 Formation of a design brief combining of user feedback and ISO recommendations  
 Design of a new proposed interface design 
 A review of the proposed interface design against ISO design recommendations 
 
Evaluation: 
 A comparative review of the current and proposed design against ISO design 
recommendations by lay users 
 A comparative experimental evaluation of the current and proposed interface using 
the experimental paradigm presented in section 8.3. 
 An evaluation of the proposed interface by qualified and student radiographer 
through group interviews  
It was decided to use this mixed-methods approach to evaluating the proposed interface to 
ensure triangulation of research findings. It was not possible to evaluate a new interface 
design in situ, and therefore a laboratory based approach was more suitable. As with the 
previous experiments, detailed in chapter 8, this approach allowed for the interface variable 
to be isolated away from the influence of any confounding variables. Lay participants were 
used for the initial evaluations as the evaluation of the interface against ISO principles and 
experimental testing did not require any expert knowledge of radiotherapy. Expert opinions 
were then sought to validate the findings from the evaluation using lay participants. As 
discussed in section 5.5, this user-centred design approach is beneficial in the creation of 




10.3 User feedback 
The poor usability of the interface used to conduct the final treatment check emerged as a 
theme from the interviews with qualified and student radiographers, this detail can be 
found in section 7.3.5. The current MOSAIQ interface and the associated issues highlighted 
by users in these interviews are illustrated in figure 10.1. The final treatment check requires 
checking of the values associated with energy, monitor units, wedge monitor units and 
wedge position. These are highlighted in blue. Additionally, participants believed that if the 
interface required more active input on the part of the user, rather than mere passive 
checking, this would help maintain attention. 
 
Figure 10.1: Current interface annotated with findings from interviews 
 
10.4 Review of current interface against ISO 9241 recommendations 
As participants reported issues with the design of the current software, the interface was 
reviewed against established recommendations for the display of visual information. The 
ISO 9241 “300” subseries was used for this purpose. This particular standard entitled 
“Ergonomics of human-system interaction” addresses software and hardware ergonomic 
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conditions for those with normal and adjusted to normal eyesight, from workstation layout 
to display recommendations (British Standards Institute 1998). Part 12 of this standard is of 
interest here as it details recommendations for the display of static visual information and is 
intended to be used by interface designers and evaluators. These guidelines were chosen as 
they are international standards specifically for the display of static information. The final 
treatment check requires visual comparison of the paper-based prescription against the 
display of the information on a static display. It does not present dynamic information or 
require the user to input information into the system. However, it is recognised that the ISO 
may not represent current design research knowledge. As such compliance with the 
recommendations of the ISO is considered a bare minimum standard to adhere to. Yet, a 
safety critical environment, such as radiotherapy, would be expected to implement more 
advanced knowledge from other safety critical domains such as nuclear power and aviation 
where static displays for monitoring of information are in use. If MOSAIQ does not adhere to 
the ISO guidelines, this suggests a clear path for further development and the need for more 
specific research into the design of this safety critical interface.  
 
ISO 9241 presents detailed and specific design recommendations for static interface design. 
The standard encourages designers and evaluators to adapt the recommendations to the 
context of the design. This is done by first ascertaining which recommendations are 
applicable to the design and then evaluating adherence to them. In this context, the 
applicable recommendations are those concerned with improving visual search and 
facilitating the discriminability of items within the interface, as these factors encompass 
what is involved during the final treatment check.  
 
The standard states that adherence can be decided based on observation, which is defined 
as “simply to examine or inspect the presentation of information to confirm that a particular 
observable condition has been met”.  From revisiting the interview data and examining the 
current interface, it is apparent that the current interface used for the final treatment check 
did not meet all recommendations given in ISO 9241.  Figure 10.2 illustrates the ISO 





Figure 10.2: Current interface annotated with violations of ISO design recommendations 
 
The standard also presents seven design principles which, when adhered to, ensure that the 
interface supports the user “to perform perceptual tasks effectively, efficiently and with 
satisfaction”.  These seven ISO principles of a good static interface are (British Standards 
Institute 1998): 
1. Clarity: the information content is conveyed quickly and accurately. 
2. Discriminability: the displayed information can be distinguished accurately. 
3. Conciseness: users are not overloaded with extraneous information. 
4. Consistency: a unique design, conformity with user’s expectation. 
5. Detectability: the user’s attention is directed towards information required.  
6. Legibility: information is easy to read. 
7. Comprehensibility: the meaning is clearly understandable, unambiguous, 
interpretable, and recognisable. 
The current interface is evaluated against these principles in table 10.2, and suggestions on 








Table 10.2: Evaluation of MOSAIQ interface against ISO design principles 
ISO principle MOSAIQ interface assessment by 
author 
Design recommendation 
Clarity The screen is overloaded with 
numbers which means the value 
required cannot be found quickly. 
Condense the information 
down into the vital values only. 
Discriminability It is difficult to distinguish which 
value corresponds to which label as 
they are densely presented 
Make it easier to determine 
which value corresponds to 
which label 
Conciseness There is an overload of information 
on screen, some of which is not 
necessary for the final treatment 
check 
Remove some extraneous 
information, or make it smaller 
so that the vital information 
dominates the screen 
Consistency Screen is consistent with other parts 
of the systems - 
Detectability User’s attention is not directed 
towards the vital values as all look 
the same 
Highlight the key information 
Legibility Values are hard to read due to the 
font used and the size of the font 
Increase the font size and 
change the font style 
Comprehensibility Due to the font style, size and layout, 
values are not always clearly 
understandable, unambiguous, 
interpretable, and recognisable 
 
Increase the font size and 
change the font style. Improve 
the layout of text to ensure it is 
instantly interpretable 
  
This review against ISO recommendations and principles suggests that the current interface 
does not adhere to the principles of a standard static interface.  Therefore, there is scope 
for the interface to be significantly re-designed to improve usability and, as a minimum, sit 
in line with these ISO recommendations. It is argued that through improved usability the 
ease of checking during the final treatment check will be improved and the likelihood of 
errors passing undetected reduced.  
10.5 Design Brief 
The above ISO recommendations and principles were combined with user feedback (section 
7.3.5) from the interviews to specify a design brief for the re-design of the interface used 
during the final treatment check. The following were specified: user accuracy was to be 
improved when reading out the four vital values, these values should be seen at a glance 




to reduce visual clutter. This brief, displayed in figure 10.3, was then given to a designer to 
guide the redevelopment of the interface.  The key design requirements from the earlier 
research and ISO are highlighted in bold. The designer was also given a copy of the MOSAIQ 
interface and briefed on radiotherapy and the final treatment check for context. 
Design brief for a safer interface in radiotherapy 
Interviews with users suggests that a re-design of the MOSAIQ interface may improve user 
accuracy and maintain user attention. The interface is used to conduct the  final treatment 
check and as such the important values are monitor units, beam energy and beam 
modification. The other information currently on screen is required only occasionally. 
Patient identification information must be retained. 
 
User feedback suggests that the current design is not user friendly. Users need to be able to 
look briefly at the interface and retrieve the information that they need. User accuracy 
needs to be improved when reading out the vital values, these values should be seen at a 
glance and be visually distinct from one another. The other information should be 
condensed down to reduce visual clutter. Users also suggested that font size needs to be 
increased on the vital values. Increased utilisation of colour was also suggested as the 
current design is monochrome. Yet colour must be used sparingly as it is used elsewhere in 
the system to indicate other errors (e.g. red to indicate errors and green to symbolise 
treatment can proceed). The use of colour could be used distinguish and draw attention to 
the location of important items, or to make items more distinguishable when in a list, whilst 
ensuring a good contrast level to ensure readability. 
 
The interface must also adhere to and achieve the seven ISO principles of a static interface. 




Three design proposals were created by an independent designer. After each proposal was 
created it was discussed with a radiographer, to ensure the presentation of the information 
required during the final treatment check was adequate. The final design was considered to 
strike the right balance between highlighting only the values needed during the final 
treatment check, whilst still containing other parameters needed to identify patients or 
occasionally required during treatment. 
10.6 The proposed interface design 
The design brief led to a new proposed design for use during the final treatment check 
which aims to meet the ISO recommendations and address the design issues raised by 
participants in the interviews. The proposed interface design is shown below in figure 10.4.  
 
Figure 10.4: Proposed interface 
 
10.7 Review of proposed interface against ISO 9241 recommendations 
The proposed interface was then compared against the ISO design principles. Table 10.3 
shows how the new interface design has addressed the seven ISO principles. The changes to 






Table 10.3: Evaluation of proposed interface against ISO attributes 
ISO principle MOSAIQ New proposed interface 
Clarity The screen is overloaded with 
numbers which means the value 
required cannot be found quickly. 
The vital values are much 
bigger and can be found 
quicker 
Discriminability It is difficult to distinguish which value 
corresponds to which label as they 
are densely presented 
The use of colour and lines 
means it is easy to follow 
which label corresponds to 
which value 
Conciseness There is an overload of information 
on screen, some of which is not 
necessary for the final treatment 
check  
All of the extraneous 
information has been 
removed, with the less 
important information 
condensed down. The vital 
values dominate the screen to 
ensure attention is drawn 
towards them. 
Consistency *not applicable as already met 
 
Detectability User’s attention is not directed 
towards the vital values as all look the 
same 
The background and text 
colour, along with the position 
and size of the box containing 
the vital information means 
direction is directed towards 
the information required. 
Legibility Values are hard to read due to the 
font used and the size of the font 
The values are easier to read 
due to a clearer and larger font 
Comprehensibility Due to the font style, size and layout, 
values are not always clearly 
understandable, unambiguous, 
interpretable, and recognisable 
 
The values are instantly 
interpretable, due to the 






Figure 10.5: Proposed interface annotated with user feedback and ISO recommendations 
   
The comparison in table 10.3 suggests improved compliance with ISO principles and 
therefore it is argued that this interface design may support a more reliable final treatment 
check. 
10.8 Design evaluation from lay evaluators 
The design was evaluated in order to determine whether it was considered to have 
improved in terms of how easy it is to use over the existing MOSAIQ interface.  
10.8.1 Aim 
To compare participants’ assessments of compliance to the ISO principles of both the 
MOSAIQ interface and the proposed interface. 
10.8.2 Method 
A questionnaire based study was undertaken in order to gain comparative ratings of both 
interface designs. 
Increased font size, 
clearer typeface 
Vital values grouped together 
and eyes drawn towards 
Lines make values 
distinguishable Less clutter: extraneous 
information minimised 
and given less priority 
Groups are retained, grouped 
according to sequence for 
efficient and effective retrieval 





A within subjects, cross-over questionnaire design was used, so that there was no bias 
based on order of presentation of the two interface designs. Participants were asked to look 
at the interface and read out the energy, monitor units and wedge position to mimic how 
the interface would be used as part of the final treatment check. They then completed a 
short paper-based survey. Ten participants completed this task using the current interface 
first and ten participants used the proposed interface first. 
10.8.2.2 Participants 
20 participants were recruited from an undergraduate psychology course at Coventry 
University via opportunity sampling.  The only inclusion criteria were that the participants 
must have normal or adjusted to normal eyesight. Participants were excluded if they had 
taken part in one of the other experiments run as part of this thesis, as this may have 
introduced practice effects. These participants were not trained in radiotherapy, and hence 
not familiar with the software, preventing any previous opinions or experience to influence 
their assessment.   
10.8.2.3 Materials 
A questionnaire was designed to assess how well users believed the principle had been met. 
Each of the seven ISO principles was converted into a statement, with a seven-point likert 
scale for the participant to indicate to what extent they agreed with that statement, with 7 
being strongly agree and 1 strongly disagree.  The statements are presented in table 10.4 
and the full questionnaire can be found in appendix 18. 
 
Table 10.4: ISO principle and questionnaire statements 
ISO principle Questionnaire statement 
Clarity I was able to find the information required quickly 
Discriminability It was easy to distinguish the value I required from other values 
Conciseness The interface contained only the information relevant to the task 
Consistency All the information I required was presented in the same way, 
according to my expectations 
Detectability My attention was directed towards the information I required 
Legibility The information was easy to read 






Informed consent was collected from the participants. Each participant completed the study 
on their own. The participant was shown the first interface, and the purpose of the interface 
and the final treatment check was explained to them. Participants were then asked to 
complete the challenge-response checking task, with the researcher acting as the 
responder.  
 
Participants completed three trials, using three iterations of the interface displayed on an 
iPad, using the screens created for the experiments detailed in section 10.10. After these 
three iterations participants were asked to fill in the questionnaire. The process was then 
repeated for the second interface. 
10.8.2.5 Ethics 
This study was reviewed and approved by Coventry University Faculty of Health and Life 
Sciences Ethics Committee, see appendix 17. The research was conducted according to BPS 
ethical code of conduct. 
10.8.3 Results 
Participants’ responses were combined and SPPS was used to conduct descriptive and 
inferential statistics. The mean participant response for each design principles are shown in 
figure 10.6.  As a higher score indicates that participants believe the principle has been met 
to a greater extent, it can be seen that the proposed interface scored higher on all ISO 9241 






Figure 10.6: Graph showing results of evaluate feedback on both interface designs 
 
The modes, means and standard deviations for each design principle are presented in table 
10.5.  Related t-tests were used to test for significance as an independent design was used 
and the data met parametric assumptions. 
 
Table 10.5: Independent t-test results comparing current and proposed interface against ISO 








Clarity old 10 6 4 4.9 1.37 -4.05 9 .003 
Clarity new 10 7 1 6.9 0.32 
Discriminability 
old 
10 7 4 5.9 1.45 -2.40 9 .040 
Discriminability 
new 
10 7 0 7 0.00 
Conciseness old 10 2 5 2.6 1.51 -5.91 9 <.001 
Conciseness new 10 7 3 5.9 1.37 
Consistency old 10 6 3 5.5 1.18 -1.92 9 .087 
Consistency new 10 7 3 6.4 0.25 
Detectability old 10 5 3 4.8 1.14 -6.71 9 <.001 
Detectability new 10 7 2 6.8 0.63 
Legibility old 10 6 2 6.0 0.67 -4.74 9 .001 
Legibility new 10 7 0 7 0.00 
Comprehensibilty 
old 
10 6 2 5.9 0.88 -3.25 9 .010 
Comprehensibilty 
new 
10 7 1 6.8 0.42 
 
Related t-tests confirmed that this difference was significant for all design principles except 





























version of the current MOSAIQ interface in terms of compliance to ISO 9241 principles, 
offering a more user-friendly and readable format. Of particular note are the improved 
ratings in terms of conciseness and detectability. 
 
There was a non-significant result for consistency. This may be because participants only 
saw this one screen and hence were unfamiliar with other aspects of the system from which 
to judge consistency, or because both screens were consistent with their expectations based 
on other systems. 
 
An improvement in usability is important to minimise the impact of poor design on user 
performance and likelihood of error. This is a small scale comparative study of user 
perception, but results point to improved usability. It is argued that the more useable a 
display is, the less likely it is to induce user error, for example through misidentification, or 
failure to identify key information. In order to test this premise, the next section describes 
an experimental study to compare participants’ accuracy when using the MOSAIQ interface 
and the new proposed interface.   
10.9 Experimental comparison of the MOSAIQ and proposed interface 
To investigate if the new proposed interface is more effective at supporting users to 
maintain attention and correctly read aloud values, an empirical test of comparative efficacy 
was required.  
10.9.1 Aim 
The aim of this experiment was to investigate if accuracy when reading values was higher 
when using the proposed interface, compared to the current MOSAIQ interface. Based on 
the previous investigation into interface design, it was hypothesised that users of the new 
proposed interface will have a significantly higher percentage accuracy score when reading 
values aloud, than users of the current MOSAIQ interface. 
10.9.2 Method 
An experimental, laboratory based study was used, as it was not possible to investigate the 





A between measures design was used, with two experimental conditions: 
1. Using the current MOSAIQ interface 
2. Using the proposed interface 
 The same experimental paradigm was used as in the previous experiments with participants 
completing a minimum of 60 final treatment checks within 45 minutes (see section 8.3). This 
paradigm and procedure is explained in detail in chapter 8, and therefore the 
methodological detail is not repeated here.  
10.9.2.2 Participants 
Participants were undergraduate psychology students recruited from the university 
psychology department’s online experiment management system via opportunity sampling.  
The only inclusion criteria were that the participants must have normal or adjusted to 
normal eyesight. Participants were excluded if they had taken part in one of the other 
experiments run as part of this thesis, as this may have introduced practice effects. There 
were 40 participant pairs with 20 participant pairs in each condition, randomly assigned to 
either condition based on order of attendance. Participants did not receive payment for 
taking part in the study but received course credits. 
 
It was decided to use participants who are not trained in radiotherapy for ease of 
recruitment and because the retrieval and reading of values is not considered a skill based 
task. Participants were briefed prior to the study commencing about the process involved in 
radiotherapy and an overview of the treatment, and given time to become accustomed to 
the interface, as in the prior experiment. 
10.9.2.3 Materials 
The same materials were used as in the last experiment (see section 8.4.3.3). In addition to 
the previous materials, the proposed interface design was adjusted using Photoshop to 
display different parameter values. Both the proposed and MOSAIQ interfaces displayed 





This experiment followed the same procedure as detailed in section 8.4.3.5. All participants 
conducted challenge-response checking in pairs. 
10.9.2.5 Data recording 
As this experiment was only investigating the effect of the interface on challenger’s accuracy 
during the final treatment check, only the challenger’s accuracy was recorded for this 
experiment. The challenger’s performance was measured by recording any mistakes the 
participants made when reading out the on-screen values, along with if they immediately 
corrected themselves. As previously discussed each mistake or correction is believed to 
indicate a lapse in attention.  These mistakes were then converted into a percentage 
accuracy score. Hence, there were two scores for each participant: percentage accuracy 
(correctly reading the value) and percentage accuracy including corrections (reading the 
value incorrectly but correcting themselves immediately). 
10.9.2.6 Ethics 
This study was reviewed and approved by Coventry University Faculty of Health and Life 
Sciences Ethics Committee, see appendix 17. The research was conducted according to BPS 
ethical code of conduct. 
10.9.3 Results 
The scores for each participant were entered onto SPPS and aggregated to provide means 
for each experimental condition. SPSS was used to calculate the descriptive and inferential 
statistics. 
 
Accuracy and accuracy including corrections were higher for those participants using the 
new proposed interface to complete the final treatment check. Table 10.6 and figure 10.7 
display the average accuracy scores for participants using the current interface and the new 
proposed interface. 
Table 10.6: Percentage accuracy means 
Condition  % Accuracy mean (SD) % Accuracy including corrections 
(SD) 
MOSAIQ interface 97.29 (2.37) 92.32 (4.03) 






Figure 10.7: Mean accuracy scores for participants using the current interface and the new proposed interface 
  
As can be seen in table 10.6 and figure 10.7 participants accuracy when reading values from 
screen was slightly higher in those using the proposed interface, however, an unrelated t-
test suggested that this difference was not significant t(38)= -.73, p= .46. Participants 
accuracy when including instances when participants corrected themselves was also higher 
when using the proposed interface and an unrelated t-test showed this to be a significant 
difference, t(38), -2.57 p= .014.  
 
These results suggest that participant’s accuracy in reading the value aloud correctly in the 
first instance was slightly better when using the proposed interface as compared to the 
current MOSAIQ interface in use, although this was not significant. As a mistake in reading 
values was believed to indicate a lapse in attention, it is inferred that the new proposed 
interface design helped focus the users’ attention during a repeated final treatment checks. 
10.10 Evaluation of proposed interface with radiographers 
Having established that the new proposed interface appears to focus the attention of the 






























The aim of this study was to gather views on the new proposed interface design from those 
who were experienced in using radiotherapy systems to conduct final treatment checks. 
10.10.2 Method 
A qualitative approach to exploring the views of potential end-users was taken to build upon 
the experimental evidence collected by gaining a real world perspective. As discussed in 
section 5.5, a user-centred approach involves iterative design and testing with end-users to 
ensure the proposed design meets user requirements. The design work thus far had only 
involved lay participants, and as such the opinion of potential end users was considered 
beneficial.  
10.10.2.1 Design 
Group interviews were conducted with qualified and student radiographers using a semi-
structured approach.  
10.10.2.2 Participants 
The participants were the same sample used in the study presented in section 9.3.1, 
recruited from BCU and Northampton General Hospital. Details of the participants’ 
experience is provided again in table 10.7. 
 
Table 10.7: Evaluative interviews participant experience 
Grade Number of participants 
Band 5 4 
Band 6 4 
Band 7 4 
Band 8 2 
Second year student radiographer 5 
Third year student radiographer 7 
 
10.10.2.3 Procedure 
The proposed interface was evaluated during the interviews described in section 9.2 that 
evaluated the checking protocol. Participants were asked questions relating to the interface 
design towards the end of the interviews.  To avoid repetition, the detail on the method 




Participants were shown the newly designed proposed interface and invited to comment on 
the differences between the proposed interface and the current interface in use. 
Participants were also asked if, and in what ways, the new proposed interface may improve 
checking accuracy. The full interview schedule can be found in appendix 14.  
10.10.2.4 Analysis 
 The verbatim transcripts of the interviews were used to conduct a thematic analysis.   Detail 
of this analysis process can be found in section 5.3.2. 
10.10.3 Results 
The participants were positive about the proposed interface, agreeing it was an 
improvement on the systems they currently use. Two themes were identified, how the 
interface had been improved and suggestions for further improvement. These are discussed 
below. 
10.10.3.1 How the interface had been improved 
The participants preferred the colours used in the new proposed interface as they were not 
as monochrome as their current systems and hence, more likely to capture their attention, 
and allow for easier identification of the values they need to check. Participants were also 
unanimous in their view that the new layout improves the clarity of the interface. All the 
required values are located in the same place, listed one after another, and easy to see: 
“I like how it’s all centred on the parameters you read out which are laid out one 
after each other. Whereas on my system you’ve got one there, and one there. You’ve 
got to search.” Third year student radiographer 
 
Participants reported that they felt they had to search for the values in the current 
interface, and this new proposed interface would speed up the final treatment checking 
process as they would no longer have to spend time searching for the values to be checked. 
This was particularly beneficial for student radiographers who found the current systems 
rather daunting and difficult to use or get used to: 
“You spend the entire year just sat there, trying to find where the wedges are!” Third 
year student radiographer 
 
The proposed interface was also seen to be an improvement as it contained only the 




screen. Participants preferred only having the required information as they felt the other 
information was a distraction: 
“I like a lot of things about it. The fact it is bigger is the stand out thing, the font is 
bigger and the specific parameters we are checking are the core ones we need to 
check. We don’t have to sift through a multitude of useless information” Third year 
student radiographer 
10.10.3.2  Suggestions for further improvement 
Participants also suggested a couple of further improvements to the proposed interface. The 
first suggestion from a couple of student radiographers was that the interface could mirror 
the prescription sheet. That is the interface orders the values to be checked in the same way 
on both the screen and prescription sheet.  The second improvement suggestion was that it 
would be beneficial for the interface to be designed to work in tandem with the new 
checking protocol. Participants believed the interface could support them to follow the 
protocol by randomising the order of the values to be checked on screen: 
“I think that would help the keeping it up and keeping it random, because I’m not 
very good at random! I settle into a pattern if I can. Yeah if it comes up in a different 
order, then you read it in a different order” Band 5 radiographer 
 
Participants also suggested that the interface could alert the radiographers to when they 
should switch roles of challenger and responder, either with an alarm or a change of 
background colour after a set amount of time. This would allow them to focus solely on the 
patient and checking task: 
“A prompt would be good in a way, because it’s the last thing on your mind, you’re 
more concerned about the patient, that you’re treating them correctly” Band 7 
radiographer 
10.11 Chapter Discussion 
Chapter 7 concluded that the design of the interface used during the final treatment check 
is likely to contribute to ineffective checking immediately prior to beam delivery. Having 
explored the design of the checking protocol, it was important to also consider the interface 
design as a source of risk. The findings summarised here support those of Chan et al. (2012) 
who found that the MOSAIQ software, which is commonly in use, violates software usability 





This chapter has identified some of the key usability issues presented by the MOSAIQ 
interface used during the final treatment check through a review employing the ISO design 
recommendations and principles. A new interface has been proposed. The initial evaluation 
has proved positive, suggesting better compliance to established design principles, better 
error rates when reading aloud from the screen, and positive feedback from potential end-
users, when compared against the exisiting MOSAIQ interface. 
 
The research also revealed further improvements which could be made to support users to 
conduct an effective final treatment check. The suggestions for further development are:  
 The interface should mirror the layout of perscrption sheets 
 The interface to randomly vary either the order or the presentation of parameters 
 The interface to alert users to swap roles of challenger and responder, either with an 
audible alarm or change in background colour 
 
A further result from the interviews with radiographers, is that although the new proposed 
interface was preferred, it could be improved further as participants would appreciate the 
interface randomising the order of the parameters for them. Further research is required to 
support this direction. Referring back to the underload theory of attention, taking away the 
effort of thinking about the order and autonomising it via the system, may prevent the 
beneficial effect of varying the order of parameters.  
 
Initial contact was made at a conference, and discussions have been held over email with 
the user-centred design department at Elekta, the company who are responsible for the 
design of the MOSAIQ software. They are interested in the findings from this research and 
are themselves looking to increase the usability of their systems, as the safety benefit of this 
is recognised. 
10.11.1 Study limitations and future work 
This chapter has used a variety of research methods to address the aim of investigating the 
role of the interface during the final treatment check. This mix of methods is a strength of 
this research.  The findings from each different method helps to strengthen the overall 




whilst the experiment allowed the isolation of variables so that the effect of the interface 
could be measured, it could be argued that this may lack ecological validity, because the 
impact of the interface was not measured in-situ, along with the impact of surrounding 
variables such as noise and pressure. However, the evaluative feedback provided by 
participants experienced in radiotherapy departments, supported the experimental results. 
This triangulation of results from various methods demonstrates the reliability and validity 
of this research. 
 
A possible limitation of this research is that the effect of the interface in situ was not 
possible to measure. However, as the proposed interface resulted in higher user accuracy, it 
is recommended that the design of the interface is explored further with software 
developers in order to implement these preliminary findings into practice for patient 
benefit. In particular it is recommended that future research explore how the interface can 
be programmed to make the final treatment check a more active process. If the software is 
developed to take account of these findings, this would present an ideal opportunity to 
conduct field research into the effect of the interface on checking accuracy.   
 
The display for the final treatment check is an isolated component of the radiotherapy 
system. The research points to the need for a more thorough usability evaluation of the 
software that moves beyond compliance with the ISO and explores a more thorough 
exploration of the interface with users, for example through walkthroughs. It would also be 
useful to look beyond the static screen and consider the interaction with other elements of 
the task, in order to take a broader systems approach to error as this area of research 
develops.  
 
It is noted that the design of the prescription sheets should also be subjected to a critical 
design review, as it is just as important that these allow users to maintain attention and 
complete the final treatment check without error. The design of the linear accelerator 
display was prioritised due to the experimental and interview data. The prescription sheets 
are locally designed and hence vary from department to department, unlike the software 




potentially improve patient safety, it is recommended that prescription sheets are also 
subject to a critical review.  
10.12 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has suggested that improved usability of the static interface, could result in a 
more effective final treatment check.  The chapter concludes that the current interface in 
use across radiotherapy departments in the UK does not meet the ISO design 
recommendations and that an interface designed in accordance with these design 
recommendations may improve user accuracy when retrieving and checking the vital 
parameters prior to beam switch on. A simpler and more useable interface has been 
developed and tested. The laboratory based comparative experimental study suggested that 
this could help focus radiographers’ attention during repeated final treatment checks, 
resulting in increased accuracy and potentially fewer errors passing undetected. The 
interview results suggested that a design change would be welcomed by radiographers, and 
if the interface was designed to work with the checking protocol, this could further assist 
them during repeated final treatment checks by making the process a less passive task.  
The next chapter, will draw together the research findings across the preceding chapters, 







11 Chapter 11: Discussion 
 
The final treatment check, conducted by two radiographers, is the final opportunity to 
prevent erroneous treatment being delivered to patients. This final treatment check has 
been demonstrated to be vulnerable to errors passing undetected (Toft and Mascie-Taylor 
2005). Therefore, this body of research aimed to understand and investigate how this 
process could be improved. This chapter will start with a summary of the main findings and 
conclusions. The discussion will then continue with a summary of how this research has 
made a contribution to the existing literature. This is followed by a discussion of potential 
further research avenues, before the concluding remarks.  
11.1 Summary of main findings 
The aim of this research was to fully understand the process of the final treatment check 
prior to radiotherapy treatment delivery in order to determine how the reliability might be 
improved to help ensure errors are detected before treatment is delivered. The specific 
objectives were: 
1. Examine and review the checking process immediately prior to beam delivery 
and identify factors affecting the reliability of this process to detect errors 
2. Experimentally test the impact on performance of different approaches to 
checking in a laboratory setting, to develop an empirical evidence base  
3. Specify and design an evidence-based revised checking process for use 
immediately prior to beam delivery 
4. Evaluate the revised process to determine user acceptance 
 
These objectives were achieved using a combination of qualitative and quantitative research 
methods. Throughout the research programme it was ensured that the research direction 
was informed by the results of the preceding study. This ensured the research path was 
relevant and applicable to current radiotherapy practice. This is illustrated in figure 5.1.  
 
The literature pointed to a need to improve the final treatment check in order to increase 
the likelihood that any errors in a patient’s treatment parameters are detected prior to 




journey in order to detect errors. During the final treatment check radiographers must 
ensure that the data displayed on a screen corresponds with the patient’s paper 
prescription.  
 
The final treatment check process and the potential reasons underlying error were 
investigated through a task analysis and exploratory interviews with radiographers in 
chapters 6 and 7. This revealed that the current methods of checking used could be 
unreliable. A number of reasons were identified as potential causes of errors within the 
checking process. In particular there was found to be variation in how the final treatment 
checks were conducted due to no current, national protocol. Human error was found to be 
the likely cause of errors passing undetected during this final check, specifically a slip due to 
interruptions in attention. It has been argued that during repeated final treatment checks, 
radiographers are susceptible to involuntary automaticity (Toft and Mascie-Taylor 2005). If 
this occurs, the final treatment check may be conducted on autopilot, without due 
attention, leading to errors between the paper prescription and on-screen values potentially 
passing undetected. The empirical research indicated that maintaining attention during 
repeated final treatment checks was challenging for radiographers. A significant reason for 
this is because the checks were repeated regularly and were almost identical for every 
patient. Radiographers themselves recognised that this can easily lead to involuntary 
automaticity occurring. Alongside the issue of attention, the interviews suggested there 
were many active and latent factors surrounding the final treatment check, which could 
contribute to human error.  Many of the factors, such as noise and time pressure, also 
negatively impacted upon attention. Hence, attention failure was both a direct and indirect 
factor negatively impacting the efficacy of the final treatment check.  
 
From the interviews, task analysis and literature review, it was found there were currently 
no defences against errors passing undetected, aside from it being normal practice for two 
people to conduct the final treatment check, as directed in Towards Safer Radiotherapy 
(Donaldson 2007). However, this was not believed to be a strong defence because the 
imprecise definition left this instruction open to interpretation by radiotherapy departments 
and individual radiographers. This openness to interpretation was observed in the variety of 




checking or chunking parameters. Consequently, it was apparent that a stronger defence 
against the many latent factors, and error producing conditions was needed.  
 
It was concluded that there was a need to focus research on developing an evidence-base to 
support two main defences against error; firstly the checking protocol, and secondly the on-
screen display of the treatment parameters. Figure 11.1 presents a representation of the 
final treatment check with the error influencing factors found and defences against error 




Figure11.1: Diagram detailing possible errors how the new protocol acts as a defence 
A holistic approach to improving verification safety also considers eliminating, or 
minimising, the active and latent error factors which have been identified during the course 
of this research. This systems analysis approach seeks to understand all possible causes of 
error. It is argued that this approach is better than root cause analysis, which, as Vincent 
(2010) also argues, implies there is one cause of an error, when there is probably many. 
Table 7.4, following the exploratory interviews presented some preliminary practice based 
recommendations to lessen the risk of the latent failures and error producing conditions 
listed in figure 11.1.  It is recognised that this may not be a comprehensive list, and that 





Two avenues to improve the reliability of the final treatment check were taken in this body 
of research: design out some of the error producing conditions, and strengthen the 
defences against errors passing undetected. The protocol and interface design are defences 
against errors passing undetected, by standardising the process in a way which promotes 
variation in repeated final treatment checks, thereby minimising routine and the likelihood 
of involuntary automaticity.  
11.1.1 Protocol 
The main defence against errors passing undetected, developed in this body of research, 
was a clear, standardised method of conducting the final treatment check. A ‘gold standard’ 
method of checking, to be adopted by all radiographers, in all departments, to prevent 
variation in practice and ensure treatment details are checked in the most effective way. 
The literature provides evidence from healthcare and aviation to guide the design of an 
effective checking protocol. However, it was decided to design a domain specific protocol by 
reviewing the current processes in place, as well as gaining supporting evidence to inform 
the current debate in healthcare over single and double checking. 
 
The domain of study is difficult to observe and measure error in. Therefore, the research 
took a simulated experimental approach. This involved devising a novel simulated 
radiotherapy checking task and exploring variables highlighted in the literature. The 
experimental context was employed to explore the optimal method of checking to increase 
the likelihood of error detection during repeated final treatment checks.  The first of these 
experiments also engaged in the debate around single and double checking (Alsulami, 
Conroy and Choonara 2012). The results suggested that double (two person) checking is 
more effective at error detection than single checking (one person), but challenge-response 
checking is most effective at detecting errors.  As such challenge-response checking formed 
the basis of the protocol. As it had been found that the final treatment checks were prone 
to involuntary automaticity, the second experiment investigated methods of maintaining 
attention, thereby increasing accuracy during repeated final treatment checks. The addition 
of switching the roles of challenger and responder and varying the order in which 
parameters were verified, were found to further increase the accuracy of challenge-




introducing variety, thus maintaining the attention of both people involved in the checks. 
This result aligns with the theory of attention underload discussed in section 6.3.3. A slight 
increase in cognitive load, helped maintain attention. These methods to keep checking an 
active process were built into a standardised protocol. 
 
This protocol was evaluated using group interviews with qualified and student 
radiographers. Evaluation of the protocol was largely positive. Participants welcomed the 
introduction of a standardised protocol and believed this would improve patient safety. 
However, there was some debate as to the impact of the new method of checking on 
treatment time and if the benefit to safety was worth the additional time spent checking.  
Whilst the interview results suggested the protocol would be welcomed, it was suggested by 
participants that there may be resistance from some radiographers when implementing the 
new protocol. This finding was not unexpected. There is a large body of literature 
surrounding improvement science which documents the challenges often associated with 
change in healthcare.  This evaluation has confirmed the need for further research into the 
best method of implementing a new checking protocol in radiotherapy. 
11.1.2 Interface 
Alongside the need for a standardised checking protocol, the role of the interface design on 
checking accuracy arose from the research findings. Therefore, a proposed interface for use 
during the final treatment check was created and evaluated. This preliminary investigation 
into the effectiveness and potential of a clearer and simpler interface, suggested that there 
is opportunity for the software to be developed, in a more user centred manner, to improve 
checking accuracy. It is also suggested, based on feedback on the protocol and proposed 
interface, that the interface design could be designed to link in with the protocol, in terms of 
varying the order of parameter presentation and providing prompts to radiographers to 
switch roles. 
 





Table 11.1: Summary of aims and findings 
Aim Findings 
Examine and review the checking process 
immediately prior to beam delivery and 
identify factors affecting the reliability of 
this process to detect errors 
 A hierarchical task analysis and semi-structured interviews suggested variation in how the final 
treatment check is currently done, which leaves the process vulnerable to error 
 This qualitative research identified number of likely causal factors to explain why the final 
treatment check may fail to detect errors; attention, noise, lack of training, time pressure, 
authority structures, environment, interface design 
 Interviews suggest a standardised checking protocol would be of value 
 The checking process needs to be less routine and more active to prevent involuntary 
automaticity  
Experimentally test the impact on 
performance of different approaches to 
checking in a laboratory setting, to 
develop an empirical evidence base  
 Simulated laboratory-based radiotherapy checking task developed to mimic the task and control 
variables 
 A number of methods checking defined, based on the literature and qualitative research, and 
comparatively tested 
 A challenge-response method of checking found to be more effective at error detection than 
single or double checking  
 Switching roles of challenger and responder regularly and varying the order of parameters helps 
to maintain attention during repeated challenge-response checking 
Specify and design an evidence-based 
revised checking process for use 
immediately prior to beam delivery 
 Findings from the experiments translated into a detailed challenge-response protocol in both 
written and diagram format 
 The current interface used during the final treatment check evaluated in terms of adherence to 
ISO principles 
 A new, simplified interface designed for use during the final treatment check 
 Qualitative and quantitative data to support the improved usability of the interface designed 
Evaluate the revised process to determine 
user acceptance 
 Semi-structured interviews suggested the protocol and proposed interface would be well 
received by radiographers and help to detect errors during the final treatment check 
 Potential barriers to implementation of the protocol identified as: time and resistance to change 






11.2 Overall conclusions and contributions to existing literature 
The literature review suggested a paucity of patient safety and human factors research 
within radiotherapy. This research has identified that a process designed to detect errors 
prior to treatment delivery is itself error prone. To improve this process a number of 
different research approaches were taken. Qualitative and quantitative research was 
combined with psychological theory and user-centred design to produce a new checking 
protocol and proposed interface design for use during the final treatment check 
immediately prior to beam delivery.  This has the potential for positive impact on the field 
as, despite the weakness of checking being recognised in documents such as Towards Safer 
Radiotherapy (Donaldson 2007), there has been no effort to create a formal, standardised 
method of checking. The research also suggests that this would be well received by 
radiographers. Therefore, the research findings presented in this thesis have a number of 
implications. The main implication is on current radiotherapy practice, surrounding the final 
treatment check of a patient’s treatment.  
 
Alongside implications for radiotherapy practice, this research also has implications for 
training programmes in radiotherapy. This is because the research has suggested that 
current student radiographers would benefit from more training in patient safety and 
human factors. This increased training may also help minimise some of the factors 
negatively impacting upon the final treatment check by increasing radiographers’ 
understanding of why they have a negative impact, such as distractions and deference to 
authority. 
 
This research has also engaged in the debate surrounding single and double checking in 
healthcare. The literature is currently divided as to which is the safest method of checking, 
yet there is little empirical evidence to support either method (Alsulami, Conroy and 
Choonara 2012). This thesis has provided empirical evidence, from an experimental study 
which simulated the repetitiveness of radiotherapy checking, to support the claim that 
challenge-response checking is the safest method of checking. This is not in support of 
existing research which suggests single checking is more effective (e.g. Armitage 2007, Kruse 




study, rather than retrospective or small sample analysis, which forms the majority of 
existing research in this area. 
 
This research also therefore has potential implications for healthcare in a wider context. 
Double checking is conducted in many areas of healthcare to prevent errors and ensure 
correct treatment is given to patients. This research provided evidence which supports 
challenge-response checking as the most effective method of checking. Therefore, this 
method of double checking can also potentially be applied to other areas of healthcare, with 
local modification, such as blood transfusions or drug administration, which use double 
checking as an error defence. 
 
In summary the thesis has therefore resulted in the following original contributions: 
1. A detailed understanding of the final treatment checking process in radiotherapy 
and identification and analysis of factors contributing to effectiveness 
2. The design of a unique experimental paradigm designed and employed to mimic 
the repetitiveness of radiotherapy treatment checking 
3. An empirical evidence base to support the validity of challenge-response 
checking in radiotherapy 
4. The development and evaluation of a new evidence and theoretical based verbal 
safety protocol for use immediately prior to treatment delivery in radiotherapy 
5. Recommendations surrounding the design of the radiotherapy interface to 
improve treatment checking accuracy 
6. Practice recommendations to improve detection of errors in patient’s treatment 
during the final treatment check prior to treatment delivery 
11.3 Evaluation of research approach 
This research employed a mixed methods approach to meet the research aims, namely 
qualitative interviews and experimental studies using a novel paradigm designed for this 
body of research. Specific limitations of each method were explored in each respective 
chapter. The pragmatism approach allowed the use of the most appropriate research 
method at each stage of the research. Each study was informed by the findings from the 




research remained relevant and beneficial to the overarching aim of improving the safety of 
radiotherapy treatment delivery. The results of qualitative and quantitative research were 
collated to inform the design of standardised checking protocol and recommendations for 
interface design. This approach allowed for triangulation of the data which increases the 
validity of the results. Furthermore, at every stage the research was validated by discussion 
with radiographers.  
 
The studies of the thesis both began and finished with qualitative methodology. This 
approach allows for exploration and understanding of the research topic. This is beneficial 
as an introduction to the topic, because as the literature review demonstrated, checking 
within radiotherapy is currently an understudied topic. The qualitative nature of the first 
study in this thesis provided descriptive data which informed the later avenues of research.   
 
The exploratory qualitative research informed the aims of the experimental studies, as well 
as informing the design of the experimental paradigm, to ensure it was as close as possible 
to a reliable simulation of real life treatment checking. These laboratory-studies allowed 
methods of checking to be compared for effectiveness on error detection without any 
potential patient harm, and away from confounding environmental influences which would 
be present in a radiotherapy department. 
 
A qualitative methods approach was also adopted to explore student and qualified 
radiographers’ views, and feedback on the design of the checking protocol and proposed 
interface design. This informed the iterative development of these safety defences and 
ensured the end-user remained central to the design. It is believed this will help with the 
future implementation of the new protocol.  
11.4 What this thesis did not explore 
This thesis focussed just on the final treatment check, the few seconds which make up the 
final defence against errors in the amount of radiation delivered to the patient. As 
illustrated in figure 2.1, a patient’s radiotherapy treatment consists of many stages, of which 
treatment delivery is the final stage. This body of research has not investigated the other 




improved to strengthen earlier defences against errors in treatment delivery. As transfer of 
patient’s treatment prescription details, and entry onto RV systems, appears to be an area 
of safety risk, it is believed that there is scope to review the safety of these processes in the 
future. 
 
This research has focussed on preventing errors in the amount of radiation delivered to the 
patient during treatment delivery; as such the area explored has not included geographical 
misses. These could occur when the patient is aligned on the bed, prior to the point of 
radiographers verifying treatment details at beam switch on, and could result in, for 
instance, radiotherapy treatment erroneously delivered to the incorrect part of the body. 
However, the process of checking patient position is thought to be conducted in a similar 
manner to checking of prescription parameters. Therefore, principles from this body of 
research could potentially be applied to this stage of treatment.   
 
In addition to errors in treatment delivery, it is recognised that there may be errors within 
treatment planning. This body of research was focused on errors in treatment delivery, 
planning errors would have required an entirely different approach and knowledge of the 
physics involved in treatment planning and calculation. This area of investigation was 
beyond the scope of this research; although it is recognised there these are errors which 
need to be assessed in as much depth in order to ensure safety in all aspects of radiotherapy 
treatment. 
 
In regards to the main output of this body of research, it is unknown to what extent this 
protocol could improve safety. This is in part to the paucity of available, current, and reliable 
data on error rates in radiotherapy, and the complexity of the domain. Furthermore, it has 
not been possible to implement this protocol in practice to observe and measure the effects 
and benefits. It is recognised that until the protocol is in use and embedded in practice, its 
efficacy cannot be fully evaluated.  
11.5 Further research 
Whilst this body of research has addressed the research aims, it has also posed a number of 




11.5.1 Further evaluation 
The main output from this body of research was the design of the checking protocol to be 
used immediately prior to treatment delivery, which was informed by an analysis of this 
process and factors affecting accuracy. According to Battle and Lilford’s (2003) three step 
process of patient safety research, discussed in section 5.1.1, this research has addressed 
the first step, identification of risks and hazards, and begun to address the second, design, 
evaluation and implementation. Therefore, in order to provide a complete patient safety 
initiative more research would need to be conducted on the evaluation, implementation 
and sustained improvement to safety.  
 
The protocol would also need to be evaluated in more depth prior to implementation. The 
protocol evaluation in this thesis was conducted with a small sample of radiographers. 
Therefore, it would be valuable for future research to evaluate how radiographers perceive 
changes to the method of checking and the introduction of a formal protocol on a wider 
scale. This could be achieved with the use of a questionnaire to collect views from a wide 
demographic, across many departments.  It is also suggested that a usability test of the 
protocol is conducted, perhaps with observations of how radiographers use the protocol in 
practice and over time. This would be worthwhile to detect if radiographers develop work-
arounds whilst using the protocol. It would also be valuable to ascertain the, if any, 
additional time this protocol would add to treatment time.  
11.5.2 Implementation 
This thesis focussed on the design of a final treatment check intervention. As such the 
process of implementing this intervention has been considered, but was not central to the 
thesis. Yet, the results of the research in this thesis suggest that further research on 
implementation would be valuable, following further evaluation of safety and acceptability, 
in order to maximise the benefit of the new protocol. When looking at literature in the field 
of implementation science, there are many factors which can impact upon successful 
implementation of new safety initiatives (Proctor, Powell and McMillen 2013). Research 
would therefore need to evaluate which factors will influence the implementation of the 
protocol, in order to decide upon the best method. Therefore, there is a need to evaluate 




implementation. Some barriers and enablers to successful implementation have been 
uncovered in this research, yet, these must be analysed in more depth, to determine the 
best method of implementation.  
 
The acceptability and feasibility of the checking protocol was positive in the interviews. 
There appears to be readiness to adopt change from the radiographers. Yet, due to the 
number of strategies described in the literature and the difficulty discerning and 
differentiating improvement or implementation strategies, the proposal of the best method 
of implementation is beyond the scope of this thesis but is a strong avenue of future 
research. It is likely that successful implementation and sustainability would involve some 
behavioural change techniques (Michie et al. 2013), alongside continued involvement from 
end users in the continuing development (Taylor et al. 2013). The literature has proposed 
the important role of middle managers (Birken, Lee and Weiner 2012 and Russ et al. 2015) 
and the protocol evaluation interviews in this research, suggested that they were willing to 
lead change. It may also be interesting and worthwhile to conduct a comparative study of 
methods of implementation. Comparison and evaluation of the different methods of 
implementation can lead to recommendations regarding the best method of 
implementation for other quality improvement initiatives in radiotherapy.  There is also a 
need to understand if long term change surrounding the final treatment check is feasible 
and how to sustain the change in checking method that this protocol would involve. This 
could involve explicitly measuring the factors believed to contribute to QI sustainability, as 
summarised in table 3.3, prior to implementation, in order to target improvement on 
weaker areas of the system to optimise the sustainability. It is recognised, that despite the 
evidence-base for the success of this new checking protocol presented in this thesis, the key 
to the success of any SOP lies in the successful implementation process. 
 
It is suggested that Normalisation Process Theory be applied to the implementation of this 
new final treatment check protocol. This is because there is a growing interest in applying 
this model to healthcare interventions, and as such, use of the NPT can not only add to the 
literature on radiotherapy practice, but also the literature on use of NPT (McEvoy et al. 
2013). Furthermore, NPT provides a conceptual model and toolkit on which to base 




adherence over a long period of time from initial implementation, to when it becomes fully 
‘normalised’ or integrated into everyday practice (May et al. 2009 and May et al. 2010).   
This longitudinal study would be beneficial for allowing identification of any required 
modifications to the protocol in the future and informing the design of future radiotherapy 
safety initiatives also. 
11.5.3 Impact on error 
The protocol is designed to prevent treatment errors, therefore valuable long term research 
into pre and post implementation error rates would assist in the evaluation of the checking 
protocol designed. The literature review into radiotherapy error rates presented in this 
thesis, suggested that more research into error rates is required, and with this more 
evaluation can be done into where and how errors occur, in order to help understand how 
to design out errors elsewhere in the system.  
11.5.4 Software design and testing 
Another major output from this body of research was the finding that the interface design is 
not optimal to support the final treatment check. This research has presented design 
recommendations surrounding the interface design. However, for experimental purposes 
this made use of simple static visual display without input from the user. This would need to 
be explored on a larger, and more in depth scale, with the manufactures of the software, in 
order for this line of research to be have real patient benefit. Therefore, there is need for 
further development and research to explore the potential for the interface to work in 
tandem with the protocol to improve the accuracy of the final treatment check. 
11.5.5 Education and professional development 
A few additional potential lines of research have emerged through the course of this 
research. The research has suggested that there is scope for an increase in patient safety 
and human factors training amongst radiographers. The results of the evaluative interviews 
suggested that the protocol itself does not require specific training; yet human factors 
training may help to ameliorate the negative impact of other factors which impede on the 
accuracy of the final treatment check, and other safety critical areas of radiotherapy. 
Therefore, it would be worthwhile for further research to explore, in depth, the specific 




specific patient safety resources. There are online resources around training healthcare 
professionals in patient safety, from the WHO and Institute of Healthcare Improvement. 
However, something more formal, and specific to radiotherapy would be beneficial to 
illustrate and highlight the relevance to their practice. 
 
An issue closely related to patient safety training, which this research touched upon, is the 
issue of vigilance and safety awareness decreasing with experience. It would be interesting 
to explore if there is a difference in awareness and attitude at difference time points in 
radiographers careers, for instance, between first year and final year of training or after 
qualification and five years post-qualification.  
11.6 Concluding remarks 
This research revealed many factors which can have a negative influence on the accuracy of 
the final treatment check in radiotherapy. Involuntary automaticity was a key issue, 
alongside many other factors which had either a direct or indirect negative impact on 
attention during repeated final treatment checks. Therefore, an evidence-based and 
theoretically driven protocol, and interface design recommendations, for use immediately 
prior to beam delivery were developed. To take a participant’s words, the protocol and 
interface recommendations are “a speedbump to automation” during repeated final 
treatment checks. This protocol is currently an unfinished patient safety innovation 
requiring further development and exploration of the best method of implementation to 
achieve its full benefit and sustainability. This new SOP will require behaviour change from 
radiographers in order to ensure its success. It is known that behaviour change is the 
greatest challenge in successful implementation of QI initiatives. Yet, two of the factors with 
the greatest negative impact on implementation are negative attitudes and a lack of 
engagement with the new QI initiative. Preliminary evaluation of the protocol presented in 
this thesis suggests a positive engagement with, and attitude towards the protocol, in the 
majority of end users. Therefore, it is envisaged that with the correct process of 
implementation, the adherence rate to the new SOP will be high. 
 
The ultimate risk of radiotherapy treatment errors is because the final defence against error 




undetected during final treatment checks due to involuntary automaticity, or human error 
due to a disruption in attention. In accordance with a systems based approach to error, 
either the prior defences need to strengthen or the human supported to conduct the task 
effectively. Whilst it is recognised that this body of research is not a definitive answer to 
how to make the final treatment checks infallible, it has provided a protocol which details 
the best method of checking to increase the likelihood of error detection and 
recommendations intended to reduce some of the latent and error producing conditions in 
the wider system. Errors at the point of the final treatment check are rare, yet they can 
cause significant and potentially fatal harm to patients, therefore implementation of the 
recommendations presented in this thesis into radiotherapy practice, will go some way 
towards preventing patient harm. In the words of Reason, which are appropriate to end this 
discussion on: 
“We can’t change the human condition but we can change the condition under which 
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Appendix 6: Exploratory interviews: Themes, subthemes and categories 
Theme 
 
Sub-theme Category Frequency 







Lack of standardised 
protocol 





Students unaware of protocol 
 




5 0 0 5 
Would like standardised 
protocol 
8 2 0 6 






11 3 1 7 








7 0 1 6 
Resistance to change Balance needed between time 
taken to do check and safety 
 
3 1 1 1 
Seniors more stubborn 6 0 2 4 
Protocol must be evidence 
based 
4 1 0 3 
Lack of training in patient 
safety and protocols for 
verification 
No specific patient safety training No specific patient safety 
training on course 
7 2 3 2 




studies to educate 
On-the-job training variance Confusion over who is 
responsible for delivering 
which learning outcome 
4 0 1 3 
Variation in the quality of on-
the-job training 
7 0 1 6 
Verification overlooked during 
training 
No discussion between 
students on local protocols but 
considered beneficial 
4 1 0 3 
The “fear factor” with doing 
verification correctly wanes 
with experience 
7 0 4 3 
Difficulty maintaining 
attention 
Overreliance on technology The computer does it all 9 1 4 4 
Might not notice if computer 
was wrong 
2 0 0 2 
Automaticity Switching roles helps prevent 
automation 
5 3 1 1 
Number overload 3 2 0 1 
Conducting verification on 
auto-pilot 
9 2 0 7 
Need to self- maintain 
attention 
2 2 0 0 
Assumption treatment is correct Less attention paid to 
verification mid- treatment 
10 5 0 5 
Fatigue Requires immense 
concentration 
3 1 1 1 
Job is physically tiring 3 1 1 1 
Boredom due to repetitive nature of 
job 
The job can be monotonous 11 4 1 6 
Same anatomical regions are 
treated on the same machine 
3 0 1 2 
Would prefer machines to mix 
up anatomical regions 
5 2 0 3 
Boredom has an impact on 
recruitment and retention 
















Design Different departments have 
different software which 
requires a period of getting 
used to it 
4 1 2 1 
Monochrome 3 1 0 2 
Font size is too small 5 1 0 4 
Too much information 
displayed 
6 0 0 6 
Active input  If values had to be manually 
input this was considered to 
improve attention 
4 0 2 2 
Working environment Atmosphere “gloomy” treatment rooms 
impact focus 
2 0 0 2 
The impact of music 3 1 0 2 









Pressure from other healthcare 
professionals 
 
2 0 2 0 
Machine breakdowns 3 0 2 1 
Short staffed 3 2 0 1 
Distractions Other staff distracting 11 2 4 4 
Patients distracting 3 1 1 1 
Authority structures and 
team culture 
Senior radiography sets the tone Senior sets the tone 2 0 1 1 
Deference to authority Some seniors are harder to 
speak up against 
8 0 2 6 
Discourage juniors just 
agreeing but hard to avoid 
4 1 1 2 
Culture surrounding verification Commitment to following 
protocol 
11 3 2 6 
Verification not considered 
important by some 
radiographers 






















Appendix 9: Participant instructions for experiments 
Participant instructions for the experiment paradigm 
The experiment you are about to take part in is designed the mimic the work of 
radiographers in real life hospitals. Immediately before they are about to deliver a dose of 
radiotherapy to a patient they must check that the dose details displayed on the 
radiotherapy machine’s interface correspond exactly with what is on the patient’s paper 
prescription. You will conduct the same checks using an exact copy of the interface and 
prescription used in real life hospital departments. These checks are vital to prevent 
administering the incorrect dosage to a patient which can be harmful and sometimes fatal. 
Hence these checks are very important and you must bear this in mind when conducting 
these checks. 
 
This is an example of a prescription sheet and this is an example of the interface. The four 
values you must check and ensure they are the same on both the prescription and 
interface are; energy, monitor units, wedge monitor units and wedge position. To do this 
pick up the first prescription sheet, and swipe the interface to the right to reveal the first 
interface. Check the four values. If you believe them to be correct, sign the prescription 
sheet by writing your initials on the back. Place the prescription sheet to one side and 
swipe the iPad to clear the screen. If you believe there to be an error, do not sign the 
prescription sheet. Do not go back and alter your answer once you have decided if there is 
an error or not. 
 
In between each check you must stand up and walk over to the desk with the Russian 
dolls. Un-stack and arrange the Russian dolls in the height order displayed on the picture 
plan. Once they are in the correct order, turn the picture plan over and restack the dolls. 
Return to the other desk and check the next prescription sheet and interface.  
You must complete a minimum of 60 checks within 45 minutes. This gives you 
approximately 45 seconds per check. For every check you complete over the minimum you 
will receive a reward in the form of a wrapped sweet from a selection. There will be 
between zero and five errors placed randomly in the checks. If you fail to detect an error 
you will lose 2 sweets earnt. If you believe there to be an error when there is not you will 
also lose 2 sweets. Hence you must work quickly but accurately. 
 
Single checking condition 
You will be doing a single check so will check by yourself that the four values are correct. 
Sign the sheet if you think it is correct. Do not sign if you think there is an error. 
Double checking condition 
You will be doing a double check. That means that you must both check at the same time 
that the four values are correct. Do not talk whilst checking. You must both sign or both 
not sign depending on if you think there is an error or not. You must both complete the 
Russian doll task together. 
Challenge-response condition 
You will be conducting what is known as a challenge-response check. One of you is the 
challenger and the other the responder for the duration of the experiment. The challenger 
looks only at the iPad and the responder looks only at the prescription sheets. To check 
the challenger must read out the values one at a time, the responder then looks at the 




prescription sheet. For instance, “Energy:250”. The responder then looks at the paper 
prescription, checks it is correct and if it is, says yes and repeats the value, “Yes, energy 
250”. This is repeated for all 4 values. If all are correct sign the sheet, if not do not sign. 
You must both complete the Russian doll task together. 
 
Challenge-response with role rotation 
You will be conducting what is known as a challenge-response check. One of you is the 
challenger and the other the responder for the duration of the experiment. The challenger 
looks only at the iPad and the responder looks only at the prescription sheets. To check 
the challenger must read out the values one at a time, the responder then looks at the 
prescription sheet, signals agreement by saying yes and repeating the value from the 
prescription sheet. For instance, “Energy:250”. The responder then looks at the paper 
prescription, checks it is correct and if it is, says yes and repeats the value, “Yes, energy 
250”. This is repeated for all 4 values. If all are correct sign the sheet, if not do not sign. 
You must both complete the Russian doll task together. Every 15 minutes you will be told 
to switch roles by the researcher. When told to switch roles whoever was the challenger, 
becomes the responder. Whoever was the responder becomes the challenger. 
 
Challenge-response with varying the order of values 
You will be conducting what is known as a challenge-response check. One of you is the 
challenger and the other the responder for the duration of the experiment. The challenger 
looks only at the iPad and the responder looks only at the prescription sheets. To check 
the challenger must read out the values one at a time, the responder then looks at the 
prescription sheet, signals agreement by saying yes and repeating the value from the 
prescription sheet. For instance, “Energy:250”. The responder then looks at the paper 
prescription, checks it is correct and if it is, says yes and repeats the value, “Yes, energy 
250”. This is repeated for all 4 values. If all are correct sign the sheet, if not do not sign. 
You must both complete the Russian doll task together. Each time you begin the check for 
a new patient you must vary the order in which you read out the four values. 
 
Challenger-response with role rotation and varying the order of values 
You will be conducting what is known as a challenge-response check. One of you is the 
challenger and the other the responder for the duration of the experiment. The challenger 
looks only at the iPad and the responder looks only at the prescription sheets. To check 
the challenger must read out the values one at a time, the responder then looks at the 
prescription sheet, signals agreement by saying yes and repeating the value from the 
prescription sheet. For instance, “Energy:250”. The responder then looks at the paper 
prescription, checks it is correct and if it is, says yes and repeats the value, “Yes, energy 
250”. This is repeated for all 4 values. If all are correct sign the sheet, if not do not sign. 
You must both complete the Russian doll task together. Each time you begin the check for 
a new patient you must vary the order in which you read out the four values. Every 15 
minutes you will be told to switch roles by the researcher. When told to switch roles 
whoever was the challenger, becomes the responder. Whoever was the responder 




































Appendix 15: Protocol evaluation interviews: Themes, sub-themes and categories 








Safer because more 
active 
It’s less passive more active 13 6 7 
Second checker forced to be involved/ remain 
focussed 
   
Verbalised appreciated as they can be sure both 
have checked 
9 3 6 
The clearly defined roles are appreciated 9 3 6 
Time implications Slows the verification down in a good way 6 4 2 
May takes too long  11 6 5 
Worth spending extra time to prevent an error 4 2 2 




Diagram protocol is very different to other work 
instructions. Written can get forgotten. 
5 2 3 
Diagram is clearer than written 6 5 1 
No time to read written protocol 5 2 3 
Written protocol not appealing 4 1 3 
Diagram as a 
permanent visual 
reminder 
Diagram to go on wall near machine 6 3 3 
Diagram protocol as a reminder to glance at as it 
stands out 
9 2 7 
Training benefits of it being visual 5 3 2 
Diagram easy to digest/visual reminder 8 4 4 
Both to be used 
together 
Written needs breaking down into roles    
 Written protocol is clear 6 5 1 
 More likely to adhere with the explanation of why 7 4 3 
 Protecting radiographers from making mistakes 2 0 2 
 Written used when radiographers join department 6 5 1 




new protocol appreciated Standardisation is a good thing and helps when 
moving to a new department 
13 8 5 
Differences between 
now and this protocol 
Similar to what is done now 8 5 3 
No 2nd verbal check currently 7 5 2 
Roles not rotated at the moment/informally rotated 5 4 1 
Values not varied at the moment 8 6 2 
Variation in how verification is done currently 8 2 6 
Implementing into 
practice 
Enforce following through departmental audits and 
training 
9 4 5 
Enforce national following from government 3 0 3 
Gentle/informal introduction/lunchtime seminars 10 6 4 
Explanation of why needed in 
introduction/evidence for it 
7 2 5 
Needs support from seniors 6 1 5 
Trial period needed    
Willingness Would follow protocol 9 4 5 
Resistance from experienced radiographers 14 3 1 
Would get easier with 
time 
Better the more they use it 7 4 3 
New generation will help its continuation 7 4 3 
Future use Need to change habits to ensure longevity 3 0 3 
Would people to continue to check them 
individually? 
3 3 0 
Need to increase accountability 3 0 3 
Extension to other areas of cancer treatment 4 2 2 
Error prevention Would help to 
maintain attention 
Would prevent errors 9 5 4 
Speed bump to automation 4 2 2 
Healthy form of automaticity 2 1 1 
It makes you have to think more 6 4 2 
Switching roles maintains attention 9 4 5 




Both especially beneficial during long treatments 4 2 2 
Issues the protocol 
does not address 
Time pressure and staffing levels 10 5 5 
Distractions still present 13 9 4 
Design of department 4 3 1 
Authority gradients still present 5 2 3 
Human Factors Training still needed 7 5 2 
Secondary benefits Benefits for the 
individual 
Secondary function increasing confidence to speak 
up 
7 3 4 
Students find it useful as an introduction  10 7 3 
Team benefits May increase the perception of verification 
importance/need to be silent during verification 
7 3 4 
Improving relations between team members 3 0 3 
Improves team working 3 0 3 
Design improvements Assistance from 
software to vary the 
order of parameters 
Varying order would be too hard/would forget 13 10 3 
Paper too easy to ignore 3 1 2 
Perhaps tick boxes needed built into software 8 3 5 
Good if interface varies the order 13 8 5 
Software prompt to 
swap roles 
Colour changes to symbolise swap 3 1 2 
Sign in to signify roles have swapped 4 2 2 
Additions to protocol Clearly display all values to be checked at the top on 
protocol 
3 2 1 
Addition of a “patient introduction” check to place 
treatment in context 
7 6 1 
Interface Proposed 
improvements 
Colour of new interface better 3 1 2 
Interface layout aids clarity 9 4 5 
Don’t have to search for values on new interface 10 5 5 
New interface is quicker to use 5 3 2 
Only the required information is present 7 4 3 
Further 
improvements 
Mirror the prescription sheet 2 0 2 





















Appendix 18: Interface questionnaire evaluation 
 
